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Abstract 
 
 
This research constitutes an investigation of unconscious interaction between patient 
and analyst in situations where psyche and soma are in relation.  The literature is 
extensive, but not coherent, and there exists a need for an overall mapping of the 
field.  The project aims to establish a conceptual topography, grounded in Jung’s 
psychoid concept, since this applies to a deeply unconscious realm that is neither 
physiological nor psychological but that partakes of both.   
A methodology based on the conceptual research of Dreher (2000) is employed, 
including: a historical study tracing the evolution of Jung’s ideas, from their 
biological origins in the work of Driesch (1903) and Bleuler (1929), through Jung’s 
own self-investigation in his Red Book work, to his subsequent theoretical 
conceptualisations, to establish a public definition for the psychoid concept; and an 
empirical study, based on expert interviews, to interrogate this definition.  The 
empirical study employs a methodological instrument, developed for this research, for 
identifying clinicians’ private theories relating to psycho-physical experience.  Such 
instrument comprises the process notes for a single session, in which the psychic fact 
and the physical fact are combined, and a set of discussion vertices, derived from 
Sandler (1983), Canestri (2006) and Tuckett (2008), for guiding the interview.  The 
empirical data, constituting the transcripts of the interviews, not the process notes, is 
analysed using grounded theory. 
Comparisons from psychoanalysis are employed at all stages of both studies.   
The results demonstrate that the psychoid concept is valid and clinically useful.  The 
empirical study establishes that clinicians support contrasting views of the 
transference, namely a symmetrical and mutual transference and an asymmetrical and 
hierarchical transference, the former being consistent with Jung’s psychoid concept.  
Unexpectedly, not only Jungians but also some psychoanalysts conceptualised a 
symmetrical transference, albeit employing different terminology.  This adds 
Popperian weight to the research results.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Setting the scene 
The present project is a clinical one, in that it constitutes an investigation of 
unconscious interactions between patient and analyst involving psyche and soma in 
relation.  It addresses a very particular aspect of the body-mind problem, as 
experienced in the analytic consulting room, and hence embraces not merely a 
philosophical or theoretical position but also most especially an empirical one.   
The project is based in clinical experience: not merely in a single analytic case; and 
not just in personal analytic practice, although the project stems from personal 
clinical work as a starting point.  Such clinical origin drew attention to certain 
embodied phenomena, taken by the analyst to reflect the state of the analytic process, 
and has guided but is not the focus of the project, generating at the outset of the 
research the hypothesis that phenomena, combining experiences of body and mind in 
sensation at a psychic level, arise and are communicated to the analyst during periods 
of regression by the patient to states where issues concerning separation and bodily 
integrity are at the forefront.   
A literature study has highlighted a Babel of theories, as well as a lack of clinical 
description, language and elaboration, and has thus shown firstly that the area is not 
well delineated and secondly that it is difficult to establish a conceptual terrain.  At 
the same time, there has been increasing interest in psychoanalytic circles, in recent 
years, on the role played by the body in psychoanalysis, whether in terms of the 
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physical presence of the analyst and their embodied response to the patient or in terms 
of the ways in which the patient perceives and employs their own body in 
communications with the analyst, as evidenced by a proliferation of publications and 
conferences addressing this topic from a wide variety of angles.  In all of these 
instances, a common issue is the question, how are we to think about and understand 
embodiment in psychoanalysis, the talking cure?  There is, therefore, a manifest need 
for a mapping of the area and for specifying a conceptual terrain, and this is what the 
present thesis aims to do.  To achieve this, a methodological instrument suited to the 
research has had to be devised. 
There is a long history to the issue of the relationship of mind and body, reaching in 
the clinical arena back to the beginnings of psychoanalysis and beyond, and the 
present project selects and tracks a single conceptual strand in the clinical debate, 
employing primarily a form of conceptual research as proposed by Dreher (2000), 
having a historical aspect and an empirical aspect.  Jung’s psychoid concept is 
selected as the focus, as a theoretical position relating to an ultimately unknowable 
area that is neither psychological nor physiological but that entrains aspects of both. 
Accordingly, the historical conceptual research is grounded in Jung’s psychoid 
concept, and traces the origination and evolution of the concept to show how a 
present day understanding has developed.  The research locates the origins of the 
concept in the work on Das Psychoid of the biologist and neo-vitalist Hans Driesch 
(1903) around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and follows the 
development of this early thinking into Die Psychoide of Eugen Bleuler (1925), 
director of the Burghölzli from 1898 to 1927.  Jung’s adoption and extension of the 
ideas of both thinkers are set in the context of his own oeuvre and his relationship 
with the psychoanalytic movement.  Trends in his own professional development, and 
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comparisons from the work of other psychoanalytic sources, serve to clarify and 
refine a resultant definition for the psychoid concept, according to Jung.  Elaboration 
and refinement of this definition is achieved by reviewing subsequent developments 
by the post-Jungians having a bearing on the psychoid concept, and by comparison 
with a parallel development by Bion of his proto-mental concept, in order to arrive at 
a contemporary definition.  In this way, the thesis attempts to establish what was in 
Jung’s mind when he conceived and formulated his psychoid concept, and to arrive at 
a set of characteristics to be anticipated in clinical manifestations of psychoid 
processes.   
This historical work does not confine itself, as Dreher would, to a narrow tracing of 
variations in the meaning of the psychoid concept, but also acknowledges influences 
on the thinking of Jung and his followers from other sources, and employs a 
comparative approach based on ideas from other psychoanalysts, most notably Freud 
and Bion.  Comparisons are made continually.  Thus, the project may be seen not 
merely as conceptual research but also as comparative contextual research.   
Apart from the inherent historical interest of such approach, the advantages of a 
comparative contextual model are the ensuing tightening of definitions, something 
that is especially pertinent given the allusive style of writing adopted by Jung 
increasingly, following his Red Book work, in direct contrast to his scientific style in 
his early work on the Word Association Tests.  Rowland (2005, ix) observes that all 
of Jung’s works after World War II “are devoted to finding a form of psychic healing 
that would avert the acting out of the apocalyptic myth”, and so he experimented with 
“kinds of writing in which the word has the power to heal through appeal to more 
than rational understanding”.  Thus, he came to a style combining aesthetic and 
scientific forms in a manner, described by Rowland (ibid., 2-3) as a “literary playing 
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with metaphors”, that seeks not merely to describe the psyche but also to “enact and 
perform it”.  Jung’s terminology is also constantly in flux, as can be seen from the 
fact that, whilst he employs the word ‘psychoid’ in 28 passages in the Collected 
Works, he refers inter alia to a psychoid reflex-instinctual state (1947/1954, par. 385), 
a psychoid system (e.g. 1947/1954, par. 382), psychoid processes (e.g. 1947/1954, 
par. 380), psychoid functions (1947/1954, par. 382), a psychoid factor (e.g. 
1947/1954, par. 417), a psychoid unconscious (e.g. 1955/1956, par. 787), and a 
psychoid archetype (1958, pars. 849/51), as well as describing the archetype as 
having a psychoid nature (e.g. 1958, par. 852), a psychoid property (1952, par. 947), 
a psychoid form (1945/1954, par. 350) and a psychoid essence (1958, par. 854).  
Accordingly, every contextual aid to the development of a precise definition for the 
concept is to be appreciated, whilst at the same time acknowledging that the ultimate 
unknowability of the psychoid unconscious, according to Jung, limits what can be 
said about it. 
Having acquired a current definition for the psychoid concept from the historical 
study, the empirical aspect of the project develops a contemporary view, by means of 
expert interviews as proposed by Dreher.  Here again, it has been necessary to devise 
a suitable methodology.  Whilst Dreher describes the use of semi-structured 
interviews of analysts by analysts to elaborate the meaning and modes of employ of a 
concept, this approach to interviewing was felt likely to yield consciously constrained 
theoretical accounts, and hence to be too limiting for the present task.  Rather, what 
has been sought in this project is a more unconscious formulation, such as arises in 
case discussion in response to clinical material through free association.  Therefore, 
an interview design was formulated based on the process notes for a single session, 
actually the one that prompted early thoughts of the present research, and 
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interviewees were asked to describe their own way of understanding and approaching 
the session, as well as their free associations in the face of the example given.  The 
interviews were recorded, and the transcripts subsequently analysed by grounded 
theory techniques.  It is to be emphasised that the transcripts, and not the process 
notes, constitute the data, and that grounded theory was selected in order to extract 
the personal models or theories of the interviewees, both conscious and unconscious, 
and to generate a set of parameters that could then be compared with the definition 
previously derived from the historical study for the psychoid concept.  The psychoid 
concept was thereby interrogated, by evaluating whether the contemporary views 
obtained from the empirical study matched the historical definition.   
Furthermore, a comparative approach was again adopted, by selecting interviewees 
both from psychoanalysis and from analytical psychology.  Since psychoid 
phenomena are a Jungian conceptualisation and are acknowledged in the language of 
analytical psychology, it was to be anticipated that the analytical psychologists would 
be more likely to generate accounts consistent with the historical psychoid definition.  
By contrast, such phenomena are not recognised in the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, 
and therefore a finding of congruent phenomena, regardless of terminology, from any 
of the psychoanalysts would lend significantly greater weight to the validity of Jung’s 
psychoid concept.  Very surprisingly, some of the psychoanalysts did indeed also 
produce similar results, effectively providing unexpected confirmation of Jung’s 
psychoid concept, in the manner proposed by the philosophy of science of Popper.   
Consequently, the thesis has employed a methodology based generally on Dreher’s 
conceptual research, but modified to suit the present project by: 
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(i) Importing a contextual dimension to the historical study, from the history of 
ideas in twentieth century and from psychoanalysis generally. 
(ii) Interrogating rather than elaborating the selected psychoid concept in the 
empirical study, by undertaking clinical interviews and extracting theory from 
them, using grounded theory, and only subsequently assessing whether the 
extracted theory matches the psychoid concept as derived from the historical 
study. 
(iii) Supplementing the entire conceptual study, both historical and empirical, with 
comparative elements to clarify, push and refine the definitions derived from 
the basic analysis. 
Bifurcations 
The trajectory taken by the research work, and the manner in which at each stage the 
current position influenced the ongoing course of the project is of interest. 
Having selected Jung’s psychoid concept as the focus for the study, the work began 
with a review of Jung’s writings on the subject, his main publications being On the 
Nature of the Psyche (1947/1954) and Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting 
Principle (1952).  Hans Driesch (1903) is acknowledged in the former, and a footnote 
directs the reader to Die “Seele” als Elementarer Naturfaktor for an early vitalist 
account of the psychoid.  Following the initial review of Jung’s own works, the 
conceptual line was traced back to its origins in the biological thinking and vitalist 
ideas of both Hans Driesch and Eugen Bleuler.  The former published his accounts of 
Das Psychoid from 1903, and likewise gave lectures, most notably the Gifford 
Lectures, in both English and German on his experimental research that formed the 
basis for his psychoid concept defining body and mind as a unity (Driesch, 
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1907/1908).  The latter also published in both languages, starting with his Die 
Psychoide als Prinzip der Organischen Entwicklung (Bleuler, 1925).  Accordingly, a 
direct trajectory could be developed from these beginnings to Jung’s writings in On 
the Nature of the Psyche, and could be set in the context of ideas current in 
psychoanalysis during the same period.   
As discussed in this thesis, and as evidenced by their correspondence, Jung first 
mentions the psychoid to Freud in their famous 1907 meeting as a suitable 
designation for the unconscious, presumably, given the timing, referring to the 
biological ideas of Driesch (McGuire, 1991, 58).  Based on this biological 
foundation, he goes on to develop a vitalistic understanding of the concept, as 
described in On the Nature of the Psyche to embrace a unified or monistic view of 
body and mind, designated ‘bodymind’ herein.  The evolution of the psychoid 
concept took place in two phases: namely an initial phase, dating from this 1907 
reference, grounded in biology and vitalism and addressing the relationship of body 
and mind; and a later phase, dating from 1937, associated with quantum physics and 
addressing the relationship of mind and matter.  Thus, Jung’s mature work links the 
psychoid concept with synchronicity, his earliest recorded discussions of 
synchronicity arising in his Dream Seminars, when he developed a line of thinking 
from internal and external events that ‘synchronize’, to the notion of ‘synchronism’ in 
Eastern forms of thinking, to his invention of the term ‘synchronicity’ to cover 
coinciding but unconnected events (Jung, 1928-1930).  Subsequently, Jung began his 
collaboration with the Nobel prize winning physicist, Wolfgang Pauli, who suggested 
in 1937 that “modern physics offers a symbolic representation of psychic processes” 
(Meier, 2001, 19); and in 1947/8 in letters to Jung, and an unpublished essay, giving 
rise to two lectures to the Zurich Psychological Club on Kepler, that “background 
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physics” is of an archetypal nature affording both psychological interpretation and a 
basis in modern physics (ibid., 32-35, 180).  Thus, together they conceived a basis for 
the psychoid concept in quantum physics, as described in Synchronicity: An Acausal 
Connecting Principle, covering a panpsychic view of mind and matter generally. 
At this point, it became apparent that Jung’s account of the psychoid is derived from 
biology insofar as it concerns a monistic view of the body-mind issue, and from 
physics insofar as it concerns a panpsychic view of the matter-mind issue, and that 
chronologically he moved from the former to the latter.  More especially, this move 
took him from a vitalistic base, wherein the origins of consciousness are embedded in 
living, organic matter, to an unus mundus embracing mind and inorganic as well as 
organic matter.  Although he presented his later ideas on the psychoid concept as an 
extension of his earlier ones, he did not offer an explanation for the traverse from the 
field of biology, applicable to his earlier thinking on the psyche-soma, to the field of 
physics, covering his later ideas on synchronicity.  Actually, once he adopted his later 
thinking, he then applied it ex post facto to his understanding of the relation between 
body and mind, but he still omits an explanation for applying a principle from physics 
to a biological issue.   
It was also apparent that Jung’s earlier understandings of the psychoid and his later 
understandings of synchronicity are conceptually different.  The former is considered 
as a teleological ordering factor immanent as potential in the stuff of the organism 
and creating an emergent dynamic by which the life process of the organism unfolds, 
as discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  The latter, by contrast, is considered as a 
form of knowledge or meaning arising when two or more events that are not causally 
related nonetheless have a meaningful connection.  The latter may arguably 
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supervene on the former, but not underpin it, whereas the former may be usefully 
investigated without reference to the latter.   
As is apparent from the literature discussed in Chapter 2, this same separation occurs 
also in the post-Jungian community, both theoretical and most especially clinical.  
Writers, such as Dieckmann (1974, 1976, 1980), Clark (1996, 2006), Merchant 
(2006) and Stevens (1995), focus primarily on the biological approach to a monistic 
bodymind, whilst others, such as Fordham (1957, 1962), Aziz (1990, 2007), Von 
Franz (1992), Zabriskie (1995), Bright (1997), Meier (2001), Main (2004, 2007), 
Gieser (2005), Hogenson (2005), Cambray (2002, 2004, 2009), Colman (2011), 
Haule (2011), Giegerich (2012), Atmanspacher (2013, 2014), and Connolly (2015) 
focus on an unus mundus embracing mind and matter, synchronicity, the occurrences 
of meaningful coincidences, their unknowability, and their associations with quantum 
physics.  There is truly a proliferation of published work in this second arena, 
including a somewhat nebulous PhD thesis (Cadigan, 2007). 
Accordingly, a conceptual bifurcation exists, both originally in Jung’s work and 
contemporaneously in the post-Jungian community.  For a thorough understanding, it 
was clear that the biological conceptualisation of the psychoid must be explored first, 
before the conceptualisation linked with synchronicity and physics could be 
addressed, and that conflation of both would add an extra layer of complexity to an 
already complicated study, especially in view of the voluminous quantity of research 
and publication in the field of synchronicity.   
The present thesis therefore focuses on one branch only, namely the earlier biological 
origination of the psychoid, and on the effects of these vitalistic roots on an 
understanding of the psychoid concept.  The later branch relating to synchronicity is 
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omitted, for reasons of focus and the reasons given above.  This also means that the 
thesis addresses primarily the forwards trajectory in Jung’s thinking rather than the ex 
post facto reasoning, although it will be apparent in the empirical strand that some 
interviewees at least partially espouse this later viewpoint. 
This was the first and most significant bifurcation that arose in the evolution of the 
project, and it resulted in discarding one possible trajectory in the research.  However, 
others more relevant within the subject of the research followed, and were practically 
useful in setting up a differentiating function, and these were incorporated into the 
research methodology.  
In particular, the data analysis in the empirical strand yielded an interesting 
bifurcation, in that two different models of the transference were located and isolated, 
namely a symmetrical model and an asymmetrical model
1
, and were primarily but not 
completely aligned respectively with the different interviewee groupings of analytical 
psychologists and psychoanalysts.  The symmetrical model pre-supposes a 
symmetrical field of unconscious interaction between patient and analyst during a 
session, whereas the asymmetrical model assumes that such field is weighted in the 
direction from the patient to the analyst.  Analysts operating with a symmetrical 
model consider that patient and analyst contribute equally to an undifferentiated field 
of unconscious interaction.  Of course, the fact that the analyst has had a training 
analysis, and is therefore better able to process and discriminate his own material, 
means that there is inequality in the analytic dyad at a personal and more conscious 
level, but nevertheless the unconscious field may be described as symmetrical.  
Analysts operating with an asymmetrical model consider the field between patient 
                                                 
1
 The concept of bi-logical structures, including forms of symmetrical and asymmetrical logic, 
according to Matte-Blanco (1988) is acknowledged but, as discussed in Chapter 9, is differentiated 
from the present work. 
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and analyst to be unequal and hierarchical, and for them the focus is on the patient 
and the patient’s unconscious, the patient being seen as projecting onto or into the 
analyst, and the analyst whilst seeking to discriminate out their own material before 
making interpretations nonetheless viewing the dynamic primarily as being generated 
by the patient.   
This particular bifurcation has been central in shaping the results of the empirical 
study, and in fact yielded the powerful and unexpected result mentioned above.  
Firstly, the analytical psychologists not only supported the symmetrical model, but 
they also linked it with the psychoid concept, and demonstrated in their 
conceptualisations the embeddedness of the psychoid concept in current practise.  The 
psychoanalysts, for whom there was a significantly lower probability of support for a 
similar conceptualisation, albeit employing alternative terminology, surprisingly 
produced powerful validating evidence for it.  Thus, this test in fact yielded an 
unexpected Popperian confirmation of the psychoid concept.  This is the primary 
finding of the present research. 
A further bifurcation manifested itself in the empirical strand as a result of these 
comparisons, namely that between a teleological organising function representing 
normal development through life, and a chaotic fragmentation associated with 
psychosis, respectively associated in the empirical study with the symmetrical and 
asymmetrical fields of unconscious interaction.  In the historical study, it became 
apparent that while Jung does acknowledge dissociation in his clinical work, and of 
course dementia praecox or schizophrenia in his early works, nonetheless he was 
generally more interested in the teleological view and individuation.  This carried 
over into the empirical study, in which by and large the analytical psychologists 
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conveyed more interest in questions of organisation and emergence, while the 
psychoanalysts focused more on questions of splitting and schizoid states.   
This thesis argues therefore as a secondary finding that there are lacunae in Jung’s 
ideas insofar as clinical applications are concerned, and that his account of his 
psychoid concept, whilst offering a foundation for understanding the purposiveness of 
individuation, lacks the detail for supporting clinical work in borderline states.  To 
address these lacunae, reference may be had to Bion for comparison, firstly because 
of a strong similarity between his proto-mental concept and Jung’s psychoid concept 
in terms of understandings of the relationship between body and mind, and next 
because Bion focuses with his concept on psychotic functioning.  Contextually, the 
experiential influences informing both concepts, as opposed to the theoretical ones, 
can be traced to WW1, and the difference of focus between the two concepts may at 
least partially be understood in terms of the utterly different war experiences of the 
two men.   
One point needs addressing here.  Neither of the two concepts, psychoid and proto-
mental, occupies a central place in the overall published work of their respective 
author.  However, there is evidence, as shown in this thesis, that both concepts are 
increasingly becoming seen as clinically significant, and are actually of fundamental 
importance.   
Apart from these main bifurcations, others of a more minor nature also arose during 
the course of the project, and were likewise adopted into the methodology, as follows: 
instinctive and spiritual understandings of the archetype; developmental and 
archetypal experience; an organising function and chaotic confusion; concrete 
behaviour and symbolic capacity; and the individual and the group.  Whilst the initial 
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bifurcation of body-mind and mind-matter required a definitive choice for practical 
reasons of research capacity, the later ones presented themselves as differentiating 
aspects of the research work, to be evaluated and discussed in each instance, as aids 
to clarification and definition, appearing first in the historical strand of the research 
and later in varying guises in the empirical strand. 
Chapters 
This thesis presents the research in eleven chapters, starting with the present one 
setting the context of the project and outlining its trajectory.   
Chapter 2 describes the methodology employed in this project, in the form of 
conceptual research, based on Dreher, including both a historical strand setting the 
psychoid concept in an historical context, and an empirical strand involving 
interviews with practising clinicians for interrogating the psychoid concept.  A 
critique of Dreher’s approach sets the scene for an account of the present 
methodological model, wherein the historical strand follows the history of ideas, 
referring generally to primary neo-vitalist sources and Jung to generate a public 
definition of Jung’s psychoid concept, and the empirical strand is based on individual 
interviews with 12 clinicians, and a small group discussion with 6 discussants, in 
order to elicit the private theories of the participants, thereby to interrogate Jung’s 
psychoid concept.  An instrument designed for these interviews is described with 
reference to Canestri (2006) and Tuckett (2008).   
Chapter 3 is a review of the literature relating to embodiment in the consulting room, 
giving a brief account of the main published theories and clinical cases in analytical 
psychology and psychoanalysis.  This review exposes a complete lack of theoretical 
unity, and both linguistic and descriptive conceptual confusion, in such accounts, and 
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demonstrates the need for an over-arching concept, such as the psychoid, addressing 
body and mind in clinical work.   
Chapter 4 introduces the detailed historical strand of the research, by tracing the 
biological origins and vitalistic development of Jung’s psychoid concept, based on 
the work of Driesch and Bleuler, set in the context of early debates between analytical 
psychology and psychoanalysis, which distinguish Jung’s basic methodological 
approach to psychoanalysis from that of Freud.  This provides a backdrop to Jung’s 
account of the psychoid in On the Nature of the Psyche, to yield an initial public 
definition for the psychoid concept (1947/1954). 
Chapter 5 considers the psychoid concept in certain research contexts, including 
Jung’s own self-experimentation and his initial theoretical conceptualisations 
foreshadowing the concept.  Early texts, including The Red Book, and two papers 
published, respectively, in 1916 and 1928 are reviewed for this purpose.  A 
concurrent collective experiment by Jung with the aid of his contemporaries and 
analysands is brought in by reference to biographical accounts.  This background 
provides an hermeneutic context for his psychoid concept, yielding additional 
vitalistic understandings of the same, and further verification is afforded in later 
clinical research by The Berlin Group.  This account will demonstrate that two key 
themes arose from such experimental researches, relating respectively to the notions 
of: 
(i) A dialectic of undifferentiation/differentiation as aspects of individuation 
(ii) The transference 
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and that both themes are pertinent to a contemporary understanding of Jung’s 
psychoid concept.  This results in a refined definition of the characteristics of the 
psychoid, as a product of the historical strand of the present research.   
Chapter 6 compares Jung’s psychoid concept with Bion’s proto-mental concept, 
considering common influences on the thinking of the two men and noting that their 
concepts have aspects in common in an underlying psychosomatic matrix.  Starting 
from Bion’s wartime experience and his work at the Tavistock Clinic, the 
development of his ideas is traced, in the light of his group work, and later conceptual 
shift into individual psychoanalysis with respect to the nature of psychosis, projective 
mechanisms, and identification.  The question whether the conceptual development of 
his proto-mental concept extends also into his notion of alpha and beta functioning is 
contemplated, noting the assertions of some psychoanalysts, e.g. Grotstein (2007), to 
this effect.  A public definition of Bion’s proto-mental concept thus generated is 
compared with the public definition of Jung’s psychoid concept from the previous 
chapter, in order to clarify the ambit of the psychoid concept.     
Chapter 7 introduces the empirical strand of the research, starting with a review of the 
question of the relationship between theory and practice, by reference to the literature 
on the nature of implicit or private theories of the analyst at work.  This leads into an 
account of the interview process employed in the project, including the selection of 
interviewees, the management of the interviews themselves, and an example of the 
use of grounded theory for the data analysis of one interview subject.  This example 
demonstrates the manner in which the empirical work yields (a) emergent metaphors 
and private theory for each interviewee, and (b) conceptualisations of the interviewee 
relating to embodiment in analysis.  It also shows the relation of the same with public 
theory.  
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Chapters 8 and 9 cover the overall results of the data analysis, relating these 
respectively back to the two themes mentioned in Chapter 5.   
More especially, Chapter 8 addresses the question of ‘analytic method’ according to 
the private theories of the various interviewees, considering key themes of the method 
as contemplated by the different interviewees, with respect to a dialectic between 
unconscious and conscious processes, for comparison with Jung’s notion of 
undifferentiation and differentiation underpinning the individuation process.  This 
commences an evaluation of the extent to which the various private theories of the 
interviewees conform with Jung’s psychoid concept, whether or not employing 
congruent language, and it is argued here that the initial results validate the notion of 
a dialectic between undifferentiation and differentiation, according to Jung, and in all 
cases validate a notion of individuation, according to Jung, and thus support certain 
aspects of Jung’s psychoid concept. 
Chapter 9 isolates the transference models according to the private theories of the 
various interviewees, noting two key views emerging from the interviews, namely the 
contrasting notions of a symmetrical and mutual transference field and an 
asymmetrical and hierarchical transference field.  The chapter classifies the findings 
into: 
(i) Those that envisage a symmetrical field consistent with the psychoid concept, 
mainly from Jungian interviewees who have applied and moulded the 
psychoid concept in their own practices. 
(ii) Those of certain of the psychoanalysts who conceive aspects of their clinical 
work similarly, whilst yet employing different language and a different 
theoretical base. 
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(iii) Those that envisage an asymmetrical transference field based around the 
notion of projective identification, in contrast or conflict with the psychoid 
concept, mainly from certain psychoanalysts.   
Some interviewees combine features from both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
viewpoints, and these results are highlighted, in order to demonstrate the ways in 
which clinicians may in their private lived theories combine elements from different 
public theories, even to the point of introducing internal inconsistencies.  It is argued 
that these combinations and the associated inconsistencies are interesting and 
relevant, because they demonstrate that notions of symmetry alone, leading to Jung’s 
psychoid concept, are not sufficient to describe certain clinical situations.  This 
chapter concludes that a pre-mental undifferentiated state arises in bodymind work in 
the analytic consulting room, which is characterised in the approaches of both 
psychoanalysts and Jungian analysts by a symmetrical transference field.  For the 
Jungians, this leads to Jung’s psychoid concept.   
Chapter 10 compares the empirical findings and the previously established historical 
findings, and demonstrates that Jung’s notion of a psychoid concept holds valid in 
present day clinical work.  Further, by comparing and contrasting the different 
conceptual models from the empirical strand, noting the bifurcations between them 
and highlighting the distinctions, it is argued that the findings from psychoanalysis 
fill in lacunae in the Jungian approach.  In this respect, the views of two interviewees 
(S3(AP) and S10(PA)) are noted specifically, since they elaborate respectively on 
Jung’s psychoid concept and Bion’s proto-mental concept in ways that are implied 
but not clearly evidenced in the primary sources in the published literature.  This 
integration, thus, both yields and validates a current understanding of the psychoid 
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concept as a main finding, with an acknowledgement of the value of Bion’s proto-
mental concept as a further finding.   
Chapter 11 then evaluates the research, its findings, its benefits and its limitations.  
Finally, this chapter reviews the ambit of the research, and proposes avenues for 
further research.   
Summary 
Accordingly, and significantly, this thesis demonstrates the validity and clinical 
usefulness of Jung’s psychoid concept today, seen as a deeply unknowable aspect of 
the unconscious, manifest in the transference by a symmetrical field, an emergent 
dynamic, and in the countertransference by phenomena combining body and mind in 
sensation at a psychic level, often during periods of regression by the patient to 
primitive states of mind.  Not only does the thesis show that the concept is valid and 
of relevance to the Jungian practitioner, which might be expected given their 
familiarity with Jung’s work, but that amongst the psychoanalysts there are those who 
also conceive their work in a similar way.  Therefore, most importantly, this thesis 
demonstrates the significance today of the pyschoid concept both theoretically and 
clinically.   
Further, as a secondary finding, the research demonstrates the need for additional 
conceptual clarification in the arena of psychotic processes, and shows that this may 
be obtained from Bion’s proto-mental concept and his detailed elaboration of the 
clinical conditions arising in relation to patients in these primitive states of mind. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
The methodology employed in this project is a conceptual research in the field of 
psychoanalysis
2
, as proposed by Dreher (2000).  The present chapter first reviews 
Dreher’s account, and then describes the methodology in the light of her ideas. 
According to Dreher, conceptual research has for its aim the systematic clarification 
of analytic concepts, by tracing their origin and history, as well as their current use.  
She proposes that a conceptual study may employ a number of strands, including, for 
example: 
(i) An investigation of the historical context of a concept’s origins. 
(ii) A comparison of the history of the concept viewed against changes in 
psychoanalytic theory. 
(iii) A study of the current use of the concept in clinical practice. 
(iv) A critical discussion and formulation of proposed further/different uses for the 
concept. 
Steps 1 and 2 reconstruct the past in order to trace modifications of the original 
concept, and identify ambiguities that have arisen in the course of its evolution.  
Historical and archival research, especially when based on primary data and sources, 
                                                 
2
 It is to be noted that in this thesis, for simplicity, the term psychoanalysis is employed to refer both to 
the field of psychoanalysis as conceived by Freud and to the field of analytical psychology as 
conceived by Jung, except where a specific distinction is made.   
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may be employed for this purpose, in order to elicit information concerning the 
origination and development of a psychoanalytic concept.  Re-formulations of 
concepts obtained thus may then assist in clarifying their public meanings, as 
contained in the general literature and as thereby discussed and expanded within the 
psychoanalytic community.  In the course of this process, researchers can pick up and 
highlight deviations in a concept from a practically useful trajectory, as well as 
inconsistencies in its application.   
Step 3 constructs a present day picture of the clinical application of the concept, in 
order to demonstrate how it is actually being used clinically as opposed to 
theoretically, and requires an empirical research technique, such as expert interviews 
with practising clinicians.  This may throw into relief potential further deviations or 
directions of change, and permit timely clarification.  Step 4 then sifts the previous 
elaborations to develop a practically useful contemporary definition of the concept.   
As Dreher thus makes plain, conceptual research involves tracing and establishing not 
only the various formulations of a concept in the public domain, but also the current 
applications of the same concept in clinical practice.  The importance of this is that 
developments in the actual use of the concept may thereby be integrated into present 
day psychoanalytic knowledge, in order “to formulate its basic scientific concepts 
with increased precision, and progressively so to modify them that they become 
serviceable and consistent over a wide area” (Freud, 1915, 117-8).  Essentially, 
Dreher is arguing for increased discrimination of psychoanalytic concepts, both for 
enhancing clinical understanding and for advancing theoretical knowledge. 
She gives two examples, namely the Hampstead Index Project for the clarification of 
Freudian psychoanalytic concepts undertaken from early 1950s to 1970s at the 
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Hampstead Clinic, and the Trauma Project conducted by a research team of 
psychoanalysts (of whom Dreher was one) at the Sigmund Freud Institute in 
Frankfurt in 1980s into the concept of psychic trauma.  These examples inform the 
present project, and will therefore be discussed by way of illustration.  
Hampstead Index Project 
The Hampstead Index Project was initiated by Anna Freud and her followers in the 
Freudian Group in the early 1950s, after the ‘Controversial Discussions’ and 
following the division of the British Psychoanalytical Society into three sections, and 
was directed by Joseph Sandler from 1956 to the 1970s.   
It was not designed as a research project, but rather as an attempt to create a 
comprehensive system of classification from case material recorded by clinic 
therapists, who were expected to document their daily analytic work by means of 
weekly reports of the phenomena observed and two-monthly summaries of the course 
of treatment.  An Index Working Group of therapists and supervisors was created and 
given the task of: first breaking the material from fifty cases down into units of 
observation or clinically relevant episodes and noting the dynamics, such as 
resistance, defence etc.; and then constructing categories, using a mixture of concepts 
influenced by Anna Freud and literary research, as a basis for classification.  Because 
of over-determination of the material, a cross referencing system had also to be 
devised.   
The selection of units of observation and the assignment of categories turned out to be 
more complex than initially envisaged, and later stages of the classification often 
involved re-consideration of the earlier clinical observations and then re-adaptation of 
the subsequent theoretical frames of reference.  Frequently, gaps in understanding 
22 
 
 
 
arose, and questions concerning concepts could not be answered, and these were 
recorded in ‘problem charts’ for later consideration.  As a result, it was decided 
eventually to set up, in addition to the Index Group, a Concept Group, whose task 
was the clarification of concepts.   
The outcome was a classification of data under two main headings, namely General 
case material including background and biographical information, and 
psychoanalytic material including clinical categories and sub-categories.  A fully 
indexed case took the form of a set of Index cards, each containing one main category 
plus the respective sub-categories and cross-references, plus a clinical vignette 
illustrating the category, and page referencing to the original case report.  An 
additional set of cards contained the ‘problem charts’, highlighting gaps and queries 
relating to certain of the concepts. 
By a process of evolution, the Hampstead Project thus came to acquire the 
characteristics of conceptual research, involving as it did a multi-stage procedure 
including the collection of empirical case data, the systematic analysis of such data in 
co-operation with the treatment analyst into units of observation, categories and sub-
categories, the production of problem charts, group discussion reflecting on both 
indexing and concepts, and constant re-workings of each step of the analysis and 
conceptual classification.  The group aspect of the discourse, according to Dreher, 
was crucial as critical reflection for achieving consensus, or at least a full elaboration 
of dissenting views.   
Over time, the Concept Group took on a role in formulating the historical 
reconstruction of Freudian concepts.  Surveys of the relevant literature were put 
together, and manuals were compiled to provide comprehensive definitions.  This 
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revealed a continual necessity both for re-indexing parts of the case material and for 
re-working the definitions of the concepts in the manuals, in order to achieve 
conceptual precision.   
As Dreher notes, the Hampstead Project focused on multiple key concepts in the 
Freudian lexicon.  One thing it did not take into account was the relationship between 
theory and practice, and thus there was no reflection on the way that concepts are 
actually employed in the consulting room.  This issue was specifically addressed in 
the Trauma Project. 
Trauma Project  
The Trauma Project originated in the early 1980s under the instigation of Joseph 
Sandler, and was conducted by a team of six psychoanalysts meeting twice weekly 
and working in co-operation with him.  By contrast with the Hampstead Project, the 
Trauma Project was designed as a research project from the outset, having as its aim 
an examination of the scope of one single analytic concept, namely psychic trauma, 
which was selected for its historical significance, and for the fact that it had multiple 
clinical meanings attached to it (Dreher, 2000, 127).  At the time, Sandler’s 
reflections
3
 on conceptual change attributed flexible dimensions of meaning to 
psychoanalytic concepts, with conceptual expansion taking place in the context of 
clinical experience.  He envisaged practitioners developing subjective meaning spaces 
for concepts on a case by case basis, at first implicitly in the sense that this would be 
outside their conscious awareness
4
.  Differentiation of the dimensions of these 
subjective meaning spaces to render them explicit would then enable psychoanalytic 
                                                 
3
 Later published as Sandler, J.  (1983). 
4
 Throughout the present chapter, the term ‘implicit’ is employed in a general sense to mean: not 
wholly consciously developed, being half-formed or even initially unconscious, and thus not 
elaborated.  In a later chapter, a more detailed discussion of the question of implicit theories is 
undertaken. 
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concepts to be delineated more completely and with greater precision in all their 
complexity.  Such conceptual extensions could thus be absorbed into acknowledged 
theoretical understandings, and deviations highlighted for consideration. 
In this context, a three-phase research model was designed, including: 
(i) A general literature analysis; 
(ii) Interviews of psychoanalysts by psychoanalysts; 
(iii) Discussion and evaluation in the project group. 
In phase I, the research team elaborated the public meanings for the concept, by 
reviewing the concept of trauma in different theoretical models, including Freud’s 
original account, the notion of trauma in infant development, the impact of trauma on 
psychic structure, the link between external events and unconscious fantasy, and 
cases of extreme traumatisation in war.  The result was a complex and confused 
picture.  The data collection of phase II took the form of ten semi-structured 
interviews by members of the research team, in which interviewees were asked, 
without specifying any delimitation of the term trauma, to give a spontaneous 
presentation of three terminated trauma cases.  Each interview gradually progressed 
from a case-oriented discussion to a concept-oriented one, by creating a dialogue with 
the interviewee around the history and dynamics associated with the specific reported 
trauma, and seeking their reflections on the conceptualisations that they voiced, 
thereby encouraging developing theorisation.  Transcripts of the interviews were 
produced, and were then discussed in detail and evaluated in the regular group 
meetings in phase III, with the aid of theoretical understandings already reached from 
the literature analysis.  In these discussions, the group first identified those statements 
that were part of the officially recognised versions of the trauma concept, and then 
25 
 
 
 
they focused on conceptual extensions that were not explicit but could be deduced.  In 
this way, they worked towards identifying the implicit assumptions and 
conceptualisations of the interviewed analyst, and to establish how the subjective 
meaning space of each analyst relating to the concept of trauma was structured in all 
its complexity.   
As Dreher (2000, 141) observes, interviews of psychoanalysts by psychoanalysts 
“allowed researchers to track down ‘half-formed notions and beliefs’ (implicit 
conceptualisation processes) relating to the trauma concept, and to encourage the 
reporting analyst to voice more explicit reflections”.  Emergence was thus an 
important factor, since: 
[W]hile practising analysts let their clinical behaviour be guided by their 
implicit assumptions, their use of concepts only becomes manifest to them … 
in all its relevant aspects once it is put into words. 
… In the interviews themselves, explicit statements and hidden implicit 
assumptions were, of course, closely connected.  (Ibid., 141-2) 
Similarly to the uncovering of unconscious material in the psychoanalytic process, the 
researchers found that implicit material was brought to light by the research process, 
and a more differentiated view of the concept could be determined.  Dreher (ibid., 
166) suggests that an important aspect of this project was the teamwork that enabled 
the group to achieve a systematic and comprehensive clarification of the trauma 
concept. 
Her account of the Trauma Project highlights the way in which implicit assumptions 
guide the clinical behaviour of the analyst, until these are made consciously explicit, 
and highlights too how different dimensions of meaning may be associated 
subjectively with any particular concept.  For trauma, for example, the dimensions of 
meaning crystallised into characteristics attributed under the headings: the traumatic 
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situation, whether event or fantasy, the consequences of trauma including intra-
psychic changes both immediate and long-term, the pre-disposition for trauma, and 
the treatment approach for trauma patients, as well as the interplay between these 
various categories.  It was noted that, both in the literature and in the interviews, the 
term trauma tended to be used in an undifferentiated way without discriminating 
between these various meaning dimensions, and that the research project 
discriminated different aspects of the concept and increased the conceptual clarity 
significantly.   
This lack of linguistic clarity is one of the factors indicating a significant need 
generally for conceptual research in psychoanalysis, and more specifically in the field 
of this project.  And, the Trauma Project was designed as a pilot study offering a 
methodological approach for doing such research. 
Some conceptual reflections 
Dreher does not specifically relate these two examples to the methodological steps 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter, but we may assume in each case that the 
literature review constitutes Steps 1 and 2 providing an understanding of the 
historical origins (here the Freudian origins) of the concept and charting the course of 
its subsequent development.  In the Hampstead Project, the literature review and 
history were narrowly focused on the conceptual views of Anna Freud and the 
Freudian Group emerging from the ‘Controversial Discussions’, although the project 
covered a range of key psychoanalytic concepts.  By contrast, in the Trauma Project, 
the literature review was drawn widely across different fields of psychological trauma 
but only one concept was considered. 
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The empirical strand of Step 3 differed considerably in each case.  In the Hampstead 
Project, case reports, closely linked with primary data in the form of process notes, 
were systematically broken down into units of observation, these units were 
systematically sorted into categories and sub-categories for classification, conceptual 
ambiguities were systematically recorded in problem charts, and, significantly, a 
hermeneutic circle of conceptual reflection and feedback involving continual re-
division of the case reports into revised units of observation and re-assignment of the 
updated units into new categories and sub-categories, all contributed to a formulation 
of the current use of the concepts in clinical practice.  Step 4 involving critical 
discussion and evaluation took place during this process on an ongoing basis. 
Although grounded theory had not by that time been discovered, its discovery being 
attributed to Glaser & Strauss (1967), nevertheless the techniques of breaking data 
down into units, extracting categories, and cross-referencing them to formulate 
theory, together with repeated feedback steps to clarify and refine the previous results 
are remarkably similar to the grounded theory techniques of coding, organising the 
results by forming clusters of codes and relationships between them, and developing 
conceptual categories and generating theory from them.   
In the Trauma Project, semi-structured interviews by experts (practising analysts) 
supplied the empirical data furnishing the material both for studying current 
applications of the trauma concept (Step 3) and for evaluating further directions of 
development for such concept (Step 4).  The interviews were designed to start from 
case presentation, and move towards theory.  The discussions by the research group 
combining both Step 3 and Step 4 are noted generally above, but a precise 
methodology for generating their eventual formulations is not disclosed by Dreher. 
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One point that she makes, however, in both cases, is the value of teamwork for this 
kind of research.  Apart from the fact that individual research must necessarily have 
more limited aims, she argues that group work avoids the possibility of personal bias 
inadvertently distorting the research process or the results.  Teamwork is more likely 
to ensure that important clues are not overlooked, and the discourse between 
members of a research group can be expected to resolve conflicts and lead to a 
coherent result more effectively.  
Present research 
This project concerns embodiment in psychoanalysis, and, accordingly, starting from 
a Jungian base, begins with Jung’s psychoid concept, since it is through this concept 
that he brings body and mind into relationship in  a deeply unconscious set of 
processes immanent in the underlying matrix of the organism.  Thus, the present work 
constitutes a conceptual research into the psychoid concept.  
In this project, Dreher’s model is followed, including both historical and empirical 
conceptual studies of the psychoid concept, but with some modifications to her 
schema to adapt it to the present area of study.  One such departure is to incorporate 
an extra strand in the empirical aspect of the study, in order to interrogate the value 
and validity of the psychoid concept, as well as elaborating its contemporary 
meaning.  
By contrast with Dreher, this project is a piece of individual research, since it is not 
practical within the confines of a PhD to undertake the kind of group work described 
with reference to the Hampstead Project and the Trauma Project.  Nonetheless, it is 
believed that useful results can still be obtained, as discussed below. 
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1. Historical Study 
Having regard to Dreher’s Steps 1 and 2 set out in the introduction, this thesis 
commences with a general literature review addressing the question of the body in the 
consulting room, in terms both of embodiment in the analysand in the analytic work 
and of embodiment in the analyst in the countertransference.  Such review covers the 
main published psychoanalytic theories and clinical cases pertaining to this area, and 
demonstrates that it is not a well delineated area, since there is a lack of description, 
lack of common language and lack of theoretical unity on the subject of embodiment 
in analysis.  It is therefore difficult to establish a conceptual terrain for the area, 
especially for the notion of ‘embodied’ countertransference, and there exists a need 
for an overall mapping of the field.  This wide historical study serves to set the 
context for the specific focus of the project in the psychoid concept, by which a 
conceptual topography is delineated.     
Employing a more focused historical literature study, the project then explores the 
origins and development of the psychoid concept in Jung’s own thinking in an 
attempt to ascertain what was going on in his mind when he envisaged the concept.  
Commencing from primary sources in the work of the neo-vitalist and biologist Hans 
Driesch, who initially conceived and developed the term psychoid, and of Eugen 
Bleuler, former Director of the Burghölzli Asylum, who later extended and adapted 
the term, the evolution of the concept from its first biological origins is traced.  Jung’s 
development of his own theory is then reviewed, first tracing in the literature his 
specific references to, and accounts of, the psychoid over a period of more than forty 
years, and then filling in the theoretical background with related ideas from some of 
his intervening published work.  Such specific study will continue into an 
30 
 
 
 
investigation of the subsequent public evolution and application of the psychoid 
concept in the post-Jungian community.   
Based on the general literature review, contemporaneous comparisons from Freudian 
and post-Freudian psychoanalysis are brought in at every stage, both to set the context 
for, and to serve as a comparison with, the psychoid concept.  In this respect, an 
additional comparison is brought in from a focused historical review of Bion’s proto-
mental concept, since this at least notionally shares some characteristics with Jung’s 
psychoid concept.  This historical study will yield a contemporary definition of the 
characteristics, or dimensions of meaning, of the psychoid concept derived from 
published sources. 
The historical strand therefore combines both general and specific literature studies, 
and it reviews the wider history of the psychoid concept, both before and after it 
entered psychoanalytic thinking.   
This is in contrast to the Hampstead Project, which is a focused historical 
psychoanalytic study confined to Freudian concepts, based on the writings of Freud 
and the records of the Controversial Discussions, and which addresses a number of 
psychoanalytic concepts.  It is also in contrast to the Trauma Project, which started 
with a general review of the psychological literature on trauma and proceeded to an 
empirical study. 
Although the general and two specific literature studies are all individually 
conducted, the comparative approach ensures that any personal bias cannot 
inadvertently hold sway, because constant and repeated comparisons serve to 
highlight contiguities and differences and to tighten definitions. 
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2. Empirical study 
Next, the project comprises an empirical study, based on a series of individual expert 
interviews, and a small group discussion, with practising clinicians, as proposed 
generally by Dreher.   
However, rather than elaborating the psychoid concept by focusing on it directly, as 
by structured or semi-structured interviews, it is interrogated, by seeking to discover, 
firstly, how the participating clinicians conceptualise a given embodied clinical event 
and whether unprompted they draw links with the psychoid concept.  Secondly, their 
conceptualisations, as derived by data analysis of the transcripts of the interviews 
through grounded theory techniques, are evaluated to establish whether they are 
consistent with the psychoid formulation determined from the historical study.  
Again, comparisons of post-Freudian and post-Jungian psychoanalysts are made.  In 
this way, the empirical study serves both to elaborate and to validate the psychoid 
concept. 
In the Trauma Project, semi-structured interviews were employed to generate data, 
and interviewees were asked to present their own trauma cases and were guided from 
case discussion towards conceptual discussion.  By guiding the interviewees thus, the 
focus is directed towards the concept, namely trauma, and the dynamics of all the 
different cases become subservient to the single concept.   
This project differs in that all the interviewees discuss the same case, without 
imposing any conceptual focus, and may add their own clinical examples or 
theoretical observations for illustration.  Where certain of the Jungians themselves 
bring in the psychoid concept, direct elaborations on the public dimensions of 
meaning already attributed to it can be determined.  Otherwise, by seeking simply to 
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discover how different psychoanalysts from different affiliations conceptualise the 
same event, their theoretical positions are not in any way predetermined, but enable a 
situation to be reached where it is possible to enquire whether their conceptualisations 
match the public dimensions of meaning for the psychoid concept already determined 
from the historical strand of the research.  This is what is meant by the assertion that 
the psychoid concept is interrogated to evaluate its validity and value. 
a. Methodological instrument  
To achieve this, it was necessary to develop a methodological instrument for the 
interviews. Such instrument includes a single set of process notes, and in addition a 
set of guidelines for discussion, in order to ensure that the interviews generated data 
and did not simply re-create a series of supervisions.  The aim was to design 
guidelines that respect: The patient, the analytic work, and the interviewees, whilst at 
the same time both capturing the fluidity and subtlety of the analytic process and 
avoiding fragmenting the data, through breaking down complex information into 
sections and applying codes without holding and working with the whole in mind, as 
described by Hollway & Jefferson (2000, 68-70).   
Assistance over the design of the guidelines was obtained from the work of Canestri 
(2006) and the EPF working party on theoretical issues, and Tuckett (2008) and the 
EPF working party on comparative clinical methods. 
i. Canestri 
The EPF working party on theoretical issues chaired by Canestri undertook a project 
designed to explore the relationship between clinical practice and theory.  As Canestri 
(2006, 25) writes, the challenge was to locate a methodology that would help to 
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identify in clinical practice the implicit theories of the analyst at work, so that those of 
value could be integrated into future public theory.  To this end, they conceived a 
map of the theories employed by the analyst in clinical work, comprising a set of six 
vectors, as follows:  
(i) A topographical vector, which takes into account influences from all of the 
conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious, in Freud’s topographical 
model.  This covers: common-sense psychological values; cultural values 
including those due to training affiliation; theoretical concepts borrowed from 
other psychoanalytic groups; assumptions linked with other fields, such as 
science, philosophy or language; the significance and use of metaphor; and 
dynamic meta-elements, such as uses of theory in ways that are counter-
psychoanalytic and that indicate repression, resistance, and splitting within the 
analyst. 
(ii) A conceptual vector, which covers the influences of all of psychoanalytic 
knowledge, clinical attitudes, and conceptual models relating to elements, 
such as: theories of change; the selection of meaning; the transference; 
approaches to interpretation; the importance of the first dream; and the 
prioritisation of image or language in the interaction. 
(iii) An action vector relating to the analyst’s actions in his relationship with his 
patient.  This vector includes: his approach to listening in the session; his 
selection of clinical facts that help him give meaning to the patients’ 
utterances; and factors that influence his formulation of something coherent 
for the patient, and his choice of wording for interpretation. 
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(iv) An object relations of knowledge vector, which concerns the analyst’s 
relationship with his theories, and with his own internal theoretical objects.  
Influences here may include his incorporation of, and his attitudes towards, 
the history of psychoanalysis, transgenerational training affiliations, and 
theory.   
(v) A coherence versus contradiction vector, which addresses the analyst’s 
approach to the balance of coherence and contradiction within his own process 
and in his interactions with his patient, and his tolerances of contradiction.  
This vector refers to metaphor as a vehicle for carrying implicit knowledge 
whilst containing contradiction.   
(vi) A developmental vector, which concerns the analyst’s attitude to 
developmental stages/phases, and his level of sophistication in his 
understanding of developmental models. 
The working party conceived this map as a flexible instrument capable of adaptation 
and expansion as a methodological aid in analysing “the private, implicit and 
preconscious theories of the analyst at work”, which instrument would lead from 
practice towards theory (ibid., 42).   
Reflecting on these generalised vectors during the planning of the present project, it 
appeared that they could be adapted to suit the specific example of an embodied 
countertransference in a clinical session, and could thus furnish a framework for the 
discussion of associated case material.  These vectors were therefore employed as a 
basis for the design of a set of discussion vertices for use in the present interviews.   
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ii. Tuckett 
Further assistance was obtained from the work of the EPF working party on 
comparative clinical methods chaired by Tuckett (2008, 1), which set out to design a 
new method for “abstracting the models that lay, usually implicitly, behind the 
different ways of working” of different practitioners.  They developed a two-step 
model, in which an individual clinician presents successive sessions from an analysis 
in a small group discussion with fellow psychoanalysts, and the group evaluates the 
clinical material by means of the following procedure: 
(i) Step 0 – the group engages in a free discussion of the material.  
(ii) Step 1 – the group reviews each intervention of the analyst and places it in one 
of six categories according to the function of the intervention (ibid., 136-7, 
Table 6.1). 
(iii) Step 2 – the group attempts to determine the approach of the presenting 
analyst with reference to five discussion dimensions or axes (ibid., 165, Table 
6.4). 
Step 0 allows the group to familiarise themselves with one another and with the 
material.  Step 1 was conceived as a structural aid to help the group to focus on the 
presenting analyst and their approach, rather than the case material, since the purpose 
is to consider the model of the analyst and is thus to be distinguished from 
supervision.  And, Step 2 was designed as a more conceptual instrument for 
abstracting the main elements or dimensions of analysis in the hands of a particular 
practitioner.   
Step 2 employed a set of five discussion axes:   
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(i) What’s wrong? 
(ii) Listening to the unconscious. 
(iii) The analytic situation. 
(iv) How analysis works. 
(v) Furthering the process. 
In fact, Tuckett (ibid., 159-61) implies that the dimensions of Step 2 are informed by 
the vectors of Canestri, although this is not explicitly acknowledged. 
The group work in Steps 0 to 2 occupied a period of approximately thirteen hours 
over a weekend.  The aim was to elicit the presenter’s explanatory working model of 
analysis, embracing the complex mix of beliefs and feelings, both explicit or 
conscious and implicit or pre-conscious, that the presenter has about the analytic 
process, i.e. what brings the patient to analysis, how analysis works to transform the 
patient’s situation, what must be attended to in an analytic session, and what the 
analyst believes is the function of his or her interpretations.   
Tuckett’s method, although directed at locating explanatory models for analysis 
generally, rather than specific concepts, nonetheless offered some useful pointers for 
this project.   
Firstly, the two-step method bases itself around a discussion of case material, in order 
to study the models of the analyst.  It differentiates itself from standard case 
discussion and the closely associated task of supervision, but starts from a similar 
foundation of process notes.  This demonstrated that case material and process notes 
could be discussed in different ways, respectively supervisory or research-oriented, 
according to the desired outcome.   
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For the present project, it was also interesting to compare Steps 1 and 2.  Step 1 is a 
focused and structured tool as an aid to data analysis, but the requirement to allocate 
to each intervention by an analyst a number from 1 to 6 is cumbersome, potentially 
producing concrete thinking, and thus an impediment to free association and clinical 
understanding.  This approach might potentially fragment the data, in the way that 
Hollway & Jefferson envisage, as mentioned above.   
Step 2, as a more conceptual tool, provides axes for discussion rather than a 
rigorously structured framework, and could usefully aid free association and 
conceptualisation.  Step 2, designed for discussion of the dimensions of analysis 
generally, could also usefully be adapted to a set of dimensions relating to a specific 
clinical event, namely that of sensory experience within the transference.  Such a 
simplified model would also be suited to research by an individual researcher.   
For this project, therefore, interview guidelines as a methodological instrument were 
designed by modifying the ‘vectors’ of Canestri, based on Tuckett and adapted to suit 
this specific project, as shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
   
   
Figure 1  
The nature of the 
phenomena 
themselves 
The unconscious 
origins of the 
phenomena 
The analytic 
theory that best 
describes the 
phenomena The clinical 
meaning of the 
phenomena  
The analytic 
response to the 
phenomena 
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For the sake of comparison, the same vertices are shown in Appendix A, firstly in 
comparison with the vectors of Canestri, and secondly in comparison with the axes of 
Tuckett.   
iii. Comment 
The result is an interview approach, which is neither structured nor even semi-
structured.  The present methodological instrument, namely the process notes, in 
which an event is highlighted, and the set of discussion vertices, guide interviewees in 
a different way.  The process notes assist the interviewee to enter a familiar frame of 
mind, a form of evenly suspended attention that normally attends on case discussion 
in supervision or group presentations of case material, and the discussion vertices 
guide the interviewee away from a supervisory attitude into a new arena, where they 
are describing their own way of thinking and working.  Even if, in some cases, there 
may be a tendency to lapse into a supervisory attitude, in spite of the injunction to 
avoid this, firstly no real problem arises since such attitude also reveals the 
interviewee’s own models, and secondly the interviewee may be guided back to the 
task at hand by the interviewer by referring them back to the discussion vertices. 
This approach is in contrast to the basic model described by Dreher in relation to the 
Trauma Project, where the interviews of psychoanalysts by psychoanalysts were 
conducted on a semi-structured basis and where interviewees were asked to present 
their own trauma case material as a starting point and then to enter into a conceptual 
discussion around the trauma concept on the basis of their own cases. 
It is believed that this approach will provide a better vehicle for ‘free’ 
conceptualisation than would be achieved by means of such semi-structured 
interviews, since it will bring the participants closer to the analytic process with all its 
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subtleties and ambiguities than could be achieved by carefully framed open questions, 
which would inevitably lead to a more cognitive attitude to the project.   
It is true that there will still be limitations as to how close the participants can get to 
the analytic process, since they will have only one session to use as a springboard, 
rather than a series spaced over a period, and since the here and now requires also a 
history for detailed, nuanced, understanding.  However, this may also be a plus, 
because they will be less tied to a particular clinical scenario and thereby more able 
freely to associate into their own ideas and practices. 
b. Interviews 
In order to obtain as wide a set of outcomes as possible, within the limitations of the 
project, an interviewee distribution was selected including senior clinicians from a 
range of training affiliations, theoretical backgrounds, geographical location and 
known personal bias, for 12 initial interviews, and a small group discussion with 6 
discussants.  There were equal numbers of analytical psychologists and 
psychoanalysts, in each case, of whom 10 were men and 8 were women.  In the 
individual interviews, the numbers of men and women were 9 men, and 3 women, 
with 4 of the men and 2 of the women being analytical psychologists and 5 of the 
men and 1 of the women being psychoanalysts.  In the group, 1 man and 2 women 
were analytical psychologists and 3 women were psychoanalysts.  Amongst the 
interviewees, there were 5 medically qualified doctors, 2 of these being analytical 
psychologists and 3 of these being psychoanalysts.  The group included no medically 
qualified members.  The analytical psychologists practise in a variety of geographical 
locations, including UK, Australia, France and USA, and are members of 5 different 
societies, 2 of which are based in London.  The psychoanalysts are all members of the 
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British Psychoanalytical Society (BPAS) in London, but from different theoretical 
orientations within the BPAS.   
It might be argued that a more even balance of men and women could have been 
selected, for the sake of comparison.  However, the general nature of the phenomena 
being investigated applies equally to both genders, and thus conceptualisations are 
more likely to be affected by training and theoretical bias or affiliation than by 
gender
5
.   
The issue of affiliation needs some comment.  With reference to the analytical 
psychologists, Samuels (1985) has envisaged the following schools in Analytical 
Psychology: Classical, developmental, and archetypal, depending on a respective bias 
in the three theoretical areas of definition of archetypal, concept of self, and 
development of personality, and a respective bias in the three clinical areas of 
analysis of transference-countertransference, emphasis on symbolic experiences of 
the self, and examination of highly differentiated imagery.  All of these schools were 
represented in one degree or another in the interviewees.  Only one individual 
interviewee and two members of the small group came from the Society of Analytical 
Psychology in London, with its generally acknowledged developmental or Kleinian 
bias, whilst the other Jungians came from groups in London and abroad with other 
approaches, whether respectively more classical, more archetypal or closer to the 
views of the post-Freudians.  The three from abroad all came from different training 
organisations, and thus there was a varied and balanced theoretical distribution 
amongst the Jungians. 
                                                 
5
 For this reason, and to avoid adding an extra and unnecessary layer of complexity, all interviewees 
are referred to herein as ‘he’. 
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The psychoanalysts all came from the BPAS in London, which also has a significant  
Kleinian component, although in practice this accounts for only a proportion of the 
membership, since the majority of psychoanalysts trained at the BPAS identify 
themselves with one of three groupings, namely Contemporary Freudian, Independent 
and Kleinian.  The interviewees were distributed accordingly, mainly describing 
themselves as aligned with the Independent or Kleinian groups, and therefore the 
psychoanalysts also represented a varied theoretical distribution.  However, all being 
from London did imply that there would be a predominance of ideas aligned with a 
European way of thinking, and not that of North and South America, and that there 
could be an absence of interviewees designating themselves as relationists and field 
theorists, in accordance with such tradition.  These points are further discussed in the 
chapters on the results of the research. 
As for the question of medical qualification, an initial expectation was that the 
medically qualified practitioners might have more of a tendency to focus on 
symptoms and psycho-somatisation than their non-medically qualified counterparts, 
but this proved not to be the case.   
Accordingly, the selected distribution of interviewees was expected to yield a 
sufficient range of differing viewpoints for the purposes of the project.   
The interviews were all conducted under identical conditions.  Each interview 
focused on the same set of process notes from the same single session of an intensive 
analysis, including highlighted a vignette describing a countertransference event in 
which the body and mind of the analyst are in relation.  Each interview was limited to 
one hour.  The focus group was conducted under the same parameters, with the 
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exception that the time allocated was an hour and a half.  All the interviews were 
recorded, and transcripts produced. 
In the interview process, the interviewees were asked to discuss the session from their 
own perspective and not in a supervisory capacity, guided by the vignette and by the 
discussion vertices for focusing the dialogue, whilst encouraging them also to 
associate away into their own examples.  The interviewer said little, except 
occasionally to draw the interviewee back to the process notes and the discussion 
vertices or to interject a question seeking clarification.  By this means, it was sought 
to elicit how the different analysts conceptualise the kind of event described in the 
vignette and thereby how they conceptualise embodiment in the countertransference.   
It is to be noted that this is not single session research, nor is it case study research, 
but that the process notes and the discussion vertices are employed as a 
methodological instrument in an interview process. 
The interviews all produced a quantity of data, since all but one of the interviewees 
once started had a great deal to say.  After a few interviews thus, an attempt was 
made to rein in the process, by asking more direct questions to focus the outcome.  
However, it was then found that the interviews tended to collapse, the material was 
less rich, as well as being more consciously proscribed, and the conceptualisations 
were more concealed.  Thereafter, accordingly, the original approach of going with 
the flow was resumed.  
It quickly became clear that the individual interviewees were often just warming up 
towards the end of the allotted hour and mostly had much more to say on the 
designated topic.  In an initial data analysis of the early transcripts, it was also 
discovered that some of their observations needed clarification.  Therefore, a second 
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interview was requested as a follow through.  The second interview was based 
entirely on the transcript of the first interview, and not on the process notes, in order 
to focus down, and not further open up, the enquiry.   
A comment on chronology is in order here, because the interviews took place from 
August 2010 to July 2013 (with one further second interview occurring in February 
2014), and were therefore complete before some of the literature mentioned in the 
literature review was available.  The interviews are thus situated within the context of 
their timing.   
All of the interviews were recorded and produced as transcripts as primary empirical 
data.   
c. Data analysis 
Having thereby obtained the primary data, the transcripts of the interviews were 
subsequently analysed using grounded theory techniques from the social sciences, in 
order to draw themes and patterns from the data, whereby to elicit the 
conceptualisations of the interviewees, and discover their theoretical and practical 
views concerning embodiment in the consulting room, and especially in the 
countertransference.  An approach was chosen based primarily on the established 
technique of grounded theory, as described by Charmaz (2006), which is developed 
out of the original grounded theory of Glaser & Strauss (1967) aimed at generating 
theory out of data by means of systematic qualitative analysis.   
The technique of grounded theory is well known in the social sciences as an 
instrument for data analysis, having the advantages that the approach is grounded in 
actual empirical data, allows the results to emerge from the data by means of the 
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grounded theory process, employs iterative feedback steps for repeated verification 
and validation of the emerging concepts, is adaptive in the face of unforeseen 
setbacks, and advances as the process evolves, thereby allowing the process to be 
continuously improved as it progresses.  In grounded theory, therefore, the data rather 
than the researcher leads the outcome, the results emerge from the data, and continual 
refinement of the results assists the generation of uncontaminated results.  This is 
very important, to avoid the risk of personal bias attributed by Dreher to individual 
research projects. 
Apart from this, grounded theory, rather than any other analytic technique from the 
social sciences, was chosen for two reasons.  Firstly, as already mentioned, the 
methodology is based on the model offered by Dreher, including the approach of the 
Hampstead Project with its hermeneutic circle of continual feedback and repeated re-
evaluation of the different stages akin to grounded theory.  Therefore, grounded 
theory was considered to be an appropriate technique for the present project.  
Secondly, grounded theory is the form of analysis generally chosen to elicit theory, as 
opposed to narrative, meaning, or subjective experience, and this empirical work 
seeks above all to locate the personal models, conceptualisations and theories of the 
interviewees, namely their private theories. 
Succinctly, the elements lifted from Charmaz’ method include: subjecting the 
collected data, namely the interview transcripts, to line-by-line coding and focused 
coding; making comparisons between coded interview transcripts of the same and 
different individuals, and feeding the results back into repeated coding steps; and 
writing memos during and after the coding process, highlighting categories that point 
towards conceptualisations of the interviewees relevant to the research theme.  
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Further iterations are introduced at this stage, feeding results back into more refined 
coding steps and generating and clustering new and more detailed categories. 
In addition, at first a short while following, but later immediately after, each 
encounter and during the subsequent process of data analysis, field notes were made, 
recording reactions arising from the interview and the analysis (the researcher’s 
countertransference to the research).  This is a step proposed by Hollway & Jefferson 
(2000, 45), since “our feelings in and around the interview are of value for 
understanding the dynamics of the research relationship … they are important to how 
the data are produced”. 
The purpose of these field notes is partially to add an additional level of 
understanding and reflexivity to the data analysis, since this aspect of the project 
involves participant observation, but also more significantly to address the 
researcher’s own transference onto the research project and onto the interviewees.  
This important reflexive practice is discussed in Hollway & Jefferson (ibid., 65), in 
terms of elaborating the initial data and avoiding distortion of the data analysis, and in 
Romanyshyn (2007), in terms of differentiation of the researcher from the research by 
making conscious the researcher’s own complexes so that they do not contaminate the 
results.  It will be appreciated that this step is of particular importance given Dreher’s 
reservations about the risk of personal bias entering the results of individual research. 
Where this differs from Charmaz, therefore, is in each case in making the field notes, 
in which are recorded the researcher’s impressions, reactions and associations arising 
out of the interviews, in relation to the interviewees, and arising out of the data 
analysis process, paying attention to the unconscious inter-subjective interview 
dynamics in the interview relationship.  These field notes have been used primarily to 
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differentiate out the researcher’s own material, but occasionally also to elaborate 
understandings of an interviewee’s emerging implicit theory.   
The conceptualisations of each interviewee have thus been extracted from the 
transcripts, and a chart of the different conceptual characteristics obtained overall 
from the complete set of interviews has been compiled.  These results are compared 
in order to classify the different viewpoints of the interviewees.  In particular, it has 
been possible: to elaborate the psychoid concept directly from the results obtained 
from the interviews of those Jungians who have brought in this concept; to evaluate 
whether the views of all of the Jungians are consonant with the public definitions for 
the psychoid concept; and to establish whether any of the psychoanalysts have 
produced conceptualisations contiguous with those of certain of the Jungians, albeit 
employing different theoretical models and terminology. 
3. Evaluation 
The final step of the conceptual study is the critical review and formulation 
constituting Step 4 proposed by Dreher, as mentioned above.   
In this review, the project firstly brings together the historical study and the direct 
accounts of the psychoid concept emerging from the empirical study, in an initial 
elaboration of the concept.  Next, the empirical categories elicited from the data 
analysis are critiqued, in a form of interrogation of the psychoid concept.  This 
involves reflecting on the internal coherence or otherwise of the models of the 
respective interviewees.   
Two main areas of conceptualisation have been defined in the data analysis, 
according to two different structural understandings of the transference, namely 
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symmetrical and asymmetrical
6
, defined and discussed in Chapters 9 to 11.  These 
two different viewpoints are then compared and contrasted, in order to consider the 
extent to which they are respectively mutually exclusive or complementary.  A 
comparison is also made of these two viewpoints with the characteristics for the 
pyschoid concept obtained from the published literature, as it has been defined 
through the historical study.  This comparison yields a contemporary set of elements 
associated with the psychoid concept, corresponding with one of the two structural 
understandings of the transference and derived both from the historical study and 
from the empirical study.  The comparison of the two structural models for the 
transference will also serve to validate the psychoid concept.   
Accordingly, the present methodology, designed specifically for this project, 
generates not only a conceptual analysis of the psychoid concept from its historical 
origination in the work of Hans Driesch and its public evolution through to the 
present day and current clinical usage, but also the empirical strand quite separately 
validates the psychoid concept.  This is an important distinction from Dreher, who 
seeks only to look at the currency of a concept and not in addition to validate the 
same.  
  
                                                 
6
 These understandings are to be distinguished from Matte-Blanco (1988) and his concept of bi-logical 
structures, including forms of symmetrical and asymmetrical logic, as discussed in Chapter 9. 
48 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Literature review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter sets the context for the present project, by offering a survey of the 
literature pertaining to the field of embodiment in psychoanalysis, including 
analytical psychology.  This is no mean task, since the literature is diverse, and both 
the terminology employed and the theoretical understandings offered are legion, 
demonstrating the need for an overall mapping of such conceptual landscape, and 
hence for this research. 
The chapter begins with a history of different theoretical attitudes towards the 
relationship of body and mind, exposing the diversity of theories available.  Some 
clinical examples will also be introduced, indicating that the clinical literature is not 
allied with the theoretical literature.  This will form the main focus of the chapter and 
set the general context for the project.   
In the Jungian field, certain studies will be mentioned, showing that Jung started a 
rigorous and fertile tradition of research in the arena where body and mind are in 
relation.  There will follow an account of the literature pertaining to the psychoid 
concept, which is the central conceptual terrain of this thesis, differentiating between 
Jung’s early ideas on the psychoid and his later ones on synchronicity.  Such account 
will demonstrate that no single coherent account or definition of the psychoid concept 
exists, and will segregate the project from the study of synchronicity. 
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An extremely interesting aspect of the present project has been the proliferation of 
literature since the outset of this project.  A search through the PEP web in March 
2007 yielded just 13 hits for the term ‘psychoid’, including: a 1907 reference to the 
Jung-Freud letters (McGuire, 1991); two papers by Freud (1923, 1925) dismissing the 
term ‘psychoid’ as merely philosophical; and one by Reich (1927) reviewing a 1925 
paper by Bleuler, as discussed in Chapter 4.  Just over a year later, the PEP web 
yielded 20 hits, and in September 2014 the same source produced 185 hits.  This last 
figure is largely due to the fact that in the intervening period the Journal of Analytic 
Psychology had been added to the list of Journals covered by PEP, but even taking 
this into account there are still many more recent papers referring to the psychoid 
concept than earlier ones.  For example, in September 2014, the period of more than 
100 years to 1999 yields 97 citations, while the period of just 14 years from 2000-
2014 yields 88 citations.   
Taking Bion’s proto-mental concept as a search comparison, since, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, this is the psychoanalytic concept most resembling Jung’s psychoid 
concept, the comparable PEP results for the term ‘proto-mental’ are respectively 73 
and 162.   
Clearly, in both cases, there is a surge of interest in recent years.   
This combination of confusion surrounding, and professional interest in, the clinical 
relation of body and mind amply justifies the present research. 
In the following, a number of different themes will be isolated, in each case 
highlighting the main strands, for the purposes of situating the project amongst them, 
and delineating the field of the research.  Key references only will be included, it 
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being appreciated that the number and range of publications is too great to cover 
exhaustively.   
History of the soma in psychoanalysis 
1. Freud and Jung 
In the early days of psychoanalysis, Freud and Jung, both coming from a medical 
tradition, conceptualised psychoanalysis as embracing mind and body.  Freud 
(1950[1895]), in his Project for a Scientific Psychology concerning the environment’s 
impact on the human organism and the organism’s reaction to it, attempted to 
represent mental phenomena in terms of physiological processes.  The pioneering 
work of Freud and Breuer (1892-1895), in their Studies on Hysteria, traced a link 
between a precipitating psychic trauma and sensory memory and experience, 
attributing a mechanism to hysteria involving repression of unwanted ideas of a 
sexual nature, coupled with conversion of the accompanying affect into somatic 
symptoms.  Later, Freud wrote, “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego” (1923, 
26).   
For his part, Jung (1902, par. 11) in his inaugural dissertation for his medical degree 
quoted Krafft-Ebing’s account of hysterical delirium, that “hallucinations of all the 
senses are not uncommon.  The most frequent and most important are delusions of 
sight, smell and touch” 7.  By the time of his meeting with Freud, in March 1907, he 
was borrowing freely from Freud’s work on hysteria, and treating cases with 
conversion symptomatology involving a wide variety of sensory phenomena (Jung, 
1905, 1908).   
                                                 
7
 1895, 498-9 
51 
 
 
 
Concurrently, his major scientific study on the Word Association Tests (WATs) 
demonstrated, through the use of a galvanometer whose electrodes were placed in 
skin contact with the hands and feet of his subjects, that a physical reaction, namely 
an accumulation of sweat associated with the sympathetic nervous system, 
accompanies the manifestation of an affect laden association of ideas (Jung, 
1907/1908, pars. 1046/9).   
His next key work on the relation of mind and body was his theory of psychological 
types, representing the manner by which individuals apprehend the world, 
respectively, through two attitudes, namely introversion and extraversion, and four 
approaches to consciousness, namely the functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and 
intuition (Jung, 1923).  To the functions, he ascribed a physiological base, and a 
psychic component controlled by the ego.    
Subsequently, he formulated ideas concerning the archetype as such, seen as an a 
priori, a pre-existent form or possibility immanent in the substance of the human 
organism, linking instinct and spirit, and his psychoid concept covering the 
interdependence of body and mind, as discussed below and in Chapters 3 and 4. 
2. Post-Freudians and post-Jungians 
Various post-Freudians and post-Jungians have elaborated on this early start.  On the 
Freudian side, followers, such as Dunbar (1935), Reich (1945)
8
, Alexander (1950), 
Ferenczi (1955) and Deutsch (1959), contemplated notions of libido, hysterical 
conversion and somatisation, all treating patients with somatic presentations.   
Shapiro (1996) traces the development of embodiment in psychoanalysis, starting 
from Freud’s body ego and conversion hysteria, through Reich and Ferenczi and their 
                                                 
8
 Reich was an early follower until the end of the 1920s. 
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attempts to analyse somatic experience in the consulting room, the research of Stern 
(1985) and Beebe and Lachmann (1988) into early infant development and their work 
on cross-modal perception and mutual regulation, to Damasio (1994).   
On the Jungian side, a number of research traditions have emerged.   
Jung’s WATs were ground breaking advances at the time, and have spawned studies 
both clinical and theoretical.  Schoenfeld (1962) describes the use of the WAT to 
demonstrate scientific credibility for psychoanalysis.  Rapaport, Gill and Schafer 
(1946) have applied the WAT in a clinical study, while Sutherland & Gill (1970) and 
Rosen et al (1991) have undertaken studies based on extensions of the WAT, 
Sutherland & Gill’s Word Association Sentence, seeking sentences in response to 
stimulus words, being employed at the Tavistock Clinic.  Shin et al (2005) have 
studied implicit learning, by testing two groups of subjects, one on the basis of words 
relating to, and one on the basis of words not relating to, active complexes, as 
determined from the WAT.  And, Petchkovsky et al (2013) have performed the WAT 
under fMRI conditions to record fMRI responses. 
Jacobi (1959), Stevens (1990), and Knox (2003) have all researched Jung’s theory of 
the archetypes.  Knox observes that Jung offers four different models, as: biological 
entities hardwired into the genes for instructing mind and body; organising mental 
frameworks of an abstract nature; core meanings containing representational content; 
and metaphysical entities that are independent of the body.  Scholarly accounts by 
Progoff (1953, 1959) and Gray (1996) review the social applications of Jung’s ideas 
on the archetypes.   
Stone (2006) has undertaken a research study of embodied forms of 
countertransference, referring to Dieckmann (1974), McLaughlin (1975), Samuels 
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(1985), Field (1989), Schwartz-Salant (1989), McDougall (1989) and Spiegelman 
(1996).   
Jung’s practice of active imagination, by which archetypal ideas are explored through 
creative physical expression, has also engendered a fertile post-Jungian tradition, as 
described, for example, by Cwik (1991, 2011), Davidson (1966), Dieckmann (1971), 
Fordham (1955, 1977), Swan (2000, 2008, 2011), and Schaverien (2005, 2007).  The 
process of active imagination also forms the theoretical foundation for Sandplay 
Therapy (Friedman & Mitchell, 1994), for Jungian art therapy (Schaverien, 1991), 
and for the Jungian practice of drama and movement therapy (cf Chodorow (1991), 
Whitehouse (1979) and The Sesame Approach taught at The Central School of 
Speech and Drama, London (Lindkvist, 1998)). 
More generally, Sassenfeld (2008) offers a review of approaches to the body in 
analytical psychology, citing inter alia Sidoli (1993) and Redfearn (2000) on 
psychosomatic disturbances, Samuels (1985), Redfearn (2000) and Cambray (2001) 
on somatic countertransference, Chodorow (1999) and Greene (2001) on body and 
mind as a monism, and Chodorow (1999) on active imagination. 
Some specific theoretical areas developed both by the post-Freudians and by the post-
Jungians are detailed below. 
a. Winnicott  
Winnicott (1949, 1966, 1970) contemplates the mind and its relation to psyche-soma 
based on the development of the individual from the outset of psychosomatic 
existence.  In the beginning, he writes, psyche and soma are not distinguished from 
one another, and the environmental provision or holding by the mother determines the 
54 
 
 
 
mental health of the individual (1949).  Good-enough maternal handling, physically 
and emotionally, at the start of life assists the infant to develop a sense of his self 
being centred in his body, which may be described as “the psyche indwelling in the 
soma” (Winnicott, 1970, 264).  Providing that the continuity of being of the 
individual is not disturbed, the psyche-soma proceeds along a process of growing 
mutual inter-relation, in which the psyche develops an imaginative elaboration of 
somatic functioning, and the body is felt by the individual to form the core of the 
imaginative self (Winnicott, 1949, 244).  Abram (1996) describes this as body-mind 
integration.  Graduated failure of adaptation by the mother produces healthy mental 
activity in the infant, but certain, more drastic, kinds of failure lead to mind-body 
splits and pathological mental functioning, for example, false-self functioning, 
confusional states, or psychosomatic symptoms.   
b. Klein 
Klein (1932) conceived a notion of unconscious phantasy, based on primitive sensory 
forms of infantile experience and the mother’s breast as the primary object.  She saw 
the body as the source of such phantasy, wherein early conflicts between the life and 
death drives are played out, phantasies of forceful entry into the mother’s body by 
projective identification, in order to attack and control her, bringing persecuting 
anxieties of retaliation.  As Isaacs (1948) elaborates, the infant’s earliest phantasies 
are presented in a somato-sensual mode, first as bodily sensations and then as motor 
action, making specific use of the body as a primitive pre-verbal language.   
Developments on Klein’s work led in various directions.  A number of authors, 
including Bick (1964, 1968), Anzieu (1989), and Gaddini (1969), address infantile 
states of mind; and various writers, among them Bion (1940, 1961), Meltzer (1986), 
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Lombardi (2002, 2008), Ferrari (2004) and Bleger (2013), evolve the psychoanalytic 
thinking of Klein into new theoretical avenues.  A further strand concerns the work of 
Tustin (1972, 1986) on autism. 
c. Infant development 
Based on systemic studies of infants, from infant observation introduced into the 
training of the Institute of Psychoanalysis in 1960, Bick (1968, 484) formulated ideas 
concerning the experience of the skin in early object relations, conceiving the skin as 
a boundary between “parts of the psyche not as yet differentiated from parts of the 
body” and the external object.  A primitive binding together of these personality 
parts, through introjection of the object, establishes a psychic skin as a container for 
the nascent self.  Her work is extended by Anzieu (1989) into the notion of a skin ego 
providing a containing, unifying envelope for the self, a protective barrier for the 
psyche, and a surface and filter for early sense traces and communications.  Both 
noted that early disturbances lead to various forms of pathology, including autism, 
schizophrenia and psycho-somatic symptoms. 
Gaddini (1969, 63) describes an attitude towards the object involving primitive 
perception through the soma, developing in accordance with a functional model from 
physical “imitation in order to perceive”, as in the infant echoing her mother’s smile 
and thus having within her own body an experience of mother’s smile, into psychic 
“imitation in order to be”, as in the infant having an hallucinatory image, in the 
absence of the mother, of being fused with the mother as an extension of herself and 
thereby holding onto the absent mother and gaining comfort.  According to Gaddini, 
these processes occur in the first months of the infant’s life.  Normally, they lead to 
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the development of ego capacity, but frustrations of an oral nature tend to promote 
physical, rather than psychic, imitative manifestations, and pathological disturbances.   
A more recent account of imitation is the research on mirror-touch synaesthesia by 
Banissey and Ward (2007a, 31), describing how synaesthetic touch, in the form of 
tactile sensations that are phenomenologically akin to actual touch, arises in response 
to the witnessing of physical touch.   
d. Autism 
Next, the work of Tustin
9
 (1972, 1986) conceptualises autism as an arrest at a 
sensation-dominated, pre-thinking stage of psychological development, arising in 
response to a traumatic awareness in infancy of separateness from the mother.  Such 
infantile catastrophe institutes a profound split in the personality and leads to an 
experience that Bion described as ‘nameless dread’, in which anxiety of loss of self-
cohesiveness prevails.  Fearing to leak away, such individuals resort to auto-
sensuousness by employing autistic objects and autistic shapes.  The former 
constitute physical items, like toy cars, capable of giving hard edge sensations, and 
the latter comprise subjective, abstract elements, like intensities and temporal 
patterns, serving to pattern emerging sensation experiences in a psycho-biological 
arena, foreshadowing a primitive notion of boundedness and the first creation of 
mental organisation.  Meltzer (1975) describes such object use as adhesive 
identification, wherein a defensive adherence to the surface of the object through 
imitation seeks to allay anxieties of disintegration. 
                                                 
9
 Trained at the Tavistock Clinic from 1950-1953 under the guidance of Bowlby and Bick, and 
analysed by Bion, Tustin spent a year following qualification working with autistic children at the 
James Jackson Research and Treatment Center.   
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Following Tustin, Ogden (1989) proposes the concept of an autistic-contiguous 
position to represent a primitive organisation forming an integral part of normal 
development.  In this mode, experiences of sensation are the principal media for the 
creation of psychological meaning, and pre-symbolic connections between sensory 
impressions come to form bounded surfaces (ibid., 128).  The nature of anxiety linked 
with this position concerns disruptions in sensory boundedness, and fears of 
dissolving away into boundless space.  Attempts to sustain a cohesive surface involve 
imitation as a way of holding onto the object by carrying the influence of the other on 
the skin surface.  The other thus becomes a second skin to contain such anxiety and 
foster development of a ‘locus of self’ (ibid., 136).   
Mitrani (1995) also writes of unmentalised experience comprising sense data, 
perceived as concrete objects in the psyche and as bodily states, which can neither be 
brought to mind nor repressed.  Such experience may be conceived as a lacuna in the 
mind, an area frozen and left barren, which has failed to attain mental representation 
but is covered over by sophisticated defenses and compensatory structures.  She 
attributes these states to privation in the earliest post-natal environment. 
e. Bion 
Bion (1940, 1961), as discussed in Chapter 5, brought experience of working with 
shell shock during WWII to his group work, and conceived a proto-mental arena 
covering events lying between the psychic fact and the physical fact.  After analysis 
with Klein, he went on to apply Klein’s notion of projective identification to his 
developing ideas, according to which beta elements, constituting the infant’s raw 
sensory experience, are transmitted to the mother by projective identification for 
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containment and processing through her reverie, namely alpha function, to make them 
manageable for the infant (Bion, 1962, 1963).   
Meltzer (1986, 36), reviewing Bion’s contribution to a model of the mind in which 
mental functioning develops out of somatic functioning, situates “psycho-somatic 
phenomena outside the sphere of symbol formation and thought”.  Referring to 
Experiences in Groups, he sees the proto-mental apparatus as implying that at a 
primitive level the ego construes emotional experiences as bodily states and reacts to 
them in a bodily fashion (ibid., p. 35).  Bion’s later writings propose that undigested 
beta elements are dealt with as accretions of stimuli suitable only for evacuation, 
resulting both in the loss of the capacity for creating meaning and in the generation of 
meaninglessness in the form of hallucinatory activity (1962, 1963, 1965).  To 
introduce meaning, the analyst must help to elevate these processes into the realm of 
symbol formation through alpha function by doing the patient’s dreaming for him. 
The Symingtons (1966, xvi, 35) suggest that Bion’s proto-mental system foreshadows 
his later ideas on beta elements, and Grotstein (2007, 192, 258) also views his proto-
mental phenomena as the direct forerunners of his later concepts of beta elements and 
‘O’, the thing-in-itself.  Torres (2008) has researched the value of Bion’s proto-
mental system as a bio-psychoanalytic-social model, and has demonstrated both a 
direct connection between social interaction and the mind-body balance, and the 
current value of the proto-mental concept in the understanding of forms of illness that 
seem to be determined by stressful social conditions.  
f. Post-Kleinians 
A number of post-Kleinians focus on the primacy of the body.   
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Contrary to Klein’s view of the breast as the object for the infant, Ferrari (2004) 
considers the body to be the main object of the mind and its primary reality.  He 
designates as ‘the concrete original object’ the unity composed of “a mental apparatus 
that has a capacity for perception and notation, and a physical body, and the sparse 
sensations that come from it”, with emotions forming a bridge between the corporeal 
and the psychic (ibid., 41).  The external relationship with the mother then assists the 
infant with the task of converting the emotional turmoil into thought.   
Lombardi (2002, 363) builds on the work of Bion and Ferrari, focusing on an area of 
clinical experience involving “events lying between the bodily and the psychic fact”, 
arising when primitive, archaic areas of mentalisation are encountered.  His premise 
is that the body is the first and founding entity upon which identity is based, and that 
certain patients have lost the continuity between the physical and emotional nuclei of 
identity, due to failures of the early infantile environment.  For them, the sensory-
emotional dimension is either excluded or so predominant that it presents a dramatic 
obstacle to communication, and analytic work on their relationship with corporeity, 
and with the sensory and emotional events that stem from it, is needed, during which 
the analyst may have to withstand intense countertransference bodily hallucinations. 
Another approach, based on Klein, is Bleger (2013), who postulates a third positon, 
the glischro-caric position, preceding both the paranoid-schizoid position and the 
depressive position and arising in the earliest weeks of life, even in the intra-uterine 
stage.  This is characterised by a primary undifferentiation, which is not actually a 
state of undifferentiation but a structure or organisation, including the subject and the 
subject’s environment but not as distinct entities (ibid., 4-5).  Bleger borrows the term 
‘participation’ from Levy-Bruhl, pointing out that this places notions of projection 
and projective identification in doubt, since rather a form of fusion or symbiosis 
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operating in the area of the body and the external world applies (ibid., 35).  In this 
position, deficits in a sense of reality are manifest, anxiety is massive, and primitive 
violent defenses may include psychosomatic illness and autism.     
Grotstein (1997) contemplates body and mind as a unity, developed from the psyche-
soma of Winnicott and considered as a mindbody and a bodymind in dialectical 
relationship.  Body and mind may be seen as part of a “Siamese twinship” (ibid., 
205), always one but seeming to be two.  Early developmental failures and traumas 
lead to disruptions in this dialectic, in ways described with respect to infant 
development, Kleinian notions of projective identification and Bion’s beta elements, 
and lead thence to illness, psychosomatic disorders, and distortions of body image. 
g. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
A number of authors, such as Schore (1994, 2002) and Varvin (2003, 2007) have 
addressed PTSD, the modern equivalent of shell shock.  Schore, looking at PTSD 
from a neuroscience perspective, notes disturbances of psycho-biological regulation 
in the face of trauma, with dissociation as a defense against overwhelming affect.  
Varvin, based on research with victims of political trauma and terrorism, discusses 
the psychic and somatic symptoms of trauma, due to insufficiently symbolised and 
mentalised experience.  With the aid of clinical examples, he shows how the analyst 
must deal with complex mental survival strategies, withstanding prolonged periods of 
disorganisation and impingements on the bodily level in the countertransference.    
h. Paris School of Psychosomatics 
The Paris School, comprising a group of French psychoanalysts, found their ideas on 
Freudian theory, contemplating two perspectives towards psychosomatics as to 
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whether symptoms are a product of psychic conflict and its underlying phantasies, or 
psychic deficiency and a lack of conceptual capacity.   In the former, the life and 
death drives come into opposition, and the tension thus created produces the symptom 
as a point of fixation, where disorganised and concrete thinking take over.  In the 
latter, an undeveloped ego or lack of ego integration manifests in a lack of a capacity 
to symbolise (Bronstein, 2011, 180).   
In an alternative approach, somatization is contemplated as a chain of psychic 
occurrences promoting the development of a somatic disorder, two modalities being 
envisaged, namely via regression or via an unbinding of the drives (Smadja, 2011, 
226-7).   In the first case, somatisation occurs through regression to early primitive 
states, for example due to overload, and, in the second, narcissistic loss generates a 
state of ‘instinctual defusion’ modifying the psychosomatic equilibrium of the subject 
(ibid., 227).   
McDougall (1989) relates such psychosomatic functioning with early developmental 
failures, and inability to characterise psychic distress, as in alexithymia.  Rosenfeld 
(2001) adds the possibility that islands of psychosis split off from the psyche may 
lodge in the body and thereby be encapsulated and concealed from the healthy parts 
of the personality.  Aisenstein & Smadja (2010, 345) observe that the analyst working 
with the somatically ill patient may be subject to the fragmentation of his own body 
and the disappearance of his body image in the countertransference through 
identification.   
i. Post-Jungians and psychosomatics 
Amongst the Jungians, Kradin (1997, 2011, 2013), Ramos (2004) and Costello (2006) 
have all devoted considerable attention to psychosomatics.  According to Kradin 
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(1997, 413), psychosomatic disorders, such as chronic fatigue syndrome and 
fibromyalgia, reflect disturbances of the ego-Self axis, and are a defence against, as 
well as an attempt at, individuation.  He sees the psychosomatic symptom as 
symbolic in nature, encoded in the body rather than the psyche: the treatment of a 
psychosomatic patient thus requires careful attention to somatic sensations and 
affective oscillations in the transference-countertransference field, and to the 
imaginal.  Driver (2005) links chronic fatigue syndrome with primal processes at the 
psychoid level of the unconscious.   
Ramos also considers disease as a symbolic expression revealing a dysfunction along 
the ego-Self axis.  She associates symptoms with Jung’s complexes, each having a 
pattern of images and sensations rooted in the archetypes.  Costello (2006, 23) 
contemplates the symptom both as a regression to disrupted infantile modes of 
functioning and as use of the body as a container for as yet undigested fragments of 
experience. 
3. Clinical examples 
As with the above theoretical examples, the range of clinical examples is extensive.  
Both psychoanalysts and Jungians discuss specific instances of sensory 
countertransference, including, amongst others, Jacobs (1973, 1993, 2001), Bady 
(1984), Field (1989), Lombardi (2002), Stone (2006), and Schaverien (2007).   
Their examples have a number of common themes.  They generally concern deeply 
regressed patients with dissociative tendencies and with whom countertransference 
experience is pronounced and uncomfortable, involving symptoms extending from 
physical tension, trembling, sexual arousal, drowsiness, and nausea, through to bodily 
mirroring in terms of posture and gesture, to sensory events in the form of images.  In 
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some cases, the dynamic is described in terms of emergence, symbolism, and 
transformation and in some in terms of splitting/dissociation and defensive 
mechanisms. 
The following examples start with bodily mirroring as described by two 
psychoanalysts. 
Bady (1984), writing of a borderline patient with an angry rejecting mother, describes 
becoming a cold, withdrawn mother in the countertransference, and needing to cure 
herself to reach the patient.  A turning point arose when she found that she was 
beginning sessions rocking gently back and forth in her seat, like an aunt of the 
patient who used to cradle her and rock her in her arms at night. 
Jacobs (1993, 2001) has written a number of papers.  In one, he offers a review of 
countertransference enactment, and suggests that bodily mirroring foreshadows the 
appearance of new themes in the transference (Jacobs, 2001, 660).  In an example, he 
writes about a patient, who is describing watching an infant being roughly handled 
during a nappy change: 
As he describes the scene in the nursery, [the patient’s] right hand moves from 
his side to his abdomen and he begins to palpate that area.  Then he grasps his 
belt buckle, entwines his fingers around it, and makes a tugging motion with 
it.  Observing him, I feel myself making parallel movements … I notice this 
and wonder about it.  As I do I think of two swimmers engaged in the art of 
synchronised swimming, moving in perfect harmony, each mirroring the 
other.  Then another image presents itself. I see [him] as a young child lying 
on a table, his abdomen tightly bound by gauze bandages.  (1993, 12) 
Jacobs realises that he is witnessing a piece of his patient’s history, and that his 
patient is unconsciously recollecting an early bodily trauma.  This proved to be a 
turning point.  
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The next example, from a Jungian, concerns countertransference symptoms.  Stone 
(2006) describes an assessment with a new patient, and feeling a sharp pain in the top 
of his left arm.  This repeated itself session after session, until one day the patient 
began describing her mother’s rages during her childhood.  He felt the pain increase 
sharply, while the patient recounted her mother pulling her dress off her shoulders, 
holding her by the right arm, and beating her left arm mercilessly with a hairbrush 
until blood flowed.  After this session, he never experienced the pain again. 
Now come two examples of hallucinations or visual images, one from a 
psychoanalyst, the other from a Jungian: 
Lombardi (2002, 2003, 2008) writes on the difficulties of dealing with psychosis, 
Referring to his notion of a concrete original object, mentioned above, he suggests the 
use of theoretical models as an aid to the analyst in managing the intense 
countertransference experiences associated with “the patient’s re-emerging bodily and 
sense experiences” (Lombardi, 2003, 848).   He describes an analysis with an 
anorexic patient, for whom sensory and affective experiences were virtually absent 
(Lombardi, 2002).  When the patient started to have bizarre hallucinations of solid 
masses hovering underneath the ceiling, and of swellings to his arms and legs, the 
analyst began to have countertransference hallucinations in the form of bodily 
sensations and images.  Lombardi considered that these events represented an 
emerging experience of corporeity for the patient, which could be elaborated first on a 
basic level of physical sensation, such as hunger, and later lead to more symbolic 
representations.  In this way, transformation could be facilitated.  
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Schaverien (2007, 425-6) gives an example of a patient, who feared intimacy and 
who described a fantasy
10
 of being a tiny figure in front of an enormous woman.  In 
an ensuing silence, Schaverien became aware of a distortion in her own perception, so 
that the room seemed to become a vast cavern containing two small individuals.  The 
patient then recounted a series of images embodying an infant state.  Reflecting on 
this sequence, Schaverien felt that the experience of altered spatial perception 
constituted a reciprocal countertransference in the face of the patient’s regression, and 
deepened her own understanding, enabling them both to stay with previously 
unmanageable material.  She designates such countertransference active imagination. 
Other analysts give accounts of active imagination in the countertransference from a 
different angle.  For example, Colman (2010) writes of a patient bringing stones to 
her sessions, and giving them to him at the end of the session to hold between 
sessions; and Geerken (2010) describes herself working clay during sessions with a 
difficult patient and modelling a sea-monster, and an owl.  In both cases, the objects 
were employed creatively to assist the analysis. 
The above examples represent the emergence in the countertransference of something 
symbolic and transformative.  The next example, from a Jungian, concerns a different 
dynamic, where the dominant mechanism is splitting and dissociation, and the 
transference dynamic more defensive. 
Field describes a dissociated patient, who resisted every attempt to reach her 
underlying instinctual and affective feelings towards a much loved father and 
murderously hated mother (1989, 514).  He notes her effect on him as literally 
chilling, leaving him feeling anaesthetized and battling a constant sense of 
                                                 
10
 The psychoanalysts’ use of the term ‘phantasy’ refers to unconscious material; the Jungians’ use of 
‘fantasy’ refers to imaginal material. 
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drowsiness, as he fought to stay awake.  Even the room seemed chilled on a warm 
day, so that he imagined dying of hyperthermia and switched on the electric fire.  He 
considered this experience to be a function of split-off and uncontainable infantile 
parts of the patient’s psyche, associated with an intrusive mother imago, which she 
would project forcibly into him and need him to suffer without retaliation.  
These examples are representative of the clinical literature on the relation of body and 
mind.  Further such examples may also be found, for instance: Eshel (2001) writes 
about the analyst’s experience of falling asleep in a patient’s sessions, giving an 
account of the analytic literature on the subject; Vermote (2003) describes 
experiencing pain and sleepiness in a patient’s session; and Tersing (2005) describes 
a session with a patient fearing abandonment, in which he experiences a desperate 
need for a bowel movement to the point of nearly abandoning the patient by leaving 
the session, which he links with Ogden’s autistic contiguous position and Bion’s 
contact-barrier.  Ogden (2003) describes memory at a sensation level in the 
countertransference; and Quinodoz (2003, 1481) describes the need to listen to bodily 
manifestations and phantasies in a session to hear the patient’s pre-verbal 
communications, with an example of feeling completely bound in her chair, which 
proved to echo a body memory of the patient.  Finally, Pollak (2009, 499-500) gives 
an account of chaotic organisation in a patient needing a body-container, and an 
accompanying countertransference involving postural alteration, feelings of unwanted 
bodily contact, and spatial disorientation.   
These examples describe behaviour, physical symptoms, and sensory images, 
attributed to the countertransference and allied either with defence or transformation, 
all of a persistent and long drawn out nature, and all needing to be withstood until a 
turning point is reached.  Although, in some cases, theoretical observations are 
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offered, they are sparse and no unified or comprehensive theoretical underpinning is 
provided, again demonstrating the need for this project to ground such clinical 
manifestations. 
4. Summary 
The above description demonstrates the complexity and diversity of theoretical 
approaches applied to embodiment in the consulting room, even when starting from a 
common foundation.  Further, the different theories address an equally wide range of 
conditions, starting in the early days of psychoanalysis with dissociation, as 
conceived by Freud and Jung in relation to hysteria and dementia praecox.  
Subsequently, further disorders have been identified, with respect to: infant 
development in the work of Bick, Anzieu and Gaddini; autism as described by Tustin; 
primitive states of mind as discussed by Winnicott, Klein and Bion; shell shock, as 
diagnosed during World War II, now known as Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome 
(PTSD); and psychosomatics according to the Paris Group and certain Jungians.  
Within each of these traditions, a respective theoretical approach has evolved specific 
to the theoretical orientation of the practitioner and to the condition itself.   
Further, the clinical descriptions, as indicated above, demonstrate a marked gap 
between the theoretical and clinical accounts of relations between body and mind in 
psychoanalysis. 
Accordingly, no overarching theory of psyche and soma is available, and the clinician 
has no specific guidance on the matter in practice, apart from their own orientation.  
The need for an overall mapping of this field in the face of such background, and 
hence for the present investigation, is plain. 
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History of the psychoid concept 
The psychoid concept, representing a deeply unknowable layer of the unconscious 
instantiating processes that are neither physiological nor psychological but that 
somehow partake of both, originated in the biological work of the neo-vitalist Hans 
Driesch (Jung, 1947/1954).  One aspect of this concept, concerning a vitalist relation 
of body and mind, is thus founded in biology, and has given rise to an associated 
tradition of theory and practice.  These origins are discussed in Chapter 4, and the 
corresponding post-Jungian tradition is discussed below and in Chapter 5.   
Another aspect, concerning the relation of mind and matter, is rooted in physics, 
specifically Jung’s work with the Nobel Prize winning laureate Wolfgang Pauli 
(Jung, 1952).  This latter aspect pertains to synchronicity, which is discussed, for 
example by Fordham (1957, 1962), Dieckmann (1974, 1976, 1980), Aziz (1990, 
2007), Von Franz (1992), Zabriskie (1995), Bright (1997), Meier (2001), Main (2004, 
2007), Gieser (2005), Hogenson (2005), Cadigan (2007), Cambray (2002, 2004, 
2009), Colman (2011), Giegerich (2012), Atmanspacher (2013, 2014), and Connolly 
(2015).  Gieser (2005) and Haule (2011) both contemplate this issue. 
Gieser (2005, 344) argues that Pauli believed in a unified science embracing 
psychology, physics and biology, and that Jung was influenced by his views on this.  
She notes Pauli’s interest in evolution, his understanding that a “psychic factor in 
nature […] has been present from the beginning in the building blocks of matter and 
life and […] has evolved alongside and in interaction with them” (ibid., 306).  And, 
she postulates mathematics as “a genuine symbolic description of reality”, the means 
of expressing universal processes, and the link between Jung’s archetypes, physics 
and the mysteries of biological life (ibid., 307, 310, 312).  
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Haule (2011, 77, 81), similarly, notes Pauli’s view of a potential connection between 
physics, biology and parapsychology, and accordingly contemplates synchronicity as 
a cosmic principle.  In support of this, he lifts five lines of argument from Jung’s 
correspondence with Pauli, referring to: synchronistic phenomena as knowledge not 
mediated by the senses; the fact that the archetype’s psychoid nature makes it 
transgressive, allowing it to assimilate the physical and the psychic; the archetype as 
psychic probability, allowing it to bridge the psychic and physical realms; 
synchronicity as the numinous moment; and synchronicity as a universal dimension 
of nature supplementing the classical triad of space, time and causality. 
Whilst both appear to propose the required link between biology and physics, and 
hence a justification for Jung’s traverse from one to the other, it is not clear that either 
has proved one, and therefore this question remains open.  It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to settle this question. 
A study of synchronicity is not included within this project, for these and other 
reasons, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Consequently, the following account (and the remainder of the thesis) focuses on the 
biological tradition in the history of the psychoid concept, and contemplates its 
theoretical evolution. 
1. Biological strand 
The biological aspect was pursued theoretically by various post-Jungians, as follows.  
a. Progoff 
Working towards a doctoral dissertation on the social meaning of Jung’s psychology, 
Progoff (1953) submitted a copy to the Bollingen Foundation.  Jung (1977) 
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responded, emphasising the experimental, empirical nature of his work, and the fact 
that he saw individuation as a natural process.  He referred to Levy-Bruhl’s 
conception of participation mystique as the manner by which society contains the 
individual in a state still undifferentiated from others, and to individuation as the 
process of differentiating a piece of the archetype out of the participation mystique 
(ibid., 215-6).   
Acknowledging Jung, Progoff (1959, 116-8) borrowed from the work of the biologist 
Edmund Sinnott, for whom the primary material of the life process is protoplasm, 
seen as a guiding principle inherent in every organism engendering ‘psych-like’11 
activity and growth.  This led Progoff to conceptualise a protoplasmic image directing 
the human organism, both individually and as a species, in its basic drive towards 
individual wholeness and the preservation of life, such imagery having two functions, 
namely to provide in potentio the instinctive spontaneous patterns of behaviour that 
represent the basic life tasks of the human organism, and to provide the underlying 
patterns by which he apprehends and gives life meaning.  The former dramatise 
themselves in the way in which the individual chooses to live out his individual life; 
and the latter provide his source of creativity in the symbolic forms that emerge into 
consciousness.   
b. Gray 
Gray (1996) also addresses the social implications of analytical psychology, seeing 
the psychoid unconscious, where psyche and soma are undifferentiated, as the origin 
of the archetype as such.   
                                                 
11
 In a footnote, Progoff notes ‘psych-like’ means psychoid. 
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It is at the biological level of the human organism, he observed, that “we can best 
discover the roots of archetypal activity” (ibid., 17, 51).  In early human development, 
psychoid processes gives rise to an archetypal psychic core, through a pairing of the 
innate biological element with the environmental encounters with the parents.  These 
interactions feed back into the biological system and become the visual, affective, 
visceral and bodily foundation for the archetypal image (ibid., 62-3).  In this way, the 
psyche of the infant first emerges, and then interacts with, both internal experience 
and the environment.     
c. Stevens 
An evolutionary view of archetypes, from Stevens (1995, 2006), considers that they 
were designed to solve problems implicit in the ancestral environment.  He 
contemplates the evolutionary history of our species, relating the archetypes to 
universal patterns of behaviour.  Noting that the psychoid aspect of the archetype acts 
as a bridge between psyche and matter, he observes that archetypes are made manifest 
through the body.   
d. Merchant 
Merchant (2006), making links with anthropology, proposes a developmental model 
of the archetype, according to which archetypal imagery is an emergent phenomenon, 
arising out of neural bio-structures laid down in early infancy as a result of 
developmental experience.  He links this with the psychoid nature of the archetype. 
These theoretical accounts supporting the biological base of Jung’s psychoid concept 
are supplemented by various clinical accounts, which shed light on the ways in which 
the psychoid concept is employed contemporaneously, including Jacobi (1959) and 
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Kalsched (1996) linking the concept to dissociation and early development, Gordon 
(1993) and Clark (1996, 2006) bringing in a vitalist view associated with early 
development and the transference, Redfearn (1973) considering archetypal images, 
and Proner (2005) making links between Jung’s psychoid concept and Bion’s proto-
mental concept.   
2. Dissociation 
Jung (1902, par. 5) initially linked dissociation with hysteria, when body and mind 
co-operate to produce split-off somnambulisms
12
.   Subsequently, he wrote about the 
formation of a state of secondary consciousness, representing: 
[A] personality component which has not been separated from ego-
consciousness by mere accident, but which owes its separation to definite 
causes.  Such a dissociation has two distinct aspects: in the one case […] an 
originally conscious content […] was repressed on account of its incompatible 
nature: in the other case, the secondary subject consists essentially in a 
process that never entered into consciousness because no possibilities exist 
there of apperceiving it.  (1947/1954, par. 366) 
Jacobi (1959), in a study of dissociation, makes a link with archetypal processes.  She 
writes that the archetype as such is beyond apprehension, belonging to the underlying 
psychoid realm only as a structural factor and potentiality (ibid., 119).  Emerging 
from the psychoid background, the archetypes bring forth particular patterns, which 
are present from birth as certain aptitudes.  Significantly, the archetype as such is 
present in the healthy and the sick alike.  The content, with which the archetype when 
constellated becomes filled, may suffer a variety of fates, being assimilated to a 
greater or lesser degree.  In the case of a healthy ego, the resulting disturbances can 
be resolved and integrated and employed as a catalyst for psychic development; the 
archetype is thus neutralised.  In the case of a weak ego, the content is rejected by the 
                                                 
12
 Corresponding to complexes. 
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ego to become an autonomous splinter psyche, producing symptoms and 
hallucinations, as in psychosis.  The determining factor is not the content of the 
archetypal image but the state of consciousness confronting it (ibid., 122).  
Kalsched (1996) relates this with infant development, proposing that the infant world 
is composed of sensations of comfort and discomfort, interspersed by primitive 
affects that assail the vulnerable infant psyche like volcanic storms.  The infant relies 
completely on his mother for mediation of their effect and, when mothering is 
satisfactory, the infant’s experience is metabolised and gradually converted into an 
ego capable of containing such affects.  Without mediation, the infant’s psyche 
becomes overwhelmed and forms a ‘total’ defence to protect a fundamental aspect of 
his being.  An internal agency steps in and dismembers the psyche in order to 
encapsulate and keep separate unmanageable experience.  Kalsched observes that 
both extremes of the body-mind spectrum, i.e. the archetypal poles in the psychoid 
unconscious, tend to carry the dissociation in this case. 
According to these sources, psychoid processes promote archetypal activity in the 
face of constellating events, and generate dissociative states when the ego of the 
individual becomes overwhelmed by archaic affects arising from the constellated 
material.  
3. Development 
The above post-Jungians all equate psychoid processes with development, as do a 
number of others:  
Sidoli (2000, 52, 92) associates Jung’s psychoid concept with early infancy.  When 
there is a failure of maternal reverie, opposing archetypal forces of a 
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psychophysiological nature that are unmanageable for the young infant split the two 
poles of archetypal experience into body and psyche, and archaic bodily elements 
remain lodged in the body as symptoms and do not reach mental representation.  She 
notes that these primitive elements often manifest in analysis as unintegrated 
psychotic pockets.  Likewise, Redfearn (1973) links Jung’s psychoid processes with 
the pre-reflective level of the primal or infant self, where bodily experience is 
archetypal.  In his view, such processes promote spontaneous psycho-physical 
activity, triggered by frustration arising when there is a less than perfect fit between 
the organism and the environment.   
Gordon (1993) relates psychoid processes with a developmental stage prior to the 
differentiation of psyche and soma, suggesting that they are manifest particularly in 
projective identification, which has as its goal the undoing of boundaries and the 
expression of the basic drive towards fusion and wholeness.  She describes Jung’s 
psychoid concept as a reference to the basic substance which, in the course of 
development, both personal and collective, differentiates into body and mind.      
Proner (2005) contemplates the relationship between physical and mental states of 
anxiety, referring particularly to Jung’s comment to Bion in the Tavistock Lectures 
that “the psychic fact and the physiological fact come together in a peculiar way” 
(Jung, 1935, par. 136).  He links this with Freud’s body ego, Jung’s conceptualisation 
that the archetypes have a psychoid pole that is outside mind, and Bion’s account of 
prenatal parts of the personality that remain in a state of primitive social organisation 
without the means of representation
13
 (Proner, 2005, 313).  Based on Fordham’s 
theory of deintegration and reintegration as a process that develops structure out of 
the first psychosomatic unity, and on Bion’s idea of mentalisation by the mother to 
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 Also formulated by Bion as the proto-mental apparatus. 
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transform the infant’s beta elements into alpha elements, Proner considers how 
somatic states in the consulting room may be mediated to become thought, since 
psychosomatic phenomena do not respond to interpretation of content.  He proposes 
that change takes place through meaningful emotional experience within an I-Thou 
relationship, in which a spectrum can be discerned, “from ‘proto-mental’ sensations 
with (painful) physical facts, to physical facts with meaning, on through to 
meaningful-painful emotional experience and mental representation” (ibid., 321, 
325).   
4. Archetypal imagery 
As discussed, Progoff and Gray emphasise archetypal imagery.  Redfearn (1973, 
1994) also does, noting an interaction between archetypal activity and the individual’s 
conscious adaptation to the here-and-now.  Any frustration of psychic adaptation 
unveils and generates archetypal images.  He describes the archetypal image as the 
imaginal aspect of affective experience, including affective bodily experience based 
on sensory data, perceptions, and motor patterns, and on this ground refers to it as an 
affect-image.  Affect images are activated by unintegrated parts of the self when 
libido is blocked, and then become conscious and available for integration.  Hence, 
archetypal imagery may be considered to relate to an emergent part of the self (1973, 
128).  
5. Embodied countertransference 
A significant number of post-Jungians have written about embodiment and the 
transference, including: Plaut (1956), Fordham (1957), Dieckmann (1974, 1976, 
1980), Moore (1972, 1986), Samuels (1985), Clark (1996, 2006), and Proner (2005).  
A number of these, but not all, make specific reference to psychoid processes; the 
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others refer more generally to archetypal activity and are included here, since they 
elaborate the contributions of those who refer to Jung’s psychoid concept. 
Plaut (1956, 16-7) writes of an archetypal transference, in which the analyst takes on 
the “image of the archetypal contents” of the transference, becoming the image 
“bodily” so as to “incarnate” it for the patient.  Fordham (1957, 144-5) describes such 
incarnation as a state of primitive identity, in which the image can be expressed either 
by the analyst or by the patient.  Samuels (1985, 53/60) describes this as an 
‘embodied countertransference’, in which the analyst experiences “a physical, actual, 
material, sensual expression” of an internal object of the patient, implying that the 
analyst’s body has become a medium for the patient’s transference communications 
and the analyst may thus be subject to ‘bodily visions’. 
In a research project, Samuels investigated a sample of 32 psychotherapists to test 
whether they had encountered such experiences, classifying their responses as to type 
of countertransference and form of embodiment.  He concluded that an embodied 
countertransference was relatively common, and to explain it proposed a theory of a 
mundus imaginalis
14
, defined as a “level of reality, located somewhere between 
primary sense impressions and more developed cognition and spirituality” (ibid., 58).  
Such an area functions as a mutual relationship between patient and analyst, in line 
with Jung’s transference diagram15 of a quaternio, and is thus to be distinguished 
from projective identification (although Samuels acknowledges Gordon’s link 
between projective identification and Jung’s psychoid concept).   
Various post-Jungian authors propose ways of addressing embodied 
countertransference.   
                                                 
14
 Corbin is acknowledged as originator of the term mundus imaginalis. 
15
 Jung, 1946, par. 422. 
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Clark (1996, 2006) describes primitive sensations and psychosomatic events 
experienced between patient and analyst: 
[T]he psychoid level of experience is not only personal, subjective and 
intrapsychic but vitally it is also interpsychic, between and together, 
belonging to an intimate mix-up.  It is effective in the communications and 
meta-communications at the level of the autonomic nervous systems as moved 
and shared between persons in mutual symbolic sensations.  As, for example, 
deeply and at a visceral level, between mother and baby, or in regressive 
transferences.  (1996, 349) 
In his model, the patient is operating at a pre-verbal, part-object infantile level, and 
the transference produces in the analyst psychosomatic sensations and symptoms, as 
well as imaged body parts and experiences, possibly even making the analyst ill.  
Clark discusses several clinical examples relating to borderline patients, “for whom 
developmental lacks and failures have caused an inability to distinguish or 
differentiate between fantasy and reality, inside and outside, self and other, and who 
are in a chronic and acute state of body-mind confusion” (2006,  68).  As he 
emphasises, however, this area is not only pathological, it is also a normal and 
necessary pre-differentiated state, which is a natural archetypal aspect of human 
nature.  He sees it as the analyst’s parental job to differentiate out his/her reactions, to 
“help the patient - (and the analyst) - to a new psyche-soma co-ordination” (1996, 
365).  
Greene (2001) writes about embodied processing of the countertransference, using 
her body as an instrument of perception, by noting her own somatic cues, such as 
posture, hunger, sleepiness, muscle constriction and breathing rhythms, to transform 
sensation into emotion or image, and hence symbolic understanding.  This may be 
seen as a form of active imagination.  She acknowledges that Jung’s psychoid concept 
provides a theoretical underpinning to her work.  
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6. Active imagination 
Further post-Jungians also contemplate using active imagination for addressing 
embodied countertransference. 
Contemplating the analyst’s part in the process of change in analysis, Moore (1972, 
59) suggests that ego development involves “the gradual separation out of the 
archetypes, which are at first experienced in terms of bodily feeling and later on in 
play, make believe and fairy-tales”, in the presence of an adequately containing 
environment. 
In a study of 129 analytic sessions from 15 patients, recorded over a period of 4 
weeks, she monitored the transference process, her introspections, and her 
interpretations, whereby to investigate how the Jungian notion of amplification
16
 
affects the transference process (Moore, 1986).  She begins with a personal account 
of a visit to the Yad Vashem memorial to the victims of the holocaust, and of an 
experience of feelings of nausea, physical symptoms, and primitive body sensations.  
Her approach to managing this was to seek associations of a cultural, collective and 
mythological nature, until these led her to childhood sense memories of soft fur and 
blackness.  She noted that this process of amplification rendered the unmanageable 
manageable.  She applied this in her clinical study, observing that it is fruitless to 
make clinical interpretations when concrete somatisation occurs in the 
countertransference.  Instead, she takes a ‘self’ or ‘non-ego’ position, which may be 
related to Jung’s notion of an unus mundus17, associated by Jung with the psychoid 
nature of the archetype (Jung, 1958, par. 852).  She works this through in her own 
                                                 
16
 Defined as using images and associations that are historical, mythological or religious to elaborate 
experience. 
17
 Defined as a unitary world, in which mind, body and matter are undifferentiated. 
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mind, making use of her own introspections and referring back to the personal 
individual body basis of her own earliest maternal relationship, until symbols begin to 
emerge.  Thus, the analyst’s somatic concretisation may give way to symbolisation, at 
which point interpretations can be made. 
Her approach is confirmed by Dieckmann (1974, 1976, 1980) in a research project in 
Berlin in 1970s by a group of Jungian analysts
18
, who conducted an empirical study 
of the transference based on process notes from analytic sessions.  The group 
members recorded the associations of the analyst alongside those of the patient in 
their process notes, and reported that certain symptoms were particularly marked, 
including: 
[T]he somatic reactions of the analyst in the vegetative as well as the motor 
sphere, such as pounding of the heart, feeling of strain, tension, fatigue, 
yawning, scratching, etc. Without exception an area of unconsciousness 
common to both analyst and patient could be found behind these symptoms.  
(Dieckmann, 1974, 73) 
They attributed this effect to the countertransference, noting that, in their conceptual 
model, the analyst directs his attention to his own unconscious, which is thrown into 
disharmony by the effects of the outside world/patient, and seeks to restore inner 
harmony in himself to assist the patient.  Dieckmann links this with the transcendent 
nature of the psyche, characterized by Jung as psychoid, synchronising the dynamics 
in the analytic dyad, so that a shift in the analyst confers a shift in the patient, even 
without interpretation.  
Schaverien (2007), likewise, proposes employing a method of active imagination 
when dealing with instances of embodied countertransference.  She gives three 
clinical examples, which produced in the analyst respectively an auditory experience, 
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 This project is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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a visual image and a perceptual distortion, and she explains how the analyst employed 
active imagination in each case.  Even when the patient lacked the capacity to 
symbolise, the analyst through active imagination was able to effect a shift from the 
concrete to the symbolic in themselves on behalf of the patient, and thereby shift the 
patient’s internal attitude. 
7. Summary 
As described, the literature on the psychoid concept and the bodymind is very varied, 
and without any coherent, unified account or definition of the concept. 
Conclusion 
As can be seen from this chapter, the range of literature generally on embodiment in 
analysis is inordinately wide and has no cohesive theoretical underpinning or focus.  
Such lack of coherence is even acknowledged in the literature.  As Bronstein (2011, 
174) remarks of psychosomatics, which represents merely a portion of the present 
field, there is a “huge divide and complexity that surrounds this subject”.   
It is thus evident that there is a significant need for an overall mapping of the 
topology of the area of embodiment in the consulting room, and a pressing 
requirement for the present research project and its investigation.   
The next chapter begins more specifically an account of the historical research of the 
present project.   
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Chapter 4 
Jung, vitalism and ‘the Psychoid’: An historical reconstruction 
 
Introduction 
This chapter
19
 begins the historical strand of the present conceptual study in detail, by 
looking at the origins of the psychoid concept, in an attempt to discover how the 
seeds of this concept arose and germinated in Jung’s mind, thereby to gain a better 
understanding as to what he means when he refers to his psychoid concept to 
designate a deeply unconscious set of processes that are neither physiological nor 
psychological but that somehow partake of both.  The primary aim in developing 
such a conceptual framework is to formulate an initial theoretical definition of the 
concept, but the history of this idea also sheds an interesting light on the relationship 
between Freud and Jung and on differences in their early epistemologies, and this 
offers additional comparative clarification.    
The chapter begins with a comment in a letter of Freud to Jung dated 7 April 1907, 
very shortly after their first meeting in the spring of that year, in which Freud is 
responding to a suggestion, presumably made by Jung in their meeting, to give the 
unconscious the name ‘psychoid’.   
At first sight, this exchange may seem to be no more than a casual interchange 
between the two men, but it is here argued that in fact it contains far more 
significance than initially appears.  Firstly, it shows that, in 1907, Jung was already 
contemplating an idea of a psychoid unconscious, although he did not adopt the 
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 This chapter is based on a paper published by the researcher as “Jung, Vitalism and the ‘Psychoid: 
An Historical Reconstruction”, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 54: 123-42.  
82 
 
 
 
expression ‘psychoid’ into his own published theory until forty years later, in On the 
Nature of the Psyche (Jung, 1947/1954).  Secondly, it points towards a divergence of 
approach right from the start of their collaboration, which highlights useful 
conceptual differences.   
The reference in question is somewhat mysterious, since what Freud says is: 
I appreciate your motives in trying to sweeten the sour apple, but I do not 
think you will be successful.  Even if we call the unconscious ‘psychoid’ it 
will still be the unconscious, and even if we do not call the driving force in the 
broadened conception of sexuality ‘libido’, it will still be libido, and in every 
inference we draw from it we shall come back to the very thing from which 
we are trying to divert attention with our nomenclature.  (McGuire, 1991, 58) 
Rather tantalisingly, the currently published records do not show in detail what 
passed between them in this first meeting, and so we cannot fully unravel the strands 
of their dialogue to get at their underlying intentions.  However, we can surmise that 
it was Jung who raised the idea of calling the unconscious the ‘psychoid’.  We can 
also surmise that they were discussing Freud’s theory of the unconscious, including 
his concept of ‘libido’ with its sexual connotations, and that Jung was questioning his 
ideas.  On the face of it, Freud is trying to neutralise a view alternative to his own, by 
claiming that the terms ‘unconscious’ and ‘libido’ carry within them the essence of 
his concepts, which already incorporate or supersede ideas offered by Jung.   
It is to be borne in mind that, in the beginning, psychoanalysis was founded upon an 
interest in the links between psyche and soma.  The pioneering work of Freud and 
Breuer (1892-1895), beginning with their Studies on Hysteria, traced a link between a 
precipitating psychic trauma on the one hand and sensory memory and experience on 
the other (later described by Freud as sensory hallucinations), that could be abreacted 
by bringing the memory of the original trauma to consciousness through analysis.  
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The mechanism attributed to hysteria by Freud and Breuer involved the repression 
into the unconscious of unwanted ideas of a sexual nature, and thus their dissociation 
from consciousness, coupled with a conversion of the accompanying affect into 
somatic symptoms.   
At the same time, Freud (1895[1950]) was writing his Project for a Scientific 
Psychology concerning the environment’s impact on the human organism and the 
organism’s reaction to it, in which Freud attempted to represent mental phenomena, 
including dreaming and hysterical compulsion, in terms of physiological processes.   
Not much later, Jung (1907/1908) in his Word Association Tests (WATs) 
demonstrated through the use of a galvanometer, whose electrodes were placed in 
skin contact with the hands and feet of his subjects, that a physical reaction 
accompanies the manifestation of an affect laden association of ideas or complex. 
At this very early stage in the field of psychoanalysis, the ideas of Freud and his 
followers were founded primarily on empiricism and a search for causal mechanisms 
linking body and mind, following the prevailing influences including natural 
causality, Darwin’s biology and the physiology of the Helmholtz school20, whose 
principles were physico-chemical.  In Freud’s Models of the Mind, Sandler et al 
emphasise Freud’s causal approach, stemming from his efforts to avoid metaphysical 
ideas, including teleology, in favour of an empirical orientation:  
In line with the dominant scientific ideas of the time, Freud systematically 
attempted to eliminate teleological explanations from his theories; that is, he 
saw mental functioning as being a form of adaptation to natural causes rather 
than having an ultimate and final ‘purpose’.  (1997, 17) 
                                                 
20
 In connection with the association between Freud and the School of Helmholtz, Cranefield (1966) 
reacts against the position that Freud was a mechanist/materialist, a view which was attributed to 
Bernfield (1944). 
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By the time that Freud and Jung met in 1907, Freud had moved to a more 
topographical theory of mind, in which Conscious, Preconscious and Unconscious 
define different depth levels.  The Unconscious was characterised by a very primitive 
mode of functioning according to which instinctual drives and wishes seek discharge, 
gratification and relief but are in conflict with the moral values of the Conscious and 
therefore subject to censorship.  Freud linked these instinctual drives with the 
psychosexual development of the child, and conceptualised them as fluctuating 
quantities of energy seeking discharge.  Such energy he termed libido.  
Although, in the early years of their collaboration, Jung’s attitude to Freud is 
popularly believed to have been based on an adherence to Freud’s ideas, it is argued 
here that in fact Jung was from the very beginning in this first meeting proposing a 
completely different view of the unconscious: One that was embedded in the history 
of vitalism; and one that foreshadowed and laid the foundation for many of his later 
theories.  More especially, it is asserted that, already, Jung had begun to formulate his 
own theory of the unconscious as it would ultimately be summarised forty years later 
in On the Nature of the Psyche, and that the implications in this first meeting were 
borne out by the subsequent unfolding of events. 
This chapter, therefore, now traces Jung’s interests at the start of his career, looking at 
his first case history and his early clinical work in the light of these interests, and then 
sets these themes against Freud’s early views on hysteria.  This will involve locating 
the psychoid concept within the history of vitalism, since a neo-vitalist notion of ‘a 
psychoid’ had already been conceived by the biologist, Hans Driesch (1903), prior to 
the meeting of Freud and Jung.   
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The subsequent development of the psychoid concept will then be considered, with a 
review of the extent to which Jung’s more mature ideas developed out of the vitalist 
tradition, and departed from those of Driesch.  
Etymology 
A consideration of the etymology of the word ‘psychoid’ locates its roots in the 
Greek word psyche, meaning spirit or soul, after the goddess Psyche, and breath or 
breath of life; and the Greek suffix -oeide, which is related to eidos, meaning shape or 
form or what is seen.  Interestingly, the Greek word psycho, meaning ‘I breathe’, is 
onomatopoeic, representing out-, followed by in-, breathing.   
The Greek psyche can be traced through the Latin psyche to later derivations in 
numerous languages.  The Greek psyche also carries the meaning ‘mind’, and psyche 
in the sense of mind may be opposed to the Late Latin (i.e. AD 180—600) psychicus 
having the meaning materialistic or carnal.   
Hence, the expression ‘psychoid’ may express an attempt to convey something about 
the manifest shape or form of the spirit, soul or mind, animated by the breath of life.  
And yet, at the same time, the same root yields a derivation which is material and 
bodily.   
Thus, such association points in both directions towards mind and body, and also 
betrays some uncertainty concerning their relation, and in adopting the expression 
‘psychoid’, the vitalists and Jung picked up on this association.   
As this chapter will show, they tried to encapsulate the body-mind relation in a single 
unified idea that was based not on psycho-physical parallelism but on a conceptual 
unity. 
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Driesch’s concept of Das Psychoid 
The term ‘psychoid’ was first employed in the field of vitalism to describe a 
particular teleological function of the human organism, having been coined by the 
neo-vitalist, Hans Driesch
21
, biologist and philosopher (1903).  Driesch studied at the 
University of Freiburg under Weismann, and at the University of Jena under Haeckel, 
Hertwig and Stahl.  He received his doctorate in 1889, and began a series of scientific 
studies thereafter, establishing a significant body of scientific experimentation and 
publication, before turning to philosophy.  He lectured both in UK and Germany, and 
became President of the Society for Psychical Research in 1926.   
Driesch was interested in the relationship between body and mind and was opposed to 
the notion of any deterministic connection between them, and to the mechanistic view 
that resulted from psycho-physical parallelism.  According to Driesch, all living 
bodies have three primary characteristics, namely form, metabolism and the capacity 
for action.   
In experiments conducted in 1892, he found that when an embryo of a sea urchin was 
at a very early stage, including only two or four cells (blastomeres), and all but one of 
those blastomeres were mutilated or destroyed, the single surviving blastomere still 
developed into a complete, though smaller than normal, whole.   He concluded that 
the living organism aims at some sort of wholeness in terms of its form, and thus that 
the development of organisms is directed by a life force or unifying self-determining 
ordering principle.   
Following a long line of philosophical thinkers from Aristotle onwards, he called this 
biological teleology ‘vitalism’, and he used the term ‘entelechy’ for the life force or 
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 1867-1941. 
87 
 
 
 
ordering principle governing the process (as described in Die “Seele” als 
Elementarer Naturfaktor (1903) and Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre 
(1905)).  He went on to show that entelechy might also be found to account for the 
inheritance of characteristics from one generation to another. 
He then turned to the third characteristic of the living body, namely action, in the 
sense of movement in response to a stimulus.  Movement, he said, involves a 
functional adaptation through experience, when a stimulus is repeated over time.  A 
mechanical cause and effect cannot be deduced, since the correspondence between an 
individualised stimuli and an individualised effect occurs on the basis of reaction that 
has been created historically.  An individual stimulus has a “prospective potency” of 
possible fates, only a single one of which actually results; some innate faculty 
responds to the stimulus by acting to produce a specific combination of muscular 
movements based on history.  This innate faculty he called Das Psychoid (i.e. a 
‘psychoid’):  
This seems to be just the right place in our discussion to give a name to the 
“acting something” which we have discovered not to be a machine.  We might 
speak of “entelechy” … but it appears better to distinguish also in terminology 
the natural agent which forms the body from the elemental agent which directs 
it.  […] I therefore propose the very neutral name of ‘psychoid’ for the 
elemental agent discovered in action.  (Driesch, 1929, 221) 
Accordingly, Driesch considered that the psychoid served to regulate action, and it 
did so by employing the faculties of the brain as a piano player uses a piano. 
He went on to postulate that, on the basis of future research into the nature of instinct, 
the psychoid might also be found to underlie instinctual behaviour, observing that, “if 
the analysis of instincts should help us some day to a true proof of vitalism, instead of 
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offering only some indications towards it, it might also be said that a ‘psychoid’ is the 
basis of instinctive phenomena” (ibid., 221). 
Driesch came to associate this innate faculty with unconscious ‘intra-psychical’, as 
opposed to physical, states involving memory and association, and set about 
investigating the “relations between my conscious phenomena and my material body” 
(ibid., 304).  He concluded: 
Seen from a purely psychological side
22
, entelechy, or at least that part of it 
which regulates action, i.e. our psychoid, is the same entity which is usually 
called soul or mind, being the ultimate foundation of the Ego, with all his 
experiences.  (Ibid., 306) 
Therefore, he defined his psychoid as an intra-psychic factor providing the 
unconscious ultimate foundation of the conscious ego and linking the conscious ego 
and the body-in-action.  It is important to understand that overall Driesch saw his 
psychoid as neither body nor mind but as something occupying a third position in 
between and relating to both.  This psychoid directs the brain in response to acts of 
volition from the ego to achieve individualised behaviour based on history, a process 
which he described as “I live my life” (ibid., 306).  Further, this psychoid is 
teleological and purposive in the sense that it constitutes an ordering principle urging 
behaviour along paths of adaptation to the environment, based on intentionality of the 
ego and on historical experience. 
Jung and vitalism 
Returning to Jung, it is known from his very early work that he had a significant 
interest in vitalism.  In The Zofingia Lectures, delivered as a student in the years 
1896-1899, Jung rejected both “contemporary sceptical materialist opinion” (1896, 
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par. 63) and metaphysics.  He sought a third position lying between them, which he 
found in vitalism, asserting that “a pre-existent vital principle is necessary to explain 
the world of organic phenomena” (ibid., 63).  He described the vital principle as a life 
force, which: 
[G]overns all bodily functions, including those of the brain, and hence also 
governs consciousness […] The vital principle extends far beyond 
consciousness in that it also maintains the vegetative functions of the body 
which, as we know, are not under our conscious control.  Our consciousness is 
dependent on the functions of the brain, but these are in turn dependant on the 
vital principle, and accordingly the vital principle represents a substance, 
whereas consciousness represents a contingent phenomenon.  (Ibid., par. 96) 
He linked the vital principle with the purposeful and organisational activity of the 
soul, in what he described as the new empirical psychology:  
The new empirical psychology furnishes us with data ideally designed to 
expand our knowledge of organic life and to deepen our views of the world 
[…] Our body formed from matter, our soul gazing towards the heights, are 
joined in a single living organism.  (Ibid. par. 142) 
Accordingly, right from the outset and even as a student, Jung espoused in his 
psychology a purposeful, i.e. a teleological, approach directed towards goals of 
wholeness in the future, and in this he displayed the foundations of some of his much 
later ideas with their vitalistic basis.   
This bias is also taken through into his early clinical work, as his first case study 
demonstrates.   
Jung’s dissertation 
Jung’s initial publication of clinical work was his dissertation on a case of 
somnambulism, defined as a hysterical illness often involving dissociation (1902).   
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The subject, designated Miss S. W., was in fact his cousin Helene Preiswerk although 
this was not at the time disclosed.  She was a young girl who experienced states of 
‘double consciousness’, in which she held séances attended by the young Jung.  Jung 
describes at some length so-called occult phenomena occurring in these states, 
without at any stage offering a view as to the reality of such phenomena.  Rather, he 
adopts a position of enquiry into their psychological meaning for Helene. 
In her somnambulistic “attacks”, Helene would display an unnatural pallor and enact 
the behaviour and dialogue of other personalities foreign to that of her normal waking 
state.  Jung (1902, par. 11) quotes Krafft-Ebing (1879, 498) that hallucinations of all 
the senses are not uncommon in somnambulism.  Helene would display various kinds 
of automatic behaviour, including unconscious motor phenomena and automatic 
writing, prior to returning gradually to her waking state by way of a cataleptic stage.   
Some of these other personalities were frivolous and childish but one, named Ivenes 
and identified by Jung as the somnambulistic ego of Helene, was a more mature 
woman, assured and influential.  Jung (ibid., par. 116) considered that Helene, 
“anticipates her own future and embodies in Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty 
years’ time – the assured, influential, wise, gracious, pious lady”. 
The mechanism of this double consciousness, as described by Jung, bears comment.  
Although he refers to the secondary personalities as dissociations from the already 
existing personality, mentioning Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900), 
nevertheless he explicitly avoids adopting Freud’s theories on the ground that he has 
no means of judging how far the emotion in question was “repressed” (ibid., par. 97).   
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He also refers to the dream-states producing Helene’s automatisms as hysterical, and 
links her periodic personality changes and splits in consciousness with hysteria, 
although again he avoids any idea of repression:  
Our patient differs essentially from pathological dreamers in that it could 
never be proved that her reveries had previously been the object of her daily 
interests; her dreams come up explosively, suddenly bursting forth with 
amazing completeness from the darkness of the unconscious. […] it seems 
probable that the roots of those dreams were originally feeling-toned ideas 
which only occupied her waking consciousness for a short time.  We must 
suppose that hysterical forgetfulness plays a not inconsiderable role in the 
origin of such dreams: many ideas which, in themselves, would be worth 
preserving in consciousness, sink below the threshold, associated trains of 
thought get lost and, thanks to psychic dissociation, go on working in the 
unconscious.  (Ibid., par. 119) 
For Jung, then, repression is not a factor, but rather a “forgetfulness” in which 
worthwhile
23
 content sinks below the threshold of consciousness.   
This paves the way for a view contrary to the theory of hysteria based on repression 
favoured by Freud, a view according to which Helene’s somnambulism has a 
teleological function: 
It is, therefore, conceivable that the phenomena of double consciousness are 
simply new character formations, or attempts of the future personality to break 
through. […] In view of the difficulties that oppose the future character, the 
somnambulisms sometimes have an eminently teleological significance, in 
that they give the individual, who would otherwise succumb, the means of 
victory.  (Ibid., par. 136) 
In this very early piece of work, Jung achieves a remarkable synthesis, which is more 
in line with his earlier expressed interest in vitalism than with his acknowledgement 
of Freud.   
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Firstly, he offers a mechanism for explaining dissociation, in which body and mind 
co-operate to produce split off somnambulisms that are activated by unconscious 
motor phenomena and hallucinations, and that incorporate forgotten worthwhile 
content; and secondly he emphasises clearly both the psychological meaning of 
Helene’s experiences and their teleological function in giving intimations of future 
possibilities and their form, as in the case of the personality of Ivenes.   
A case of hysteria 
During the next few years, Jung began to adopt some of Freud’s ideas more overtly, 
most notably in his treatment of Sabina Spielrein, in which he employed Freud’s 
method of working over childhood memories and associative material.  
Sabina was admitted to the Burghölzli Clinic in 1904, when Eugen Bleuler was 
Director and Jung had sole medical responsibility for patients.  Although, in 1896, 
Bleuler had described Freud’s Studies on Hysteria as “one of the most important 
publications of the last few years in the field of normal and pathological psychology”, 
the hospital records give no indication of any clinical application yet of Freud’s ideas 
(Minder, 1994, 111).  Sabina was diagnosed with hysteria, and she was effectively the 
Burghölzli’s first case to be treated using Freud’s analytic method.   
She suffered from compulsions, tics, and other somatic symptoms, and according to 
notes taken by Jung, she reported feeling as if someone were pressing upon her, and 
as if something were crawling around in her bed.  In her treatment with Jung, she 
confessed to a father complex, in which her father had beaten and humiliated her as a 
child.  Jung wrote that he applied Freud’s method with considerable success and her 
symptoms cleared up (ibid., 121).   
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However, while Jung acknowledged the efficacy of Freud’s method, it is not so 
evident that he agreed with Freud’s theory.  Minder (ibid., 129) thinks that Jung was 
referring to Sabina in his paper Cryptomnesia (1905), in which Jung describes 
hysteria in terms of his own theories, according to which hysterical dissociation is 
brought about by a feeling-toned memory complex.  The following year, in their early 
correspondence during October to December of 1906, Jung expressed directly to 
Freud doubts concerning various aspects of Freud’s theory of hysteria and its genesis, 
writing that his scientific premises were utterly different from those of Freud 
(McGuire, 1991, 51).  Papadopoulos (2006) sees in this statement a reference to 
significant epistemological differences from the outset.   
In a lecture in Amsterdam in 1907 shortly after his meeting with Freud, Jung (1908, 
pars. 51-2) again referred to his work with Sabina, presented as a case of psychotic 
hysteria, describing her symptoms very much in the Freudian terms of infantile 
sexuality, repression, and the consequent appearance of physical symptoms.  
Nevertheless, in the same lecture, Jung also criticises Freud’s views, based on his 
own theory of complexes derived from his Word Association Experiments (ibid., par. 
42), and he gives a very wide interpretation to Freud’s understandings of ‘sexuality’ 
and ‘libido’, describing them respectively as “the instinct for the preservation of the 
species” and “any inordinate passion or desire” (ibid., par. 49).  Therefore, it is quite 
possible that Jung tended to see the aetiology of hysteria more in terms of his own 
ideas concerning complexes and their links with dissociation and physical symptoms, 
rather than in terms of the mechanism described by Freud.   
All of this suggests that Jung had definite reservations about Freud’s ideas, and a 
clear view of his own scientific base, even at the stage of their first meeting.   
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Freud and Jung and their meeting 
In the light of this background, Jung’s suggestion to Freud to call the unconscious 
‘psychoid’ would seem to be no mere chance remark but one to carry within it a 
whole raft of already formulated ideas concerning the unconscious, in spite of the fact 
that the remark was tossed lightly aside by Freud with the comment that Jung was 
simply “trying to sweeten the apple” (McGuire, 1991, 58).  Given his already 
demonstrated interest in vitalism and his approach in his dissertation to the 
psychological experiences of his cousin Helene, Jung would almost certainly have 
contemplated an idea of the unconscious more in line with the vitalism of Hans 
Driesch than with the views of Freud, i.e. one that was teleological and aligned 
towards potential future forms, one having an organising function, and one whose 
drives were not solely sexual in origin.  The contents of such an unconscious could 
then be seen as worthwhile and forgotten, as opposed to unwanted and repressed, and 
the dissociation and somatic symptoms of hysteria could be explained in terms of 
Jung’s theory of complexes and the somatic thinking of Driesch.   
Even at this early stage, therefore, it appears that Jung was contemplating a view of 
the unconscious that embraced something like the psychoid of Driesch to account 
both for the body-mind connection and for the teleological function that he attributed 
to Helene and her somnambulisms. 
That this view is in fact probable may be demonstrated also by the references made 
by Jung to vitalistic ideas and works on vitalism in his later writings on his theory of 
libido, including Symbols of Transformation (1912), which proposed an idea of libido 
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in non-sexual energic terms, and his essay On Psychic Energy (1928)
 24
, which sets 
out to explain the rationale for his ideas on libido.   
Marilyn Nagy (1991, 128) draws attention to references to vitalistic ideas in Symbols 
of Transformation, commenting:, “I am certain that what was really at stake between 
the two men in their struggle over the nature of psychic libido was the ancient mind-
body problem as it surfaces in the biological sphere”. 
Actually, it is evident that the differences ran even deeper than this and were of an 
epistemological nature, since Freud, as stated above, espoused a biological-
mechanical model in his initial work on hysteria and in the Project and located the 
origins of pathology in childhood sexuality, whereas Jung from the outset held to a 
vitalistic teleological approach, which continued to influence his thinking in one form 
or another throughout his life.   
It is then no surprise that subsequent events led to a parting of the ways, as both 
Freud and Jung continued to develop their ideas along the lines already foreshadowed 
in their divergent initial epistemological approaches.  In Jung’s case, this meant that 
the influence of vitalism continued in the future evolution of his views concerning a 
psychoid unconscious, whilst Freud (1923, 15; 1925, 32) continued to dismiss such 
concept as being philosophical and representing something unknown. 
Bleuler’s concept of Die Psychoide 
The next step in the background to Jung’s mature ideas on a psychoid unconscious, 
derived from the field of vitalism, is provided by Eugen Bleuler
25
, professor of 
psychiatry at the University of Zurich, and director of the Burghölzli Asylum in the 
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period 1898-1927.  Jung was Bleuler’s assistant from 1900-1909, and it is known, for 
example from Ernst Falzeder (2007), that the Burghölzli community was close knit 
and that ideas were freely discussed and exchanged.  It is likely, therefore, that 
Bleuler was well acquainted with Jung’s interest in vitalism, and he was certainly 
aware of Driesch, as his writings attest, although he dismissed Driesch’s view of the 
psychoid on the ground that the underlying theory could be attributed to philosophy 
rather than science. 
It was only considerably after Jung had left the Burghölzli that Bleuler (1925) 
published a concept of the psychoid in Die Psychoide als Prinzip der Organischen 
Entwicklung.  In distinction from Driesch’s concept “Das Psychoid”, having the 
neuter gender, Bleuler called his the feminine “Die Psychoide”.  In a review in the 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Reich (1927) suggests that Bleuler does not 
satisfactorily distinguish his psychoid from that of Driesch, but the present discussion 
indicates that this shows an insufficient understanding of the two views. 
By contrast with Driesch, Bleuler (1930, 35) described his psychoid in terms of a 
psycho-physical parallelism, in that he argued that “both physiology and the psyche 
act on similar principles” for motives that seek to achieve some final future 
orientation.  In the case of the organism, the instincts are so ordered that life is 
maintained; and in the case of the psyche, intelligence acts as a guide to the same end.  
In both, adaptation occurs in response to experience and introduces new orientations 
accordingly.  This approach suggests the idea of a psyche-soma split, whereas 
Driesch disputes such parallelism by proposing a third position for his psychoid 
between the two. 
For example, in the case of the body, according to Bleuler: 
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[T]he organism adapts itself a thousandfold to unusual needs, heat, cold, 
increased or diminished use of certain bodily organs, change of food etc. […] 
It is as if the organism were ‘learning’ to select the conditions most favourable 
to it.  In any case, we are in the presence here of a function similar to human 
memory, which creates new connections.  (Ibid., 36) 
In another example, a new born baby cries by reflex and finds that mother comes, 
which gradually leads first to an idea that mother comes in response to crying, which 
the baby likes, and then to the building of memory and psyche.  The new-born has no 
ability to reflect, but his cry causes a reaction in that mother comes.  This produces a 
change in his psyche so that an association is formed, and thereafter crying occurs on 
the mere inclination to have mother near.   
In both cases, an influence causes a reaction and a permanent structural change, 
which shapes future reactions in a favourable direction.  Since these are not 
conscious, Bleuler (ibid., 38) eschewed the expression ‘memory’ in favour of 
‘mneme’ for the link between influence and reaction, and he allocated the expression 
‘engramme’ for the permanent change, borrowing his terminology from the 
psychologist Richard Semon.  Thus, the mneme yields an adaptation, a ‘learning’ of a 
purposeful action as if it already had a potential outcome in view, and the experiences 
are preserved in the form of engrammes that are later revived in the shape of actions, 
and in associations that determine the paths of our thought processes.  In the body, 
this yields physical actions in response to nervous stimuli, and regeneration occurs 
following injury.  In the brain, for example in the process of writing, it produces a 
perception of pen and paper, as well as engrammes of the writing movement and a 
conception of the ideas to be written that direct the writing action. 
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Thus, exactly the same elementary processes occur in the bodily functions as in the 
memory of the psyche.  Both learn by experience and both comprise an integration of 
functions: 
The psyche – apart from its experience content – consists of a number of 
instincts […] bound up as a unit […]  Bodily functions, too, are integrated to a 
high degree, not only the nervous ones but all the others; all vegetative 
functions, digestion, circulation etc., are dependent on one another […]  
Hence, we have good grounds for bringing the bodily functions under one 
conception.  This summary, the body soul, I have called the psychoid. 
As we ascertain in the psychoid, with the exception of consciousness, all the 
elementary functions that we find in the psyche, and in the latter all that are in 
the former, we cannot do otherwise than regard the psyche as a specialisation 
of the psychoid.  (Ibid., 43) 
Accordingly, the stage moves from the psychoid to the psyche at the point that 
consciousness sets in.  Bleuler defines the psychoid as the capacity to respond and 
adapt in the face of stimuli thereby creating permanent changes in the brain that shape 
future reactions.  Out of this, he goes on to elaborate the functions of the psychoid in 
the development or evolution of the species.   
For Bleuler, therefore, the psychoid is initially a bodily function that extends into the 
area of psychological growth, arising out of behaviour based on “what is favourable” 
and generating permanent changes in the body and in the brain through the 
experience.   This leads Bleuler ultimately to see the psychoid as a causal agent of 
psychic development, as in the case of the infant who develops a pattern of behaviour 
as it learns that mother responds to its crying, and in this sense Bleuler’s psychoid 
also has a teleological character.   
Bleuler, by opposing psyche and soma, is forced to locate his psychoid in one or the 
other, and does so by placing it in the body rather than in the psyche, in distinction 
from Driesch’s unifying psychoid having a third position.  Nevertheless, Bleuler 
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offers an elaboration not provided by Driesch, according to which his bodily psychoid 
is oriented towards psychic development based on a selection of that which has a 
favourable outcome.  Thus, he supplies a mechanism of a causal nature by which 
psyche develops out of soma, which may be contrasted with the very deeply 
unconscious and life enhancing process envisaged by Driesch.  We may therefore see 
the psychoid of Bleuler particularly as a developmental agent, which fosters the 
development of mind out of the matrix of the body. 
Jung’s concept of ‘the psychoid’ 
This then is the background to the adoption by Jung of the same expression 
‘psychoid’ to describe a particular aspect of the unconscious in his paper On the 
Nature of the Psyche (1947/1954).   
In the period between offering the name to Freud in 1907 and this time, Jung had 
been developing his own ideas concerning the structure and development of the 
psyche, in which he regarded instincts as a key factor.  In his paper Instinct and the 
Unconscious (1919), he described instincts and archetypes as correlates of one 
another in the spheres of action and perception, the one regulating our conscious 
actions and the other determining our mode of apprehension: 
Just as instincts compel man to a conduct of life, which is specifically human, 
so the archetypes or categories a priori coerce his intuition and apperception 
to forms specifically human.  I propose to designate the sum of such inherited 
psychic qualities as instincts and archetypes of apprehension by the words the 
‘collective unconscious’.  (Ibid., 19) 
A few years later, he arrived at a different view, according to which the archetypes 
are the forms which the instincts assume (Jung 1927/1931, par. 339).  By 1936, he 
was writing that the instincts are the chief motivating forces of psychic events: 
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I regard the compulsiveness of instinct as an ectopsychic factor.  None the 
less, it is psychologically important because it leads to the formation of 
structures or patterns which may be regarded as determinants of human 
behaviour.  Under these circumstances the immediate determining factor is 
[…] the structure resulting from the interaction of instinct and the psychic 
situation of the moment.  (1936, par. 234) 
He called this process ‘psychization’.  
This development in Jung’s thinking is relevant to his views on the nature of 
psychoid processes, because of the way in which Jung links such processes with 
instincts and the archetypes.  Acknowledging both Driesch and Bleuler, Jung 
dismisses Driesch’s view of the psychoid as a “directing principle” on the ground that 
this approach is essentially philosophical, and observes that his own use of the term 
serves to delineate roughly the same group of phenomena that Bleuler had in mind, 
namely those subcortical processes concerned with biological adaptive functions 
(ibid., par. 368).   
Jung defined his own use of the term ‘psychoid’ thus: 
[F]irstly, I use it as an adjective, not as a noun; secondly, no psychic quality in 
the proper sense of the word is implied, but only a ‘quasi-psychic one such as 
reflex-processes possess; and […] it is meant to distinguish a category of 
events from merely vitalistic phenomena on the one hand and from 
specifically psychic processes on the other.  (Ibid., par. 368) 
Based on the enquiry, “(H)ow do we define the psychic as distinct from the 
physiological?” (ibid., par. 376), he came up with precisely the view that the contents 
of the unconscious psyche contain undoubted links with the instinctual sphere, which 
may be thought of as physiological, the lower reaches of the psyche beginning where 
the psyche emancipates itself from the compulsive force of the instinct.  The psyche 
then extends along a continuum from instinct in its lower reaches in the organic-
material substrate to spirit in its upper reaches, and: 
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Where instinct predominates psychoid processes set in which pertain to the 
unconscious as elements incapable of consciousness.  The psychoid process is 
not the unconscious as such, for this has far greater extension.  Apart from 
psychoid processes, there are in the unconscious ideas, volitional acts, hence 
something akin to conscious processes; but in the instinctual sphere these 
phenomena retire so far into the background that the term ‘psychoid’ is 
probably justified.  (Ibid., par. 380) 
Having thus linked instinct with psychoid processes, he goes on to link instinct with 
his theory of archetypes, as follows:  
Instinct and the archaic [primitive] mode [of functioning] meet in the 
biological conception of the “pattern of behaviour” [… E]very instinct bears 
in itself the pattern of its situation.  Always, it fulfils an image, and the image 
has fixed qualities.  The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image of ant, 
tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and the little ant-garden of fungi.  If any one of 
these conditions is lacking, the instinct does not function, because it cannot 
exist without its total pattern, without its image.  Such an image is an a priori 
type.  It is inborn in the ant prior to any activity, for there can be no activity at 
all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern initiates and makes it possible.  
This schema holds true also of man.  (Ibid., par. 398) 
He considered that this instinctual (i.e. primordial) image
26
 represented the meaning 
of the instinct, and concluded that such patterns of behaviour constitute unconscious 
conditions acting as regulators and stimulators of the instinctual sphere.  The resulting 
unconscious processes give rise to spontaneous manifestations in the form of new 
positions, and later dreams and other fantasy-material of a consciously perceptible 
nature, in which can be seen certain well-defined themes and formal elements.  As 
consciousness sets in, the archetypal image, seen as an extension of the instinctual 
image in the psychic arena, takes over.  The unconscious processes thus act also as 
regulators and stimulators of creative fantasy-activity, which avails itself of the 
existing conscious material, so that the instinctual image, and then the archetypal 
image, stimulates mental activity generally.  Consciousness, Jung wrote, is not only a 
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transformation of the original instinctual image but also its transformer (ibid., par. 
399).  In this respect, it is here argued that Jung is describing and elaborating an 
emergent factor that arises whenever the instinctual image is fulfilled and that yields a 
new and synergistic result.   
He goes on to say: 
The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the 
unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such.  They are 
very varied structures which all point back to one essentially “irrepresentable” 
form.  The latter is characterised by certain formal elements and by certain 
fundamental meanings, although these can be grasped only approximately.  
The archetype as such is a psychoid factor […] It does not appear to be 
capable of reaching consciousness.  (Ibid., par. 417) 
By designating the archetype as such as a psychoid factor, Jung is suggesting that all 
archetypes possess this psychoid aspect, i.e. they are all underpinned by psychoid 
processes immanent in the structure of the organism, that may be conceived as 
emergent functions.  This is the first time that he has specifically related archetypes to 
psychoid processes, and it results in an extension of his previous understanding of the 
archetypes, as generators of visual images and ideas, to embrace a new view, where 
their effect may be to generate phenomena other than visual images and ideas, which 
phenomena manifest psychically although being nearer in character to the physiology 
of the organism:  
In my previous writings, I have always treated the archetypal phenomena as 
psychic, because the material to be expounded or investigated was solely 
concerned with images or ideas.  The psychoid nature of the archetype as put 
forward here does not contradict these earlier formulations; it only means a 
further degree of conceptual differentiation […] Just as the ‘psychic infra-
red’, the biological instinctual psyche, gradually passes over into the 
physiology of the organism and thus merges with its chemical and physical 
conditions, so the ‘psychic ultra-violet’, the archetype, describes a field which 
exhibits none of the peculiarities of the physiological and yet, in the last 
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analysis, can no longer be regarded as psychic, although it manifests itself 
psychically.  (Ibid., pars. 419-20) 
Consequently, for Jung, the psychoid nature of the archetype is a way of linking 
psyche and soma through a continuum extending from an instinctual or “psychic 
infra-red” pole to a spiritual or “psychic ultra-violet” pole.  We can see that, for him, 
body and mind do not stand in a parallel relation but are two different aspects of one 
and the same thing, represented in his notion of the psychoid unconscious.   
In Jung’s model, psychoid processes underlying the archetypes are immanent at an 
instinctual level in the matrix of the organism and are so deeply lodged that they are 
incapable of being made conscious.  Such processes through their links with the 
instincts give rise to activity within the psyche that produces emergent forms of an 
archetypal nature, which contribute to the development of consciousness and of 
structure within the psyche, both transforming the existing structure and then being 
transformed by the new structure.   
Discussion 
Interestingly, both Bleuler and Jung dismissed Driesch on the grounds that he was a 
philosopher and that his ideas were based merely on philosophy, in spite of the fact 
that, of the three of them, Driesch was the one with the strongest record of scientific 
experimentation, publication and scientific claim.   
In viewing the evolution of the psychoid concept through its various incarnations in 
the hands of the three men, they adopted different positions in regard to the nature of 
the linking mechanism between body and mind, with Driesch and Jung both arguing 
that body and mind are different aspects of the same thing, and Bleuler taking a view 
based more on a psycho-physical parallelism.  A common theme in each case, 
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however, was a notion of the psychoid concept as a teleological factor, and here each 
of them developed the ideas of their predecessor further towards an hypothesis of a 
specific methodology by which such teleology might be expressed.   
Driesch postulated a unifying psychoid situated between psyche and soma, such 
psychoid directing and organising behaviour, in the sense of the body-in-action, 
towards goals of wholeness lying in the future.  His psychoid was to be seen as a 
directing principle in a living body.  Bleuler’s advance over Driesch was to elucidate 
a view of the psychoid as an unconscious, adaptive bodily process by which psychic 
learning takes place in response to physical stimuli, as in the case of the infant who 
develops a pattern of behaviour as it learns that mother responds to its crying.  Haule 
(2011, 75) considers that Jung wanted to locate his psychoid somewhere between 
Driesch and Bleuler.  
However, it is argued here that Jung developed his description of psychoid processes 
a long way beyond the ideas of both Driesch and Bleuler.  Nonetheless, the fact that 
he chose to adopt the same terminology suggests that he still wished to retain a 
vitalistic base for his ideas, in spite of the fact that he eschewed the entirely vitalistic 
notion of Driesch, saying that his definition of psychoid processes is not intended to 
embrace merely vitalistic phenomena within its scope. 
The key aspect of Jung’s advance lies with his linking of psychoid processes with his 
theory of archetypes.  This enabled him to draw connections with the function of 
instincts, and with his notion of the instinctual image with its many components 
combining together into one single outcome.  This connection is a very interesting 
one, whose full implications may be far reaching.  As Jung observes, all of the 
elements must be present before any outcome arises, but at the moment when they all 
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come together something entirely new emerges.  In his example, the instinctual image 
of the leaf-cutting ant, all of the ant, tree etc., must coincide to produce the leaf-
cutting behaviour natural to the ant.  No previous experience of leaf-cutting behaviour 
is required for the ant to know what to do, and no learning takes place; rather the 
instinct is complete in its specificity from the very first occurrence.  The instinctual 
image is therefore complex and multi-valent.  It is also purposeful, teleological, and 
directed towards the survival of the organism in bringing about the next 
developmental stage.  In this manner, we can see that each succeeding stage 
supervenes on the previous one, neither being caused by, nor reducible to, the factors 
in the previous stage. 
A pattern of elements, in their multiplicity, coincide and an entirely new and more 
complex position emerges, in which all the elements are combined not simply as an 
independent collection or collocation but as an interacting whole, in which the 
interaction is not predictable from the individual parts. 
Furthermore, the instinctual image with its pattern of elements is immanent as a 
potential in the basic structure of the organism.  It exists as potential inherent within 
the organism, but it can only be brought to fruition when external circumstances arise 
to fulfil the instinctual image.  The internal potential must be met by the external 
circumstances for the next stage to emerge.    Hogenson (2001, 600), noting that Jung 
made reference to both Baldwin and C. Lloyd Morgan and their ideas on evolution, 
observes that “the archetypal is always embedded in a context”, which is equally as 
important as any structure.  Such context constitutes “instances of actually occurring 
entities that place adaptive demands on the organism”, and thus the archetypes may 
be seen as emergent properties of a dynamic developmental system involving 
organism and environment (ibid., 607). 
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As Jung says, what holds true for the instinctual image of the ant is a schema that also 
holds true for man.  And indeed it can be seen in the new-born infant who, when laid 
on her mother’s breast, has been found to seek out the nipple and start to feed.  Here, 
infant, mouth, tongue, mother, breast, nipple come together, and in this moment the 
infant instinctively suckles and milk starts to flow. 
However, Jung does not stop at the behavioural level of instinct.  He goes on to apply 
this schema to the development of consciousness, linking such development with the 
dynamism of instinct and the instinctual image at one end of the spectrum and with 
the aspiration of spirit and the archetypal image at the other, the archetypal image 
being described by Jung as “the dominants that emerge into consciousness as 
universal ideas” (ibid., par. 423).  Hence, it is to be noted that he discriminates 
archetypal images from instinctual images. 
This suggests that he is depicting a mechanism by which consciousness not only 
emerges from the matrix of the body under the pressure of the dynamism of instinct, 
in co-operation with the elements of the instinctual image, but also how 
consciousness may become increasingly sophisticated by developing to ever further 
levels by the same kind of process.  It also suggests that this process in its early stages 
requires a duality, in which the instinctual image as potential meets the elements of 
the instinctual image as objects, for new forms to arise, and points to the significance 
of relationship in the development of the psyche, the “other” being required to fulfil 
aspects of the instinctual image in the early stages of physiological development and 
of consciousness.   
The process of emergence of new forms of instinctual image will thus gradually give 
rise to consciousness, to internal representations of the ‘other’, to fantasy-material 
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concerning self and other perceptible to and interacting with consciousness, and 
eventually to forms of archetypal image.  In advanced stages, internal representations 
of the other, including fantasy material, provide elements of the archetypal image, 
and the process of emergence will be at least in part an intrapsychic one.  This fits 
with Jung’s comments that consciousness is not only a transformation of the original 
instinctual image but also its transformer. 
Conclusion 
Based on the above, this thesis argues that Jung is giving us a model of psychoid 
processes in terms of the primordial or instinctual image, which he describes as a 
pattern of behaviour in relation to the leaf-cutting ant.  When a particular set of 
conditions is fulfilled, then these processes are initiated and the instinctual sphere is 
stimulated to activity.  However, such set of conditions can only be fulfilled in the 
human sphere in relationship, at which point psychoid processes respond and lead 
first to connection, communication, and in time to the development of psychic 
structure.  Accordingly, Jung’s psychoid processes link the physiological and 
instinctual spheres with the growth of the psyche, and lead to the emergence of ever 
new and more complex psycho-physical and psychic structures. 
To return now to the point where this chapter started, with Freud’s letter of 7 April 
1907 to Jung, and the suggestion put forward by Jung in their meeting that the 
unconscious could be called ‘psychoid’, it now seems evident that even at this early 
stage Jung had in mind some idea of an unconscious more aligned with the biological 
thinking of Driesch than with the views of Freud.  Further, it appears that, even in 
their meeting, the groundwork had already been laid in the mind of Jung for an idea 
of the unconscious based on a teleological outlook directed towards the possibility, 
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and even character, of future potential.  Such a view implies that the two men had 
wholly different epistemological approaches from the outset.  Certainly, this was 
borne out in the unfolding of events between Freud and Jung.  Importantly, however, 
it also feeds in to the way in which Jung’s more mature ideas took shape and asserted 
themselves, as discussed in the next chapter. 
Thus, the next chapter continues the exploration of Jung’s ideas on his psychoid 
concept, by pursuing another strand in his early thinking, based on his researches into 
the vision-making process, including his self-investigation in his Red Book work, and 
his consequent theoretical conceptualisations, and by reviewing certain researches 
amongst the post-Jungians. 
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Chapter 5 
The psychoid in research contexts 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the historical evolution of the psychoid concept within 
the field of vitalism via a lineage commencing with the biological and experimental 
ideas of Driesch, through the developmental ideas of Bleuler, to the archetypal base 
of Jung, in each case developing further refinements on the issue of the body-mind 
relation.  Vitalism afforded Jung a matrix of thinking allowing him to develop new 
ways of seeing a purposive unfolding of the psyche-soma throughout the life cycle, 
and provided a foundation on which he grounded his notions of a psychoid factor 
underlying the archetype as such. 
It was argued in the previous chapter that the archetype as such could be seen as a 
potential in the psychoid unconscious for organising and shaping elements of an 
instinctual or imaginal character to engender new and more complex emergent 
positions, depicted as the instinctual image and the archetypal image, respectively.  
Due to the psychoid nature of the archetype, these images may emerge into 
consciousness anywhere along the psyche-soma continuum between instinct and 
spirit in embodied form.   
The previous chapter thus yields up certain approaches to understanding, and certain 
kinds of vocabulary for describing, the relationship of body and mind, thereby 
providing an initial definition of the psychoid concept located in an historical ground.   
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Starting from this base, the present chapter moves towards the clinical arena, in a 
review of an aspect of the psychoid concept relating to states where body and mind, 
and self and other, are not distinguished.  There are several related but discernible 
strands to this: 
(i) A dynamic of undifferentiation and differentiation, which has a bearing on 
regression and progression in the consulting room, in the particular sense of 
regression to states of unification of body and mind, and self and other, and 
progression to states of increasing distinction of mind from body, and self 
from other. 
(ii) A particular form of transference in which analyst and patient are mutually 
immersed in an undifferentiated unconscious field, commonly known as 
participation mystique. 
The present chapter explores these two strands, in order to tie them both together in a 
conceptual frame founded on the matrix of biological thinking established in the 
previous chapter.   
Firstly, the psychoid concept will be set within the context of Jung’s experimental 
studies, including his early conceptualisations foreshadowing the psychoid concept, 
advancing from his scientific study of word association, generating knowledge of 
autonomous processes in the personal unconscious, to self-investigation of the human 
vision-making function, yielding understandings of archetypal processes in the 
collective unconscious.  Secondly, accounts of two post-Jungian research studies into 
the transference, respectively by the Berlin Group (Dieckmann, 1971, 1976, 1980) 
and by Samuels (1985), will be presented.  Such research extends the early work of 
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Jung, relating primarily to the first strand, specifically into the arena of the 
transference, relating to the second.   
Jung’s studies  
1. Early work 
Enrolling at Basel University in the spring of 1895, Jung decided to specialise in 
medicine, and therefore his early direction was very much concerned with the 
medical model of his day, by which a Cartesian duality presided over body and mind, 
and symptoms were to be treated as organic.  In 1898, whilst preparing for his final 
examinations, he opened Kraft-Ebbing’s textbook on psychiatry and became taken by 
his description of psychiatry as a subject in an incomplete state of development 
embracing diseases of the personality (Kraft-Ebbing, 1904, iii).  Concluding that he 
had found “the empirical field common to biological and spiritual facts”, including 
hysteria and dementia praecox, Jung embarked on his psychiatric career at the 
Burghölzli Clinic (1963, 129-30).   
Next, as part of the pioneering research taking place at the Burghölzli Clinic at the 
beginning of the twentieth century under the aegis of Eugen Bleuler, Jung (1904-
1907, 1910) produced his major scientific study on the Word Association Tests 
(WATs) applied both to normal subjects and to subjects displaying hysteria and other 
psychopathological conditions, such as dementia praecox.  The experimental 
procedure involved recording the reactions of individual subjects to a series of 
stimulus words, including the subject’s spontaneous word association and their 
reaction time.  The recorded observations were classified in a variety of different 
ways, according to logical-linguistic criteria and temporal delay, and the resultant 
categories were scrutinised to ascertain patterns and discover empirical laws.  Jung 
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discovered that characteristic disturbances of association arise in connection with 
emotionally charged personal events, in that clusters of associative feeling-toned 
ideas constellate in the personal unconscious around these events and produce 
delayed reactions times in the subjects undergoing the test (1905/1906, par. 637).  He 
adopted the term ‘complex’ for such constellation of feeling-toned ideas (Jung & 
Riklin, 1904/1906, par. 167).   
An extension of the original research into the psycho-physical domain involved 
additionally measuring the skin resistance of the subject in reaction to the stimulus 
words, employing a galvanometer whose electrodes were placed on the palms of the 
hand or the soles of the feet.  The results demonstrated that the same feeling-toned 
ideas that generated delayed reaction times also produced physical effects associated 
with the sympathetic nervous system (accumulation of sweat and reduction in skin 
resistance yielding increased current flow) (Jung, 1907/1908, pars. 1046/9).  In an 
example of word association in a normal subject, the stimulus word stupid produced 
the association am I and a peak in galvanometer reading, and Jung wrote, “the subject 
had a clear egocentric complex” (ibid., 1104).  Accordingly, emotion and physical 
reaction were seen to be intimately combined in relation to complexes. 
A further application was in a study of families, in which Jung and Fürst administered 
the WAT to all members of twenty-four families (Jung, 1909).  The findings showed 
remarkable similarities in patterns of response amongst certain sub-groupings within 
the families.  As Papadopoulos notes, “in effect, this research indicated that within 
families there must be certain formations that are organising structures which are 
collectively shared” (1996, 130).   
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These studies carried out under Jung’s direction in the period from 1902 to 1910 are 
described in numerous papers, published in Volume Two of The Collected Works and 
elsewhere, and they provide scientific evidence for: Jung’s theory of complexes; the 
fact that activation of unconscious complexes affects individuals concurrently both on 
a psychic level and on a physiological level; and, the hypothesis that structural 
affinities exist within complex responses in certain categories of people.   
Jung’s psychiatric career at the Burghölzli Clinic also involved the clinical treatment 
of cases of hysteria, where blocked or repressed affect occasioned by emotional 
trauma was converted into symptomatology involving a wide variety of physical 
characteristics and sensory phenomena, and in which he employed Freud’s method, 
as discussed in the previous chapter.   
Hence, from the outset of his working career, Jung was addressing the relationship of 
psyche and soma, in which physiological facts and psychic facts are combined.  
Whilst his psychiatric work and his collaboration with Freud form one backdrop to 
his early ideas concerning the relations between body and mind, there is another 
background element, namely his personal experiment into the process of vision-
making, commencing in the lead-up to WWI.  Shamdasani describes this study as 
hermeneutic science, by contrast with the traditional view of science as applied in the 
WATs (Jung, 2009b, 32).  Through this investigation, published as The Red Book 
(2009a, 2009b), Jung’s understandings of the relation between psyche and soma 
entered a new phase, with his discovery of the technique of active imagination.  
Furthermore, his focus shifted from the personal unconscious to the collective 
unconscious
27
. 
                                                 
27
 Defined here as a universal psyche inhabited by primordial images, as stated on page 122 below. 
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His self-investigation and his early theoretical conceptualisations proceeded in 
tandem, the one providing the platform for the other.  Accordingly, the self-
investigation will be described first, and the theoretical deductions elucidated 
afterwards
28
. 
2. The Red Book 
Within Jung’s oeuvre, The Red Book is successor to Symbols of Transformation 
(1912), where he contrasted two forms of thinking, directed rational attention and 
undirected fantasy attention.  His researches for Symbols brought him to an awareness 
of symbolic thinking, when he realised that he had been projecting his own process 
onto Flournoy’s description of the visions of his patient, and hence “analysing [his] 
own fantasy function” (2012, 29).  As Shamdasani notes, this was the start of the 
work of The Red Book (Hillman & Shamdasani, 2013, 39-40).   
A few years later, in response to intense psychic pressure, Jung began to assess his 
entire life, and thus commenced his own self-investigation.  Observing that the games 
of his childhood still had an emotional charge, he set about a form of play, 
constructing model buildings, a church and a village (Jung, 1963, 198).  It is to be 
noted that introspection and self-investigation were respectable methods in 
psychology at the time (Casement, 2010, 39).  Further, Jung (2009b, 21) was aware of 
earlier examples of self-experimentation from Herbert Silberer’s investigation of 
hypnagogic states in 1909 and Ludwig Staudenmaier’s experimentation with self-
induced hallucinations in 1912.   
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 His vocabulary evolved as his ideas matured, and the original or early term will be supplemented by 
the more well-known, later term, which thereafter will be employed exclusively. 
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In the autumn of 1913, there arose two dreams of a terrible sea of blood, and a flood 
of unconscious fantasy was unleashed (ibid., 199).  From December 1913, he began 
his ‘most difficult experiment’ of actively29 engaging with the unconscious, by 
plunging himself into his fantasies, deliberately soliciting, and entering into dialogue 
with, them (2009b, 22/4).  He recorded the visions occurring in the short few months 
from October/November 1913 to February 1914, seeing those entries as the records of 
an experiment, in which the scientific question was “to see what happened when he 
switched off consciousness” (ibid., 24).  Thereafter, he commenced a series of 
retrospective reflections, elaborating the original material in a lived method of 
metaphorical evocation, including mythopoeic writing, calligraphy and painting, 
which he later termed active imagination (Hillman & Shamdasani, 2013, 9/14).   The 
extent and thoroughness of these reflections is not to be underestimated, since it 
involved repeated re-working over many years.   
Jung employed no conceptual terminology in his retrospective reflection, preferring 
instead to stay with experience-near language evoking the power of the emotional 
undertaking, although elsewhere he was already using terms such as ‘complex’ and 
‘collective unconscious’ (1916a, 377, 432).  Jung regarded this period as absolutely 
crucial in his later conceptualisations: 
The years of which I have spoken to you, when I pursued the inner images, 
were the most important of my life.  Everything else is to be derived from this. 
[…] Everything later was merely the outer classification, the scientific 
elaboration, and the integration into life.  (Shamdasani, 2012, 366) 
Although, in 1930, he moved on to alchemy, Jung continued his retrospective 
reflection in further orders of re-working for the remainder of his life, in himself 
personally embodying the lessons that he had learnt, in his analytic work, and in 
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 Researcher’s italics. 
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translating the original experience conceptually into a scientific psychology, 
including his psychoid concept, as discussed below.  His concept of active 
imagination is important in understanding his psychoid concept. 
3. Active imagination  
The Red Book presents Jung’s active imagination as: an interweaving of different 
voices from different aspects of his personality; different texts generated at different 
times; and different narrative forms.  The process was profoundly multi-layer.  
Visions recorded directly in his Black Books are supplemented by poetic elaborations 
from a year and more later, re-worked repeatedly in the various drafts of Liber 
Primus and Liber Secundus existing amongst the extant manuscripts for The Red 
Book (2009b, 105).  Jung also made a calligraphic transcription, and added his own 
paintings.   
In the published work, the original material from the Black Books is presented as 
Layer 1.  Various key figures appear in this material, amongst them Siegfried, the 
hero; Elijah and Salome, the old man and the maiden; the Red One, the devil; 
Izdubar, the warrior with bull-horns; the magician; and the prophetic figure, 
Philemon.  According to Hannah (1997, 117), the figure of Philemon was the most 
important in all of Jung’s exploration.  The later re-working, involving interrogation 
of the personified figures of Layer 1, and a dis-identification with their various voices 
through the reflective dimension of mythopoeic narrative and depiction in plastic 
form, is presented as Layer 2 (Hillman & Shamdasani, 2013, 19-20).  Especially, 
there was a need to distinguish himself from the prophetic voice of Philemon, and it 
is through this differentiation that he came to understand that it was not he who 
created his own visions but that the figures had an independent existence and 
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represented an objective reality of his psyche (ibid., 122).  Layers 1 and 2 together 
may respectively be conceived as: the practice of the image; and the metaphorical 
way (ibid., 42-3).   
By 1916, Jung (1916/1957) was already beginning to conceptualise the process of 
active imagination in his essay The Transcendent Function.  He was not as yet 
employing the expression, but in a prefatory note, added in 1959, he refers to the 
essay as a description of the method of active imagination.  In this essay, he discusses 
his “constructive or synthetic method of treatment” for assisting the patient to gain 
insight into the meaning of their disturbance, by seeking a union of conscious and 
unconscious contents in a new position transcending and integrating the content of 
both (ibid., par. 145).  He proposed starting from the emotional state of the patient: 
The emotional disturbance can also be dealt with […] by giving it visible 
shape.  Patients who possess some talent for drawing or painting can give 
expression to their mood by means of a picture.  It is not important for the 
picture to be technically or aesthetically satisfying, but merely for the fantasy 
to have free play […] There are others again […] whose hands have the knack 
of giving expression to the contents of the unconscious.  Such people can 
profitably work with plastic materials.  Those who are able to express the 
unconscious by means of bodily movements are rather rare.  (Ibid., par. 168) 
This quote foreshadows a later account in On the Nature of the Psyche, in which Jung 
attributes a role to psychoid processes in meaning-making through the embodied 
elaboration of unconscious imagery, the practice that he himself developed in The 
Red Book work:  
And so it is with the hand that guides the crayon or the brush, the foot that 
executes the dance-step, with the eye and the ear, with the word and the 
thought: a dark impulse is the ultimate arbiter of the pattern, an unconscious a 
priori precipitates itself into plastic form […] Over the whole procedure there 
seems to reign a dim foreknowledge not only of pattern but of its meaning.  
Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes shape, so the latter 
becomes clear.  (1947/1954, par. 402) 
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According to Jung, such amplification elicits and personalises the mythological 
motifs contained in the original images, and encourages a spontaneous manifestation 
of a purposive unconscious process (ibid., par. 400).  No matter what plastic form is 
selected for the living embodiment of the original fantasy image, new material drawn 
from the unconscious becomes available to the conscious mind for assimilation and 
integration, with the form and the process acting as a container to facilitate and hold 
this work.  Just as the effects of archetypal processes manifest in embodied images 
anywhere within the psyche-soma continuum, so also may embodied experience feed 
back into the archetypal organising process.
30
  The result enriches and vitalises the 
personality, bringing to conscious realisation the personalised effects of the 
archetype, and setting in train the coming-to-be or purposive unfolding of the Self, 
which Jung called individuation. 
Such conceptualisation flows out of Jung’s own active imagination, and a specific 
example of his active imagination and of the accompanying theorisation demonstrates 
this, and foreshadows his later account of the psychoid concept. 
a. The seven sermons 
One theme that appears repeatedly in different guises in The Red Book is the mystery 
and meaning of God.  For example, in Mysterium Encounter, Jung’s ‘I’ reflects on the 
essence of God in Layer 1, through a vision of Elijah and Salome (2009b, 174-177).  
In Layer 2, he contemplates the mystery play as a deep place like the crater of a 
volcano, pushing out a fiery molten mass of the unformed.  He who enters the crater, 
as someone formed and determined, melts and the formed in him dissolves and 
becomes smelted anew in the primordial beginning (ibid., 178-183).  The Layer 1 
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vision took place on 21 December 1913, but the date of the Layer 2 reflection is not 
mentioned.   
This example prefigures the series of visions over the short period from end January 
to beginning February 1916 that were to become the seven sermons to the dead (ibid., 
507-536).  Jung published these separately from the rest of The Red Book, circulating 
them privately amongst his circle in 1916 as Septem Sermones ad Mortuos, and 
ascribing them to Basilides in Alexandria, a Gnostic sage from 2
nd
 century AD.  An 
English translation by H. G. Baynes was printed in 1925, and is the translation 
discussed here, although others have been produced subsequently. 
Jung’s reference to Gnosticism was deliberate, since the seven sermons are arguably 
derived from the Gnostic mythologem of a demiurge, in the form of Abraxas, who 
appears in the second sermon; and the work makes use of a Gnostic style and 
employs Gnostic vocabulary.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace and 
elaborate Jung’s links with Gnosticism, but his debt to the Gnostics is acknowledged 
and is the subject of discussion and disagreement by a number of scholars, including 
Hoeller (1982), Quispel (1992), Ribi (2013), and Segal (1992), amongst others, as 
well as being the subject of criticism by Buber (1952).  Ribi notes, “Jung’s 
conception of Gnosis permeates the entirety of his systematic psychology” (2013, 
168-9). 
Jung turned to the accounts of the Gnostics seeking confirmation supporting his own 
observations of the mythopoeic depths underlying consciousness, in that, as Ribi 
comments, Gnosticism
31
 may be thought of as “a primordial psychic experience” 
(ibid., 32/8).  Hannah records that Jung told her “more than once that the first 
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 In second and third centuries a.d., Gnosticism assimilated itself to emerging Christianity (Ribi, 2013, 
29/40).   
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parallels he found to his own experience were in the Gnostic texts, that is in the 
Elenchos of Hippolytus” (1997, 114).  As Jung (1951, par. 169) stated in Aion, “for 
the Gnostics - and this is their real secret – the psyche existed as a source of 
knowledge”, and this is precisely how he approached his active imagination. 
Set against this background, the interest in the seven sermons for the present project 
lies in an elaboration of the themes from Mysterium Encounter in terms of Pleroma
32
 
and Creatura
33
.   
The Pleroma is described as nothingness or fullness, both differentiation and 
undifferentiation, whose qualities are undifferentiated pairs of opposites, such as 
living and dead, light and dark, time and space, good and evil.  Although not 
specifically mentioned, the Pleroma must thus also include the undifferentiated 
opposites of subject and object, as well as body and mind.  As Ribi (2013, 188-9) 
observes, Jung has borrowed a well-known Gnostic term, which he later designates 
the unus mundus or unknowable psychoid substratum of the collective unconscious.   
Creatura on the other hand is not in the Pleroma but in itself and confined within time 
and space; Creatura is distinct, and its function is to differentiate or discriminate.  In 
Creatura, the Pleroma is rent and the opposites are separate.  Creatura is 
distinguished, here, from created beings, or man, and is changeable or capable of 
transformation.  Man’s nature is distinctiveness, and the danger for man is to fall into 
the Pleroma or undifferentiated state and become submerged in nothingness.  His 
fight to achieve differentiation leads to the ‘Principium individuationis’, namely 
individuation.  Ribi (ibid., 196-7) thus considers that Creatura should be regarded as 
the universal principle of individuation, which emerges from the Self and is the cause 
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of individual consciousness, stating that something can only become conscious when 
it is separated out of the Pleroma.  He notes that the Gnostics see the Pleroma as the 
origin of the individual (ibid., 180).  Jung later wrote of individuation that, “in 
general, it is the process of forming and specialising the individual nature; in 
particular, it is the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated 
being from the general, collective psychology” (1923, 561).   
Around the same time that he was writing seven sermons, Jung was also drawing his 
first mandala, which he termed Systema Munditotius, shown surrounded by ‘Pleroma’ 
(Jaffé, 1979, 75-6).  Jeromson (2005/6, 10) indicates that there is evidence that the 
first sketches pre-date the seven sermons in 1916, and sees the seven sermons and 
Systema Munditotius as mirroring one another, joint symbolic products of Jung’s self-
exploration, leading towards the Self.  Jung himself later interpreted mandala as 
symbols of individuation and the Self.   
These accounts may be compared with Jung’s conceptual papers The Concept of the 
Unconscious (1916b) and The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious 
(1928c), as well as with various later statements by Jung about psychoid processes.   
The former essay is the text of a lecture, given to the Zurich School of Analytical 
Psychology, on the effects of assimilating the unconscious in the service of 
individuation.  It makes sense to read this essay and the seven sermons in tandem, not 
only because of their coincidence of timing but also because of their complementary 
content, the one employing only mythopoeic language, the other only conceptual 
terminology.  Although this difference means that no definitions exist for the 
mythopoeic expressions, it is possible to deduce counterparts in the conceptual 
terminology, as discussed below. 
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In this essay, Jung designates two layers in the unconscious, a personal unconscious 
and a collective or universal psyche inhabited by primordial images
34
, the latter 
referring to what he later came to call the collective unconscious with its archetypal 
images.  Assimilation of the collective unconscious tends to produce a certain quality 
of ‘god-almightiness’, an “all-compelling binding to and identification with the 
collective psyche” that disregards the different psychology of the other (Jung, 1916b, 
450/4).  “A dissolution of the pairs of opposites sets in”, often accompanied by 
peculiar symptoms, such as physical sensations of being too large for one’s skin, or 
hypnagogic feelings of endless sinking or rising, or of enlargement of the body or 
dizziness (ibid., 452/8).  A release of fantasy, including audio-visual and physical 
hallucinations is common.  Jung describes the freeing of the individual from the 
collective unconscious, through processing fantasies hermeneutically as symbols, 
leading increasingly to a differentiation (separating out) of psychological function and 
individual corporeity (ibid., 465).  We may assume, from this description, that he is 
equating the individual and his individual corporeity with the created beings or man 
of the first sermon, and is linking the collective unconscious and its dissolved 
opposites with the Pleroma, as noted by Ribi (2013, 188-9)
35
.   
The 1916 essay thus complements Jung’s seven sermons, with its account of Pleroma 
and Creatura, of undifferentiation and differentiation, and of individuation.  It 
effectively conceptualises Jung’s own process of self-experimentation in The Red 
Book, and provides a context for his 1916 account of the transcendent function.  More 
importantly, however, this essay describes the clinical process of regression, as 
mentioned above, to a state in which the physical fact and the psychic fact coincide, 
and self and other are not separate, and progression, as differentiation occurs in the 
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individuation process, corresponding respectively with the stages, set down in 
Mysterium Encounter and the seven sermons, first of dissolving in the 
undifferentiated state of the collective unconscious, and then of being “smelted anew” 
(Jung, 2009b, 183). 
The later paper constitutes an updated version of the 1916 essay with a fuller account 
of the collective unconscious.  Jung (1928, 150) warns of the attractive power of the 
archetypal image, and of the consequent dangers of an inflation, wherein the whole 
personality is dissolved and splitting of the mind ensues.  Strict separation from the 
collective unconscious is needed for the development of the personality, since a 
partial or blurred differentiation can result in the individual imposing their views on 
their fellows, and even obliteration of difference in the entire community (ibid., 158).   
Jung’s 1928 essay also contains a shift in emphasis over the 1916 version.  He brings 
in an early understanding of the transference, giving an example of a woman with a 
father-complex.  Jung (1928c, 131) writes that he knew she had transferred the father 
imago onto him from her dreams, in which the active figures were unmistakably 
herself and himself but in which he was usually misrepresented, having a body of 
supernatural size or being extremely old.  He did not at this stage discuss the 
significance or nature of the transference field. 
This essay also describes the process of individuation as “a gradual differentiation of 
functions which in themselves are universal” and starts to bring in an idea of 
symbolic representation of such process (ibid., 184).  He gives another example here 
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of a transforming vision experienced by woman patient after a long period of active 
ego participation
36
 in her fantasy life: 
I climbed the mountain and came to a place where I saw seven red stones in 
front of me, seven on either side, and seven behind me. […] I tried to lift the 
four stones that were nearest to me.  In doing so I discovered that these stones 
were the pedestals of four statues of gods which were buried down in the 
earth.  I dug them up and so arranged them around me that I stood in the 
middle of them.  Suddenly they leaned towards one another so that their heads 
touched […] I fell to the ground. […] Then I saw that beyond, encircling the 
four gods, a ring of flame had formed.  After a time I arose from the ground 
and overthrew the statues of the gods.  Where they fell to earth four trees 
began to grow.  And now from the circle of fire blue flames shot up which 
began to burn the foliage of the trees. […] I stepped into the fire.  The trees 
disappeared and the ring of fire contracted to one immense blue flame that 
carried me up from the earth.  (Ibid., 246-7)     
Jung described this dream as the symbolic expression of the process of individuation.  
As he says, “our individual conscious psychology develops out of an original state of 
unconsciousness, or in other words, a non-differentiated condition (termed by Levy-
Bruhl, ‘participation mystique’). […] Discrimination is the essence, the condition 
sine qua non of consciousness” (ibid., 226). 
Subsequently, in The Philosophical Tree, Jung (1945/1954) employs the symbol of 
‘the tree’ to represent the process of individuation symbolically, observing that, “in so 
far as the tree symbolises the opus and the transformation process ‘tam ethice quam 
physice’ (both mentally and physically) it also symbolises the life process in general” 
(ibid., par. 459).  Being an archetypal image of universal character, its full range of 
meaning for a particular individual may be difficult to establish, since “the psychoid 
form underlying any archetypal image retains its character at all stages of 
development, though empirically it is capable of endless variations” (ibid., par. 350). 
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Ribi (2013, 41-2) brings this back to Gnosticism, describing the psychoid nature of 
the archetype as a mystical concept that provides “the interface in the psyche where 
the mental and the physical meet” and that “manifests itself precisely in human 
relationships”.   
In On the Nature of the Psyche, Jung (1947/1954, par. 367) brings in the analogy of a 
scale, contemplating the psyche extending at one end into the physiological sphere of 
instinct and at the other into a spiritual form, so that psychoid processes therefore 
relate both to instinct and spirit, and thereby to body and mind.  Further, he asserts, 
the “psychoid nature of the archetype contains very much more than can be included 
in a psychological explanation.  It points to the sphere of the unus mundus, the unitary 
world” (1958, par. 852).  Emancipation or differentiation of psychic function from the 
psychoid realm through the integrative process of individuation leads increasingly to 
consciousness and true individuality.  All of this is foreshadowed in the seven 
sermons and the associated conceptual texts from 1916 onwards.   
b. The collective experiment 
Throughout the period when Jung was conducting and conceptualising his own active 
imagination, he also continued his private practice, and, according to Shamdasani, he 
extended his self-investigation of the vision-making process into a wider empirical 
research study based on his practice:  
Jung’s self-experimentation was in part a collective experiment, involving his 
patients.  Jung encouraged his patients to engage in active imagination and 
attempted to see to what extent the process of development he had undergone 
could be replicated and had typical phases.  (Casement, 2010, 41) 
This is corroborated by an observation made by Tina Keller, one of Jung’s 
analysands, to the effect that Jung “was after all experimenting just like a surgeon 
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who is trying out new methods” (Swan, 2000, 100).  Swan (2000, 2011) gives 
accounts of Keller’s analyses with Jung and Toni Wolff, indicating that she used 
automatic writing and painting to elaborate her fantasies in her initial analysis with 
Jung
37
, and embodied them through dance and movement in her subsequent analysis 
with Wolff
38
: 
Following my body tensions, I formed a crude dance.  I, or rather a young 
fantasy-woman in me, felt imprisoned in stone. […] The contours of her body 
were clear, yet she must with great exertion free herself from the stone walls.  
It took a good part of the session until at last I stood upright and free.  This 
session seemed to me much more satisfying than sessions where we merely 
talked.  (Swan, 2011, 31) 
It is also corroborated by the fact that Jung encouraged his patients to make copies of 
the pictures created in their own active imaginations, and to donate them to him for 
his private collection.  The collection is now housed in The Picture Archive at the 
Jung Institute in Zurich, which contains approximately 4000 pictures produced by 
Jung’s analysands and approximately 6000 pictures produced by those of Jolande 
Jacobi.  Both Jung and Jacobi presented and published extensive examples of such 
active imaginations, see for example, Jung’s A Study in the Process of Individuation 
(1939) and Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930-1934 by C. G. Jung (1997)
39
, 
and Jacobi’s Symbols in an Individual Analysis (1964). 
4. Summary 
The above discussion demonstrates a complete change of direction between Jung’s 
earlier psychiatric, science-based WATs, applied to the relationship of body and 
mind, and his subsequent hermeneutic understanding and approach.  He is now 
coming at his theoretical ideas firstly from self-experimentation, and secondly from 
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the empirical base of his own analytic practice and patients.  He has arrived at a 
hermeneutic method of symbolic elaboration by means of active imagination, a 
technique uniquely combining body and mind in a creative process, which as early as 
1916 he had linked with the transcendent function, defined here as a meeting of 
opposites to create a living third or new situation.  This gives an added symbolic 
dimension to the psychoid concept. 
Such discussion also shows how, in the period from 1913 to 1930, Jung was 
grappling with notions of individual and collective, and differentiation and 
undifferentiation having regard to self and other, as well as body and mind, and he 
was doing so both in an empirical sense, within his own self-experimentation and his 
collective experiment, and in a conceptual sense, in his evolving attempts to produce 
theoretical accounts from this work.  He has arrived at a notion of individuation, 
starting from an undifferentiated state, a participation mystique, peopled by typical 
forms or archetypal images, corresponding in analysis with a particular form of 
regression to unified states of body and mind, and self and other.  He has conceived 
the need for the individual to discriminate his psychological function and his 
individual corporeity increasingly from the collective, through personalisation of 
these archetypal images, and he has proposed a process of symbolic reflection or 
active imagination, involving both body and mind, in order to achieve this 
progression. 
Here, we have the empirical basis for these ideas, and its conceptual working out.  
Further, as demonstrated, these ideas pre-figure his later accounts of the psychoid 
unconscious, as discussed here and in the previous chapter. 
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Whilst he has worked out his notion of regression to, and progression from, 
undifferentiated states, and, in his WATs (1909), has found evidence of collectively 
shared organising structures and, in his 1928 essay, has conceived the view that 
consciousness proceeds from a participation mystique, he has not specifically 
demonstrated the application of these specific ideas to the transference.  This is the 
province of the post-Jungians.  
Post-Jungians  
A number of post-Jungian theorists have extended Jung’s researches, and have 
addressed the psychoid concept, from a variety of different perspectives, as discussed 
generally in the literature review.  One empirical research project is of especial 
interest to this thesis, namely the transference study of Dieckmann (1974, 1976, 1980, 
1991).  This study provides evidence for the existence of a very particular type of 
transference associated with the psychoid concept, wherein the processes of analyst 
and analysand are synchronised in terms of both body and mind, and a symmetrical 
dynamic
40
 may be seen to be occurring.     
1. Berlin Research Group 
The Berlin Research Group conducted a clinical study between 1969 and 1974.  The 
group, consisting initially of four Jungian analysts, all men, and, after two years, 
including also a fifth Jungian analyst, a woman, set out to investigate the 
countertransference “in a situation with proper scientific controls” (Dieckmann, 1974, 
71).  They met for regular fortnightly meetings, each lasting three hours and in each 
of which one member of the group presented a single analytic session, bringing also 
the content of the preceding session and the subsequent development of key themes.  
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Thereby, they conducted a regular review of clinical material based on process notes 
from individual analytic sessions.     
The method involved assuming a particular attitude to the transference, neither that of 
Freud involving “emptying oneself” and focusing solely on the patient and his 
unconscious by “holding up a mirror to him”, nor that of Jung and his example of the 
rainmaker who is thrown into disharmony by the outer world (the patient’s 
unconscious) and who focuses exclusively on his own reactions to restore inner 
harmony (ibid., 71).  Rather, the aim was to find a middle way, and to note side by 
side in the correct temporal sequence both the analyst’s observations of the patient 
and his observations of his own unconscious processes, since the group wanted to 
capture their “highly charged emotional thoughts” and also fantasies and “the 
psychosomatic affects arising from the unconscious” (Dieckmann, 1976, 25). 
A particular criterion of session selection was employed, in two research phases: In 
the first phase, the single analytic session chosen for discussion was required to 
contain an archetypal dream displaying highly charged emotional activity.  In the 
second phase, the single analytic session was selected at random from a complete 
series of recorded sessions of the presenting analyst from a given week, irrespective 
of content.  In all, thirty-seven patients contributed to the first phase, and twelve 
patients contributed to the second phase. 
Two examples are given here, demonstrating the manner by which the psychic 
processes of patient and analyst coincide, including in the somatic arena.  The fact 
that these coincidences of process and timing arose repeatedly led the group to certain 
conclusions discussed below. 
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The initial example is from the first phase of the study and concerns a woman of 
thirty-seven with a borderline condition and a psychotic mother (Dieckmann, 1974, 
73).  The patient brought a dream in which she was wearing a robe, like a devil’s, a 
god’s or a king’s, or one that might have been worn by Death.  She wanted to cast 
aside the evil, which was represented by the robe.  Her friend came, and in her fear 
she wanted to cling to him, but when she said ‘Get thee behind me, Satan’, she 
thought he might think she meant him.  She felt terribly afraid, and was beset by 
doubt and fear whether it really was her friend.  This woke her up.   
Without any emotion, the analyst associated to Mephistopheles, and a scene where 
Faust thinks he has caught the devil but the devil escapes.  The patient then continued 
that she could never sleep in the same room with her mother without terrible fear, 
since she imagined her mother would kill her with an axe.  At this, the analyst became 
filled with vital emotion.  He re-experienced viscerally his own early childhood fears 
of death, dying and extinction, all connected with the figure of Faust and his entry 
into another life.  Next, the patient went on to speak of her evacuation and complete 
uprooting as a child.  Surprisingly, the analyst saw in his mind’s eye a medieval city 
nestling behind the security of its walls, and felt that he had found within himself an 
emotional stronghold from which to overcome the conflict.  At this very same 
moment
41
, the patient reported that, during the evacuation, she had found a safe place 
of refuge in a local barn.  Simultaneously, therefore, analyst and patient found within 
themselves a safe enclosure from which to face the problem of fear.  It is to be noted 
that this entire scenario took place without interpretation on the part of the analyst.   
In the ensuing group discussion of this particular session, the group contemplated the 
issue of fear between patient and analyst in the transference, and how it was worked 
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out by passing from a confrontation at the level of the personal unconscious, in which 
the fear was unconsciously transmitted to the analyst through activated personal 
childhood memories and emotion, to an archetypal encounter, in which both patient 
and analyst simultaneously experienced the security of a primitive archetypal refuge 
(medieval city).  They noted the sequence: archetypal amplifications occur to the 
analyst around the unsuccessful banishment of the devil, corresponding visceral 
emotions from childhood become activated in his personal unconscious, and the chain 
of associations passes into the actual situation.  The patient meanwhile stays in her 
own history, exposed to her severe childhood fears.  Then, both the patient and 
analyst find an archetypal refuge from the distress.  They concluded that the processes 
of both patient and analyst were somehow simultaneously guided and organised to 
arrive in the same moment
42
 at a place of symbolic safety.   
The second example demonstrates more clearly these different levels to the 
transference, and different fields associated with such levels.  The patient is a 21 year 
old woman, suffering from a borderline personality disorder and certain addictions.  
At the beginning of the session, she recounted a vision of a tramcar standing in the 
woods.  She was obsessed and horrified by it, because she felt it represented an image 
of a destroyed world.  The analyst, by contrast, could not engage with the horror, 
since to him a tram, situated in the woods surrounding Berlin, was a natural and 
commonplace sight. 
The patient began repeating the story of the tramcar in a stereotypical fashion, using 
the same words but a different emotional inflection.  Gradually, this stereotyped 
repetition engendered in the analyst a memory of a holiday with a friend years 
previously in a very deserted area in the mountains in Turkey.  They had driven all 
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day without encountering a soul, when they rounded a corner to find three men with 
dark suits and top-hats in the road, all carrying musical instruments.  The incongruity 
took their breath away.  The analyst began to experience a participation in the 
patient’s horror, and at precisely this moment43 the patient uttered, “I can’t adapt to 
this destroyed world.  I would rather suffer under it” (Dieckmann, 1976, 34).   
The analyst then had another memory from years before, this time of a dream brought 
by another young woman patient from her own earlier adolescence: She was in the 
street leading to her school, and in front of her was a crowd of people surrounding a 
young woman of her own age, naked and shivering.  They were attacking her body 
with needles, pens and nails, pinning pieces of paper to her flesh.  She looked at the 
dreamer with a face full of blood and tears, and the dreamer began to cry aloud, 
because the face was her own.   
At this memory, the analyst became really connected to the sense of horror and 
destruction, and considered that the patient felt understood.  No interpretation had 
been made. 
In this example, Dieckmann writes, the initial part of the session had taken place 
mainly on the personal and projective level for both analyst and patient, and they had 
occupied opposed positons of adult/parent and child/daughter.  The regulated and 
conventional adult world was opposing the chaos of youth.   The repetition of the 
imagery by the patient had, however, awoken in the analyst a more archetypal 
understanding.  This enabled the analyst and patient then to enter a participation at a 
deeper collective level and arrive synchronously at a common understanding from the 
vital position of youth.  
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These examples, but most especially the second, give illustrations of two different 
forms of transference field, showing the manner in which analyst and patient relate in 
the transference depending on level, namely through projective processes at the level 
of the personal unconscious and through participation mystique at the level of the 
collective unconscious.  In the latter, their processes are intertwined and synchronous, 
and the transference field may thus be described as mutual.  The group, attributing the 
latter transference effects to “unconscious participation”, noted repeatedly an 
extraordinary degree of correspondence between the associations of the analyst and 
those of the patient.  As one member of the group remarked, “the patients continually 
say what I am thinking in the moment!”, whilst conversely the group often found 
amazing similarities between what the patients were saying and the analysts’ 
associations (Dieckmann, 1974, 73).   
From this research, the group came to a view of unconscious participation as a 
synchronization of the processes of the two individuals in the analytic dyad, an 
organising function co-ordinating their unconscious processes.  The term 
participation mystique is not employed but would appear to be appropriate.   
Dieckmann writes: 
What has impressed us most […] is that the usual causal model of 
transference and countertransference, i.e. of action and reaction or influence 
and counterinfluence, has not sufficed as a means of grasping the phenomena 
in question.  In a deeper layer underlying the analytical situation there is a 
synchronistic process regulated by the self
44
.  (1971, 83) 
The outcome of these experimental investigations demonstrated that, “the basic 
foundation of the analytic situation […] is governed by the archetype of the self 
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which is synchronising the chains of associations, that means all the psychic events 
between two persons” (1976, 31). 
Referring to von Franz, the research group divided the transference into a primary 
archaic (archetypal) level where a primitive identity exists, and a projective or 
personal level (ibid., 30).  Based on their observations of synchronisation, they 
concluded that at the archetypal level the psychoid unconscious is organising the 
dynamics in the analytic dyad in a manner that is entirely mutual and characterised by 
common unconscious factors.   
Dieckmann reported on the research findings: 
When Jung formulated his conception of the archetype per se, he 
characterised this sphere, belonging to the transcendent nature of the 
archetype, as psychoid.  In a letter written in 1951
45
 he stated that this 
transcendent nature of the archetype has the effect of an ‘arranger’ of psychic 
patterns inside and outside of the psyche.  I think we can hardly find a better 
proof for this concept than through our method of studying the processes of 
transference and countertransference.  (1976, 30)   
A footnote to the letter defines the term psychoid as a reference to “quasi-psychic 
‘irrepresentable’ basic forms”, belonging to the transconscious areas where psychic 
processes and the physical substrate touch (Adler (ed.), 1976, 22).  
We also see from the above examples that somatic experiences of emotion arise 
between patient and analyst.  Specifically, the group noted amongst the reported 
countertransference reactions certain symptoms, including: 
[S]omatic reactions of the analyst in the vegetative as well as the motor 
sphere, such as pounding of the heart, feeling of strain, tension, fatigue, 
yawning, scratching, etc.  Without exception an area of unconsciousness 
common to both analyst and patient could be found behind these symptoms ...  
(Dieckmann, 1974, 73) 
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Whilst Jung developed his understanding of the psychoid concept and its links with 
the body-mind connection from vitalism and his self-experimentation, he did not 
specifically extend his findings into the clinical aspect of the transference.  The 
research of the Berlin Group especially addresses this, and yields two important 
findings.   
Firstly, they note two different kinds of transference, according to whether the dyad is 
in a personal transference field or an archetypal transference field.  And, in the case 
of the latter field, the research demonstrates the existence of a participation mystique 
in the analytic dyad, and the organisation and synchronisation of the processes of 
analyst and patient throughout the psyche-soma.  Here, analyst and patient are in a 
condition of common understanding and identification, in other words in a 
symmetrical transference
46
.  These findings are of particular interest in their 
application of the psychoid concept quite directly to the clinical setting, with the 
extension of the psychoid concept into the arena of the transference, and in the fact 
that they are found to be verified in the empirical strand of the present research, as 
discussed later in Chapters 8 and 9.  
2. Samuels 
Another empirical investigation of the transference was also conducted by Samuels 
(1985), employing a sample of 32 qualified psychotherapists, of unspecified 
orientation.  They were asked to report a few examples of countertransference, 
classifying the examples according to one of two specified types, defined respectively 
as: a reflective countertransference, effectively reflecting a mood or state of the 
patient, as in feeling unaccountably depressed in the session then learning that the 
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patient is in a depressed state in the here and now; and an embodied 
countertransference, incarnating the patient’s emotional experience of a significant 
other and constituting “a physical, actual, material, sensual expression in the analyst 
of something in the patient’s inner world”, for example becoming depressed in a 
manner echoing the patient’s depressed mother (ibid., 52).  Instances of a neurotic 
countertransference that might be due to the analyst’s own pathology were to be 
excluded.  26 replies, covering 76 examples from 57 patients were received.  Of these 
examples, 46% were held by the participants to relate to embodied 
countertransference and 54% to relate to reflective countertransference.   
The results were collected, collated and evaluated, and classified into fantasy 
responses, feeling responses, and bodily and behavioural responses.  An overall 
pattern emerged, including a further form of countertransference embracing the 
imaginal. 
Two examples make this plain.  The first comprises an embodied fantasy response in 
a session with a patient who was extremely controlled, and watchful of the therapist’s 
slightest reaction.  The therapist interpreted the patient as beginning to trust what was 
inside the therapist, and had a visceral image of a huge black pot with a big belly.  
Continuing, the therapist said it might be like having a pot to put things in.  The 
patient instantly responded that it was like a wall against which something had been 
violently hurled.  The therapist next had a visceral image of projectile vomiting 
against a wall (ibid., 55-6).  The next comprises a reflective bodily response.  The 
therapist noted she was wearing clothes similar to her woman patient, presenting like 
a little boy in a school sweater and muddy shoes.   The patient had never felt able to 
relate to her mother.  She had allowed herself to be ‘Daddy’s girl’ but had avoided 
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incestuous involvement by a little boy strategy, and the therapist had unconsciously 
picked this up (ibid., 56).   
These examples bring in the analyst’s body, and confirm the aspect of Dieckmann’s 
research demonstrating the way that the body and the mind are bound up with one 
another, not only in a monistic relationship together in the individual, but also 
between self and other.  Samuels concluded that the analyst may be subject to ‘bodily 
visions’ in the countertransference “based on the psychoid unconscious in which 
distinctions between psyche and soma do not apply” (ibid., 65).  However, he does 
not offer any evidence relating to a symmetrical transference field. 
Discussion 
This chapter has described various historical pieces of scientific and empirical 
research, serving to give the psychoid concept substance in a practical sense and 
ground it in a clinical setting.  The existence of a psychoid unconscious and of 
psychoid processes is confirmed both by Jung’s own experiments, personal and 
collective, and by the researches of The Berlin Group and Samuels.  These accounts 
are important, because they offer hermeneutic insight into the psychoid concept, and 
demonstrate how Jung shifted from an approach founded on a scientific base in the 
biological experiments of Driesch
47
 and his own WATs, to one founded on a 
hermeneutic base in his own self-experimentation and later conceptualisations.  
However, it is believed that this shift could only take place, because of the solidity of 
Jung’s earlier foundation in his scientific work, in which the WATs provided 
evidence not only of the connection between psyche and soma, but also in the family 
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studies of the existence of collectively shared organising structures, something that 
enabled Jung to appreciate the existence of ‘participation mystique’ in a real sense. 
The hermeneutic investigations yield two new but related strands, adding to the 
understanding of the psychoid concept derived in the preceding chapter. 
Firstly, Jung’s own investigations demonstrate the ways in which psychoid processes 
link individual man to the unus mundus, and in which the individual develops in the 
process of individuation from an undifferentiated state towards increasing 
differentiation from the collective through the personalisation of archetypal images.  
This serves to distinguish the individual personally in terms both of his psychological 
function and his corporeity.  Jung proposes the method of active imagination for this 
personalisation, demonstrated by his own example and by those of his analysands, as 
conceptualised in various theoretical papers.  Such approach is heavily weighted 
towards metaphorical reflection, and psycho-physical forms of symbolic functioning, 
implying that working with imagery in all areas of the body-mind continuum is an 
important aspect of the analytic process.   
The other key theme, isolated by the Berlin Research Group, is the extent to which 
psychoid processes manifest in a specialised form of the transference, in which 
analyst and patient are mutually immersed in an undifferentiated or symmetrical 
unconscious field.  The psychoid processes then have an effect in ordering the 
material emerging into consciousness, in synchronising the associations of analyst 
and analysand, and in sharing visceral experience between them, in the service of 
understanding.   
A contemporary and clinically meaningful definition for the psychoid concept may 
now be produced, based on the evidence from the last two chapters, as:  
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(i) A deeply unknowable arena, thereby limiting what can be said about it. 
(ii) An area of undifferentiation, where psyche and soma are monistic, and self 
and other are in a participation mystique, from which the individual 
differentiates himself in the process of individuation. 
(iii) A purposive, structuring and organising principle giving rise to psychic 
patterns: 
a. Having emergent properties, by which the psyche is differentiated out 
of the body-mind matrix and new individual positions come to be 
realised; 
b. Manifesting in a symmetrical transference, in the synchronising of 
associations of analysand and analyst in terms of physiological and 
psychic facts;  
c. Symbolically linking instinct and spirit by means of instinctual and 
archetypal images, and imparting meaning. 
The next chapter compares Jung’s notion of a psychoid unconscious with Bion’s 
proto-mental concept, in order to test this definition. 
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Chapter 6 
Further contexts: Jung and Bion compared 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to delineate the psychoid concept by bringing in for comparison a 
psychoanalytic concept that bears some apparent similarities but that also differs in 
certain fundamental respects, namely Bion’s proto-mental system.   
The interest of the proto-mental system for this study is that, amongst psychoanalytic 
concepts, it shares to the greatest degree key characteristics with Jung’s psychoid 
concept, making it a useful comparative instrument.  Further, the differences between 
the two concepts highlight some lacunae in Jung’s ideas, especially in their clinical 
application.  This thesis, therefore, argues that certain clinical phenomena cannot 
fully be understood from Jung’s theory of a psychoid unconscious alone, and that 
Bion’s concept of a proto-mental system can help both to explain and to account 
clinically for such phenomena, and thereby provide a theoretical framework for filling 
in such lacunae.  Although it might be possible to search elsewhere amongst the 
respective theories of Jung and Bion to fill in the gaps left by each such partial 
account, a more satisfactory clinical understanding arises by considering these two 
theories as complementary to one another and by effectively combining them as a 
clinical tool.   
Origins 
It is interesting to note that the experience of both men in WWI provides the starting 
point for their respective concepts, although it is only with hindsight in both cases 
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that this can be traced.  Just before the onset of the war, Jung began having the series 
of visions that became the foundation of his self-experimentation, his notion and 
practice of active imagination, and the later conceptualisation of almost all of his 
theories, including the psychoid concept.  This investigation, which is the subject of 
The Red Book as discussed in Chapter 5, commences with his account of a journey 
taken in October 1913, when he was overcome by the following vision: 
I saw a terrible flood that covered all the northern and low-lying lands 
between the North Sea and the Alps.  It reached from England to Russia, and 
from the coast of the North Sea right up to the Alps.  I saw yellow waves, 
swimming rubble, and the death of countless thousands.  (2009b, 123) 
This vision returned two weeks later, and was followed by further such visions of a 
sea of blood over the northern lands, and of a terrible cold over frozen wastelands.  In 
the years following, Jung passed the war maintaining a busy psychotherapeutic 
practice, lecturing, publishing his work, and undertaking annual military service 
duties in Switzerland.  Thus began the labours that lasted for more than 16 years, and 
that Jung considered to be his most important work, from which everything else, the 
scientific elaboration and the integration into life, flowed (Shamdasani, 2012, 366).   
By contrast, as described below, Bion spent his WWI commanding a tank on the front 
line. 
Accordingly, the origins of both concepts coincided in the same time period but in 
utterly different experiences, during WWI.  Their arrival in the public domain also 
coincided.  Bion (1948a, 1948b, 1949a, 1949b, 1950a, 1950b, 1951) wrote a series of 
papers entitled Experiences in Groups, which constitute his main writings on the 
proto-mental system and which coincidentally were published only shortly after the 
publication by Jung (1947/1954) of On the Nature of the Psyche, containing his main 
account of the psychoid concept in its biological aspect.   
142 
 
 
 
The evolution of Jung’s psychoid concept has been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
while the evolution of Bion’s proto-mental concept, and its overlap with Jung’s ideas, 
is set out below.  First some definitions are presented, to frame the discussion. 
Definitions 
With these two concepts, Jung and Bion both address the locus of the soma in 
analytic work, arising from a deeply unconscious, unknowable area of a combined 
body-mind, a monism, in which body and mind are seen as different aspects of the 
same thing. 
Chapters 4 and 5 delineated a set of characteristics for the psychoid concept, derived 
from the historical conceptual study, as follows: 
(i) A deeply unconscious, unknowable area; 
a. Linked with primitive or developmental experience, prior to the 
differentiation of self and other, and psyche and soma; 
(ii) A structuring and organising principle immanent in the basic stuff of the 
organism; 
a. Giving rise to emergent properties, by which the mind separates from 
the body;  
b. Yielding instinctual and archetypal images of a psycho-physical 
nature; 
c. Manifesting in the transference. 
Bion (1961) refers to the proto-mental system as a concept that transcends 
experience, describing it in terms of group dynamics.  His initial definition sets the 
proto-mental system as a fundamental matrix, in which psyche and soma are 
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undifferentiated and which manifests as much in physical forms as in mental forms.  
He describes this level of proto-mental events as a group phenomenon, the group 
developing out of this level until its emotions become expressible in psychological 
terms. 
The historical background and development of Bion’s proto-mental concept within 
his oeuvre will now be reviewed, in order to furnish a more complete definition for 
comparison with the psychoid concept, and the extent to which Bion may have been 
influenced by Jung will be considered.   
Historical reconstruction 
This reconstruction commences with Bion’s wartime experiences, followed by his 
subsequent medical training, then his employment by the Tavistock Clinic, and later 
his qualification as a psychoanalyst.  
1. WWI 
Bion’s experiences in WWI alerted him to the effects of war on soldiers, rather 
loosely described at the time as nerve strain or shell shock (later as battle or war 
neurosis
48
).  As a tank commander of one of the early tanks, commonly known as a 
Mother Mark IV
49
, on the front line, Bion (1997) witnessed, and in all probability 
himself experienced, shell shock.  As he wrote in his diary for 26 September 1917 at 
Ypres:   
All our nerves were in an awful state, and we tried not to think of what was 
coming.  The waiting was awful and seemed to be almost a physical pain – a 
sort of frightfully ‘heavy’ feeling about one’s limbs and body.  (Ibid., 29) 
                                                 
48
 Now known as post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD). 
49
 As displayed and described at Bovington Museum, Wool, Dorset. 
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Later, for 8 August 1918 at Amiens, he wrote, “these considerations and the anxiety 
of my job rather crushed me.  I sat still and numbed with an almost physical pain, 
which made movement difficult” (ibid., 120). 
After the war, Bion went to Oxford University, graduating in history in 1921.  He 
then underwent a medical training.  From 1927-1935, Bion was in therapy with James 
Hadfield, who had practised hypnosis on shell-shock victims in WWI, and who was 
an authority on war neurosis, describing some of the symptoms in terms of 
conversion hysteria (Hadfield, 1942).  Hadfield worked at the Tavistock Clinic, 
originally founded in 1920 by Hugh Crichton-Miller to implement in civilian life a 
programme of treatment that he had learnt as part of a team adapting Freud’s method, 
for treating shell-shocked soldiers in wartime.  A number of members of staff had 
seen, studied and treated shell-shock victims, both fresh from the line and in hospitals 
at home and abroad, and they brought this background, and the associated 
understandings of psychosomatic and hysterical symptoms, to their practices.  In the 
run up to WWII, members of the Clinic, who had witnessed psychosomatic disorders 
occurring in battle conditions in WWI, published The Neuroses in War based upon 
their experiences (Miller, ed., 1940).  Appendix C of this volume, classifying 
“Psychological Disorders in War”, refers to the symptoms of conversion hysteria, 
including: twilight states with automatic movements; convulsive attacks; hysterical 
paralysis; and hysterical sensory disturbances; as well as anxiety states including the 
somatic neuroses, such as effort syndrome and emotional hypertension. 
2. The Tavistock Clinic 
Under Crichton-Miller, the Tavistock Clinic aimed at a unified psychosomatic 
approach to diagnosis and treatment (Armstrong, 1980).  Possibly through the 
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influence of Hadfield, Bion himself came to work at there in 1933, remaining until 
1948 and being amongst those who contributed to The Neuroses in War.  
Hinshelwood (2013, 46) writes that “Bion arrived at the Tavistock during a time 
when a certain psycho-physical integration was probably still a prevalent idea”, under 
the influence of its then director, Crichton-Miller.  Crichton-Miller (1920, 4) placed 
emphasis on what he described as a binocular approach that paid attention to physical 
factors as well as mental factors of a given neurosis, noting that “the physician who 
has been trained to regard disease solely from the organic point of view, and the 
psychotherapist who has become accustomed to think exclusively in terms of mind, 
are both employing only monocular vision”.  
In the 1930s, the Tavistock Clinic represented a school of psychotherapy dedicated to 
an integrative practice combining both Jung and Freud (Hinshelwood, 2013, 45).  It is 
likely that the atmosphere in the Clinic was still biased towards Freud’s theoretical 
models of hysteria and psychogenic disease.  However, Dicks (1970, 23) observes 
that Jung’s ideas found representation amongst the Tavistock staff, most notably in 
Crichton-Miller himself and in Maurice Nicol, a British pupil of Jung.   
According to Dicks (ibid., 67), Hadfield favoured a reductive clinical attitude, 
seeking to discover dynamic links between the symptom and its causes in the past, the 
‘nuclear incidents’, whilst rejecting the notion of the transference, generally a 
Freudian approach.  However, Hadfield was also influenced by the work of the social 
theorist William McDougall (1908, 1920), who developed a theory of the group 
mind.  McDougall established a system of hormic psychology, which placed 
emphasis on the dynamic and purposive aspects of the mind, owing more towards 
Jung’s understanding of libido than Freud’s.  It would appear, therefore, that 
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Hadfield’s leanings placed him somewhere between Freud and Jung in his theoretical 
stance.   
In any event, Bion would certainly have been well exposed to Jung’s ideas in his 
daily work during his time at the Tavistock Clinic.  
It is interesting to note that Bion’s daughter, Parthenope, had intended, before her 
untimely death, to write an account of Bion’s intellectual formation, and left brief 
notes on this project on the website: 
www.sicap.it/merciai/parthenope.parthenope.htm.   
Although the site closed down in 2010, these notes, dated 1 February 2001, have been 
copied and published by Torres & Hinshelwood (2013, xvi-ii) and describe plans for 
a three part biography, entitled Bion and his Books, in which the second part, 
designated “Groping towards Psychoanalysis”, included sections headed ‘Tavistock’ 
and ‘Jung’.  We may assume, therefore, that Bion was influenced by Jung, something 
affirmed separately in a private communication from Mawson
50
, indicating that Bion 
had in his library a marked copy of a work by Jung on the marriage relationship, in 
which Jung discusses the problem of the ‘contained’ and the ‘container’, language 
employed later by Bion in his concept of ‘container-contained’. 
3. Jung’s Tavistock Lectures 
In 1935, Jung (1935) was invited to deliver a series of five lectures at the Tavistock 
Clinic.  Bion attended at least the first three on 30 September 1935, 1 October 1935 
and 2 October 1935, bringing his patient, Samuel Beckett
51
, to the third.   
                                                 
50
 Mawson, C. (2013), private communication. 
51
 Beckett had come to Bion presenting psychosomatic issues, including painful physical symptoms 
and panic attacks. 
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These lectures also indicate an overlap in the interests of Bion and Jung.  The first 
lecture was on psychological types, in which Jung (1935, pars. 20-5) described the 
four functions of sensation, thinking, feeling and intuition, as ‘ectopsychic’ functions, 
meaning that they concern a system of relationship between the contents of 
consciousness and facts and data coming in from the environment and discerned 
through the senses.  He next described the ‘endopsychic’ functions, concerning a 
system of relationship between the contents of consciousness, and postulated 
processes in the unconscious, designated as the four functions, memory, the 
subjective components of conscious functions, emotions/affects, and invasion or 
something that breaks through from the unconscious.   
In the ensuing discussion, questions, including one by Bion, were put concerning the 
links between the ectopsychic function, feeling, and the endopsychic function, 
emotion or affect.  By way of response, Jung made reference to his Word Association 
Tests
52
, demonstrating the physiological manifestations of emotion.  Asked about the 
relationship between affect and physiology, he replied that the relationship between 
body and mind is a difficult question: 
All we can know empirically is that processes of the body and processes of the 
mind happen together in some way which is mysterious to us.  It is due to our 
most lamentable mind that we cannot think of body and mind as one and the 
same thing; probably they are one thing, but we are unable to think it. […] In 
the same way, the so-called psycho-physical parallelism is an insoluble 
problem. […] All we can say is that there are certain physiological conditions 
which are clearly caused by mental disorder, and certain others which are not 
caused but merely accompanied by psychic processes.  Body and mind are 
two aspects of the living being, and that is all we know.  Therefore I prefer to 
say that the two things happen together in a miraculous way, and we had 
better leave it at that, because we cannot think of them together.  For my own 
use, I have coined a term to illustrate this being together; I say there is a 
peculiar principle of synchronicity active in the world so that things happen 
                                                                                                                                           
 
52
 1907/1908. 
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together somehow and behave as if they were the same, and yet for us they are 
not.  (Jung, 1935, par. 70) 
In the second lecture, Jung described his model for the structure of the mind, 
including a personal unconscious having personal contents, and a collective 
unconscious containing traces of the archaic mind with its archetypes, archetypal 
images and mythological motifs.  He observed: 
The deepest we can reach in our exploration of the unconscious mind is the 
layer where man is no longer a distinct individual, but where his mind widens 
out and merges into the mind of mankind – not the conscious mind, but the 
unconscious mind of mankind, where we are all the same. […] On this 
collective level we are no longer separate individuals, we are all one.  You can 
understand this when you study the psychology of the primitives.  The 
outstanding fact about the primitive mentality is this lack of distinctiveness 
between individuals, this oneness of the subject with the object, this 
participation mystique, as Levy-Bruhl terms it.  (Ibid., par. 87) 
He described this layer as “the ultimate kernel which cannot be made conscious at all 
– the sphere of the archetypal mind.  Its presumable contents appear in the form of 
images” (ibid., par. 92).  He also observed that “when the collective unconscious 
becomes really constellated in larger social groups, the result is a public craze, a 
mental epidemic [… t]hese movements are exceedingly contagious” (ibid., par. 95). 
In the discussion following this lecture, Bion referred to Jung’s observations on body 
and mind from the previous evening, and to a recently published article on “A case of 
‘periventricular epilepsy’” (Davie, 1935).  The patient, in a man in his middle forties, 
had served in the war and been severely wounded in 1918 with subsequent sepsis.  
Some fourteen years later, he fell prey to attacks of loss of consciousness, involving 
disturbed breathing, movements of the jaw and pallor, apparently unconnected with 
his wartime wounds.  He was treated by his doctor, who considered the possibility 
both of links with the patient’s wartime experience and of “an anxiety neurosis in the 
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Freudian sense” (ibid., 295).  In view of this, the doctor conducted a dream 
investigation, and Jung was called in rather than Freud, since: 
I do not recollect that Freud has diagnosed organic maladies by dream 
analysis, but readers of Jung will recall instances of this. […] It has been 
suggested that the diagnosis of such cases by Jung is the outcome of his 
intuition. […]  Jung, however, seems to reach his conclusions solely by 
symbol interpretation.  (Ibid., 296)   
In the dream, some machinery needed oiling and milk was suggested as the best 
lubricant, although the dreamer felt that oozy slime was preferable.  Then, a pond was 
drained and amid the slime were two extinct animals, one of which was a minute 
mastodon.  Jung immediately diagnosed an organic disturbance, interpreting the 
drainage of the pond as the damming up of the cerebrospinal fluid circulation.   
Bion observed that, if this case had been correctly reported, it made a very important 
suggestion, and wondered whether Jung considered there was some closer connection 
between the two forms of archaic survival, those of the body and those of the mind. 
Jung responded that this also related to the controversial problem of psycho-physical 
parallelism: 
As I tried to explain yesterday, the two things – the psychic fact and the 
physiological fact – come together in a peculiar way.  They happen together 
and are, so I assume, simply two different aspects of our mind, but not in 
reality.  We see them as two on account of the utter incapacity of our mind to 
think them together.  Because of that possible unity of the two things, we must 
expect to find dreams which are more on the physiological side than on the 
psychological, as we have other dreams that are more on the psychological 
side than on the physical side.  (1935, par. 136) 
Continuing, he brought in Janet’s abaissement du niveau mental, and the nature of 
Tao, including the way the Chinese mind experiments with “being together” and 
“coming together at the right moment”, an experimental method that is not known in 
the West (ibid., par. 144).  “I use another word to designate it”, he said, “I call it 
synchronicity” (ibid., par. 143).   
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In the remaining three lectures, Jung covered the Word Association Tests, dream 
interpretation and active imagination.  No further observations were made by Bion, 
although we know that he was present with Beckett at one of these at least, when 
Jung interpreted two dreams from a small child of five in terms of images of the 
sympathetic nervous system (ibid., pars. 202/3); and the mythological dreams of 
another child as prognostic of her death, something which followed a year later from 
an infectious disease (ibid., par. 205).   
In these 1935 lectures, Jung brings in an early reference to his notion of 
‘synchronicity’ as a way of describing the body-mind connection53.  Later, Jung 
(1947/1954) links synchronicity with his own psychoid concept.  Here, however, he 
confines himself to a rejection of the notion of psycho-physical parallelism in favour 
of the radical idea of body and mind being two aspects of the same thing linked in a 
way that is not causal.  He describes the psychic fact and the physical fact as different 
aspects of the mind, coming together at the right moment and behaving as if they are 
the same, even though in reality they are not.  In other words, he brings in the notion 
of a dual-aspect monism. 
He specifically refers to synchronicity in terms of Janet’s abaissement du niveau 
mental, associated with a deeply unconscious layer in the mind, an ultimate kernel, 
which cannot be made conscious at all and which is undifferentiated, archetypal, and 
primitive in the sense that subject and object come together in a participation 
mystique.  He also links the constellation of this deep layer of the collective 
unconscious, in groups, with contagion, public crazes and mental epidemics. 
                                                 
53
 At this stage, as discussed in Chapter 1, Jung would almost certainly still have been in the first phase 
of his ideas concerning his psychoid concept, grounded more in the biological thinking of Driesch than 
in the quantum physics of Pauli, since the shift to the second phase occurred after 1937. 
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These encounters between Bion and Jung demonstrate a striking overlap of interests 
in 1935.  In Jung, these seminars foreshadow his later writings on the psychoid 
unconscious.  In Bion, it would seem that they were not forgotten, since, in a letter of 
1939 to Rickman, he makes a disparaging comment about Jung’s collective 
unconscious (Vonofakos & Hinshelwood, 2012, 67).  His own experience with shell 
shock meant that his subsequent initial papers were directed primarily to the war 
neuroses and his early group work (Bion, 1940; Bion & Rickman, 1943).  
Nonetheless, he was alive to the fact that Jung’s ideas on body and mind were a 
radical departure from current practice. 
The above discussion highlights the background to Bion’s ideas in the 1920s and 
1930s, in terms of psychosomatic thinking and a psycho-biological approach, 
described by Torres & Hinshelwood (2013, 35) as an early bio-psycho-social model.  
Jung’s Tavistock Lectures introduce a different orientation, with his references to an 
undifferentiated unconscious layer, and his implied understanding of the body-mind 
relation as a dual-aspect monism, one that is to be found in Bion’s proto-mental 
concept
54
.   
Bion’s group work 
Bion relates his ideas about proto-mental phenomena to his theory of groups.  The 
above history provides some of the background to Bion’s group work, deriving firstly 
from his time in the army as a tank commander in WWI, observing the effects on his 
crew’s morale of conditions near the front line from 1917 to 1919, and of effectual 
and ineffectual senior officers, and later from his time at the Tavistock Clinic, 
encountering the work of people such as McDougall and Hadfield.  As a result of his 
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 Apparently, Bion did not acknowledge this influence from Jung. 
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experiences in WWI, Bion was asked in 1942 to co-operate with Eric Trist in setting 
up War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs) for the selection of future officers.  
According to Harrison (2000, 90), Bion was largely instrumental in devising the 
Leaderless Group technique for the WOSBs, which employed unstructured group 
interactions to test the performance of potential officers and discover who would 
emerge as a leader. 
Torres (2013b) & Hinshelwood (2013) cite two other influences on Bion’s thinking in 
relation to groups, namely Wilfred Trotter, whom Bion encountered during his 
medical internship at University College Hospital and who was on the Medical 
Advisory Board of the Tavistock Clinic, and John Rickman, who was Bion’s analyst 
in the period 1937-1939 and who set up the Northfield Experiment in group 
psychotherapy at Northfield Military Hospital in 1943 in collaboration with Bion. 
As Francesca Bion writes in her introduction to The Long Weekend, Trotter played a 
very great part in Bion’s intellectual development (Bion, 1982).  Bion (1985), in his 
auto-biography All My Sins Remembered, writes with respect of Trotter’s skills at 
University College Hospital, both in drawing out his patients and as a surgeon.  By 
this time, towards the end of the 1920s, Trotter (1916) had long published his 
acclaimed work Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, and Torres (2013b, 17) notes 
that the influence of this work on Bion’s ideas is plain. 
Not only had Trotter (1916, 12) identified a clear link between individual and group 
behaviour, describing the two fields of the social and the individual as absolutely 
continuous; but also he attributed to man three instincts, namely self-preservation, 
nutrition and sex, plus in addition a herd instinct (ibid., 97).  Interestingly, Hadfield, 
at the Tavistock Clinic, later postulated “a triad of instincts - namely, the sexual 
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libido, the aggression or self-preservation, and dependence, with the need for 
attachment behaviour” (Dicks, 1970, 67).  Bion’s three types of group mentality, 
fight-flight, dependence and pairing, appear remarkably similar, as discussed below. 
Trotter (ibid., 39) also noted the extent to which man embodies the voice of the herd, 
with his tendency to affirm beliefs sanctioned by the herd, no matter how far such 
beliefs may be opposed by the evidence.  Such wholesale acceptance of non-rational 
belief is “invariably regarded by the holder as rational […] while the position of one 
who holds contrary views is held to be obviously unreasonable. […] The difference is 
due rather to the fundamental assumptions
55
 of the antagonists being hostile, and 
these assumptions are derived from herd suggestion” (ibid., 37).  As Trotter pointed 
out, sensitivity to the group leads to mental instability, and there is a close association 
between civilisation and mental instability (ibid., 64).  Here, indeed, would seem to 
be an early foundation for Bion’s ideas concerning basic assumption behaviour and 
the links of group mentality with psychotic functioning. 
Trotter drew his ideas on groups from biology, citing the bee as an example of 
instinctual behaviour with its sensitivity to the hive, and Torres (2013b, 19) notes a 
vitalistic base to Bion’s ideas derived from Trotter. 
Both Trotter and McDougall with their studies of groups, large and small, formed a 
backdrop to the work done by Bion and Rickman.  Bion’s analysis with Rickman 
came to an end when Rickman joined the Emergency Medical Services set up at the 
start of the war to deal with civilian casualties, but they remained in correspondence.  
Rickman worked with psychologically traumatised soldiers, and, as their 
correspondence attests, gradually began to discuss this work with Bion.  Bion visited 
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 Researcher’s italics. 
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Rickman at the Wharncliffe Hospital in January 1941, and they discussed Rickman’s 
group work with the patients, collaborating over a memorandum that was to form a 
blueprint subsequently for the Northfield Experiment (Vonofakos & Hinshelwood, 
2012, 69).  After Rickman was transferred to Northfield Hospital in July 1942, this 
experiment was conducted in the rehabilitation unit at the hospital (Harrison, 2000, 
187). 
After WWII, the Tavistock Clinic began to look at group methods for treating people 
with psychological difficulties, and Bion (1961) was invited to develop his interest in 
groups already fostered by the WOSBs and the Northfield Experiment, leading to the 
series of papers and the book entitled Experiences in Groups.  These papers divide 
into three sections, containing chronologically different accounts of his work on 
groups, published respectively in 1943 (Intra-Group Tensions in Therapy, written 
with Rickman), 1948-1951 (Experiences in Groups I-VII) and 1952 (Group 
Dynamics: A Re-View).  Thereafter, he contributed little further on the subject, in 
spite of being asked occasionally about his current views in various seminars, most 
notably in an interview with AG Banet in 1976, when he said that organisations 
protect themselves by growing a hard shell and individuals display the same shell-
building processes (Bion, 1976).   
These sets of papers contain Bion’s evolving ideas concerning group processes, 
starting in the first section with observations from his group work in a military 
psychiatric hospital.  In the second section, he includes an account of his work with 
therapeutic groups at the Tavistock Clinic.  And, in Re-View, in the third section, he 
applies ideas from psychoanalysis, particularly the theory of Melanie Klein, to his 
earlier views on group dynamics. 
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During the second period, he came to classify different groups based on ‘group 
mentality’, meaning the “unanimous expression of the will of the group”, designed to 
ensure that group life proceeds according to one of a certain number of basic 
assumptions, from which emotional reinforcement is derived (Bion, 1961, 101).  He 
identified three such basic assumption mentalities, namely the fight-flight group, the 
pairing group, and the dependent group, each modelling itself unconsciously on a 
structure suited to the relevant assumption and being associated with related 
emotional states, and each excluding the emotional states associated with the other 
two basic assumptions.  Basic assumption activity, according to Bion, requires no 
experience or mental development – it is instantaneous, inevitable and instinctive. 
Firstly, he observed that basic assumption mentalities tended to be opposed to 
learning by experience and to alternate, rather than conflict, with one another but, as 
soon as it is perceived that there is a need to develop rather than rely on the efficacy 
of magic, a more sophisticated group comes into being, privileging the value of a 
rational and scientific approach to problems and displaying a more differentiated 
level of consciousness.  Bion called this the ‘work group’, described as one that learns 
by experience.  Such a group mobilises the emotions of one basic assumption in an 
attempt to cope with those of the others, which it suppresses, and this gives rise to 
conflict.   
Such conflict manifests at an individual level, since the individual is faced with the 
choice of identifying himself with the unconscious emotional state of the group or 
with the more sophisticated conscious approach of the work group in his wish to 
develop as an individual.  Persecutory distress may arise when an individual finds 
himself caught in this conflict, and Bion postulated the existence of a proto-mental 
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system, in which body and mind are undifferentiated, to account for the dynamics 
then occurring. 
He described the proto-mental system as a matrix, from which spring phenomena 
constituting prototypes of the three basic assumptions and also precursors to the 
emotional states respectively associated with the basic assumptions.  Those basic 
assumptions that are excluded by the particular one that is operating in a given work 
group are confined to the proto-mental arena, since it is only the basic assumption 
associated with the work group task that has been able to develop freely.  Proto-
mental events cannot be understood by reference to the individual alone, since they 
are predicated on the dynamics of individuals met together in a group, and are 
therefore a function of the group.  Thus, the origins of such phenomena must be 
sought in two places, namely the relationship of the individual with the group as a 
participant in the group work, and the basic assumptions that are excluded by the task 
of the group (ibid., 102-3). 
As Bion says of the proto-mental system, “since it is a level in which physical and 
mental are undifferentiated, it stands to reason that when distress from this source 
manifests itself, it manifests itself just as well in physical forms as in psychological” 
(ibid., 102).  This is the source of group diseases having physical and psychological 
components, even though they may manifest in an individual alone.  According to 
Bion, in this second stage of his thinking, the undifferentiated arena is activated in the 
individual by his participation in the group, and the individual expresses a group 
pathology.   
Bion then goes on, in the third section, to apply ideas developed from his 
psychoanalytic training and his analysis with Melanie Klein to his thinking on groups, 
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something he had foreshadowed by stating in the second section that the apparent 
difference between individual psychology and group psychology is an illusion (ibid., 
134).  The forward to Experiences in Groups, written after the original papers in the 
second section with the benefit of hindsight, confirms this view, stating “I am 
impressed, as a practising psychoanalyst, by the fact that the psycho-analytical 
approach, through the individual, and the approach these papers describe, through the 
group, are dealing with different facets of the same phenomena” (ibid., 8). 
In the third section, Bion relates stability in a group to work group functioning, and to 
Freud’s view of the family and neurotic patterns, and instability to basic assumption 
functioning and to psychotic patterns.  In the initial 1952 version of this paper, he 
refers to Klein’s account of schizoid mechanisms, to describe the obliteration of 
individuality and automaton-like behaviour in a basic assumption group; and the use 
of splitting and projective identification in such group in the face of pre-verbal 
psychotic anxiety, with the accompanying persecutory feelings and bizarre elements 
(1952, 242-7).  In the later version in the book, he describes basic assumption 
formations as secondary to an extremely primitive primal scene that is much more 
bizarre than the classical account offered by Freud, and that is worked out on a level 
characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position of Klein, in which primitive oedipal 
conflicts manifest on a “foundation of part-object relationships” (1961, 162).  
According to Bion, the adult in the group regresses to mechanisms typical of the 
earliest phases of mental life, in which a primitive primal scene appears to be 
operating and “a part of one parent, the breast or the mother’s body, contains amongst 
other objects a part of the father” (ibid., 164).  He suggests that these psychotic 
dynamics apply not only to a sick group, but rather may be found in every group 
(ibid., 181). 
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In this respect, the association of theories from psychoanalysis with ideas concerning 
groups leads to a view of the analytic encounter as a group of two people, a link Bion 
makes himself (ibid., 131).  He attributes a group mentality to the individual alone, 
describing the individual as having a group mentality or ‘groupishness’, in the sense 
that the social instinct exists whether or not the individual is present in a group 
situation (ibid., 131).   
The real importance of this, although not specifically stated in Experiences in Groups, 
is that it points to Bion’s subsequent ideas on psychosis for further explication of the 
proto-mental system, particularly to publications where he elaborates on Klein’s work 
on the paranoid-schizoid position, and on the mechanisms of projective identification 
and splitting.   
This is confirmed by: the parallel, just mentioned, that Bion himself draws between 
the functioning of the group and the individual (1952); a chronological interweaving 
of his papers on psychosis and on groups, as discussed below, since he started writing 
accounts of individual psychotic functioning during the period of publication of his 
group papers (1950c); and his own observations in Re-View that primitive 
mechanisms, peculiar to paranoid-schizoid functioning, occupy a central positon in 
group dynamics (1952, 245-7).   
Not only did he indicate that the same psychotic phenomena arise in individual 
psychoanalytic work and in group work, but also he was already generating clinical 
writing, namely The Imaginary Twin, on his analytic work before he had published 
the final paper of the second section and his Re-View of the third section (Bion, 
1950c, 1951, 1952).   
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Contemplating these early accounts of psychotic mechanisms, in The Imaginary 
Twin, Bion (1950c, 21-22) describes certain psychotic mechanisms, based on splitting 
and introjection and projection, stating that he found it impossible to interpret the 
clinical material “as a manifestation of purely psychological development divorced 
from any concurrent physical development. […] If this is so, we would have to ask 
ourselves if these psychological developments […] come close to the first four 
months in the individual’s life”.  A comment such as this helps us to see why 
psychoanalysts, such as Grotstein (2007, 192, 258), have sought to make links 
between Bion’s proto-mental system and his subsequent ideas concerning beta-
elements, described by Bion (1967, 22) as elements “partaking of the quality of 
psychic object and inanimate object without any form of distinction between the 
two”56.   
Next, in Re-view, Bion (1952, 246-7) describes the basic assumption group in terms 
of psychotic anxiety and obliteration of the individual, in which splitting dynamics 
and schizoid mechanisms apply.   
His subsequent papers describe such psychotic mechanisms in detail, and it is 
sufficient here to refer only to those published immediately following the period of 
his group work in Second Thoughts, which includes a number of papers discussing 
the distinctions between the non-psychotic personality, or part of the personality, and 
the psychotic personality, or part of the personality (Bion, 1956).  The former 
possesses an ego capable of conscious awareness of internal and external reality and 
shows a capacity for whole-object relationships.  The latter has a hatred of reality and 
resorts to excessive use of projective identification in order to rid itself of the 
                                                 
56
 It appears, however, that Bion himself made no specific reference to any such link between his 
proto-mental system and his beta elements.  
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perceptual awareness of sense impressions, the psychotic personality employing 
splitting of the ego and projective identification of the fragments in order to avoid 
knowledge.  In consequence, the latter relates only on a part-object basis, and 
becomes persecuted by the expelled fragments and feels surrounded by bizarre 
objects. 
Although Bion does not in this volume describe the bizarre objects as proto-mental 
phenomena, nevertheless his account of such bizarre objects describes them in terms 
of an undifferentiated psyche and soma and unmanageable distress (emotion), thereby 
suggesting that he is thinking of them in the same way.  More especially, he says, 
“since these particles include pieces of conscious awareness of sense impressions, the 
senses are felt to become painfully compressed and acute to an intolerable degree.  
The patient can be seen to be in the grip of extremely painful, tactile, auditory, or 
visual hallucinations” (1956, 41).  As a result, according to Bion, the patient now 
moves in a world of objects that partake of qualities, which in the non-psychotic are 
peculiar to matter, anal objects, senses, ideas and super-ego.  
He elaborates on the sensory aspect in On Hallucination, in which he gives an 
account of an understanding slowly emerging over years of work with a particular 
patient (Bion, 1958).  He describes a session, where, at the beginning, the patient 
stands motionless, drooping, as he passes him and, “the inception of [Bion’s] 
movements to sit appears to release a spring in him” (1967, 66).  The movements of 
patient and analyst then seem geared together, as if they are both parts of the same 
clockwork toy, so that the analyst feels himself no longer to be an independent object.   
The patient glances rapidly at Bion as if his eyes could suck something from him, 
then he turns arrested beside the couch with his gaze directed at the corner of the 
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room, followed by a small shudder, as if expelling something hostile.  In an attempt 
to unburden himself of his suffering, he hallucinates an evacuatory use of the senses, 
for example expelling broken fragments of words from his eyes, it having emerged 
that the patient feels the sense organs capable of expulsion as well as reception.  The 
patient’s behaviour is also intended to rid his psychic apparatus of accretions of 
stimuli, and corresponds with muscular movements, such as changes of posture and 
expression, so that the unburdening of the psyche by hallucination, i.e. by using the 
sensory apparatus in reverse, is reinforced by muscular action, in this instance a 
shudder forming a complex analogue of a scowl.  The muscular action changes the 
expression to one of murderous assault, representing the outer form of an explosive 
projective identification (ibid., 83).  
However, the resort to excessive projective identification leads the patient to feel he is 
surrounded by bizarre objects and, as Bion says, “the attempt to rid himself of his 
perceptual system leads to a compensatory hypertrophy of sense impressions” (ibid., 
85). 
Although Bion does not refer in this paper to his group work, nonetheless, by virtue 
of his comments, in his group work, linking proto-mental phenomena with intense 
emotion belonging to a respective basic assumption, with primitive anxiety, and with 
the psychotic parts of the personality, it would seem fair to assume that this later 
description of psychotic functioning is relevant to such phenomena. 
Proto-mental definition 
In summary, Bion’s account of proto-mental phenomena locates their origin in a 
deeply unconscious stratum, where psyche and soma are undifferentiated.  He 
associates them with groups, group mentality, instinctive basic assumption 
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functioning, including intense primitive and often persecutory emotion, and psychotic 
mechanisms.  A development out of the proto-mental matrix leads into emotional 
experience and psychological states.   
This leads to the conclusions that proto-mental events may be characterised by: 
(i) Physical and/or mental manifestations; 
(ii) Regression to extremely early primitive states, of a kind associated, 
respectively, with the basic assumptions of dependency, fight-flight and 
pairing, where the individual is obliterated;  
(iii) Splitting and projective identification; 
(iv) Part-object functioning and bizarre objects; 
(v) Defence mechanisms, associated with attempts to rid the psyche of accretions 
of stimuli and persecutory objects; 
(vi) A collective aspect. 
It is to be noted that Bion described proto-mental phenomena as a precursor to 
emotional and psychological functioning.  In other words, although he viewed them 
as something arising in situations where psychotic elements and anxiety emerge, he 
does also see them as a function of all group situations, both pathological and healthy.   
Comparison of Jung and Bion 
1. First thoughts 
It is interesting to note that both the psychoid concept of Jung and the proto-mental 
concept of Bion originate in their very different experiences in WWI.  Those of Jung, 
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more fully discussed in a different chapter, are based in his investigation of vision-
making, including his own active imagination, as demonstrated in The Red Book, and 
they lead towards an imaginal approach to his psychoid concept, emphasising the 
prospective function and the numinous aspects of this deeply unconscious area.  
Those of Bion, discussed above, are viscerally concerned with the chaotic, 
fragmentary, and undoubtedly claustrophobic, experience of being a tank commander 
near the front line, and his work with shell shock.  Therefore, his proto-mental 
concept emphasises far more the bizarre and psychotic elements.  This background is 
very important, because it highlights the experiential roots of their concepts, and 
colours their emotional receptivity and attitude in their clinical work with patients.   
Nonetheless, in spite of these differences, both propounded a view of an 
undifferentiated bodymind in an arena, in which the individual has no distinctiveness, 
out of which a differentiated consciousness arises.  This thesis argues that such 
commonality also arises from a similar intellectual basis.  Firstly, the evidence 
discussed above suggests that Jung’s ideas influenced Bion directly, and, next, the 
probability exists that both men were influenced by the same source of vitalist ideas 
in philosophy, namely Henri Bergson. 
2. A vitalist viewpoint 
By way of background, during a continuous period of at least twelve years from 1915, 
the list of corresponding members of the Society for Psychical Research includes key 
contributors to the psychoanalytic thinking of the time, amongst them Freud, Jung, 
and Janet, as well as Bergson, while McDougall was President of the Society in 1920 
and Driesch was President of the Society in 1926.  As mentioned above, McDougall, 
who influenced Hadfield, owed a debt to Bergson in his hormic psychology.  Further, 
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Jung’s psychoid concept owes much to Driesch57, but his writings also contain 
numerous references to Bergson, and at least one of his close followers published an 
account of Bergson’s work (Keller, 1914).   
Driesch was developing his psychoid concept in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, and was known to Jung, by 1907, when he first encountered Freud
58
.  This 
was also the year when Bergson (1907[1911], 45) published the French edition of 
Creative Evolution, acknowledging the neo-vitalism of Driesch.  It is known that 
Jung had a copy of the 1912 German edition in his library (Shamdasani, 2003, 227).  
Further, writing to Hans Schmid on 24 June 1915, he indicates that he had read it two 
years previously (Beebe & Falzeder  2013, 48).  Both Shamdasani (2003. 227) and 
Gunter (1982, 639) note that, by 1913, Jung was comparing his own notion of the 
libido with Bergson’s élan vital. 
The minutes of the Zurich Psychoanalytical Society, Psychological Club, Zurich, for 
20 March 1914, show that, following a presentation by Keller
59
 of a paper on 
Bergson’s theory, Jung responded that Bergson should long have been discussed 
since he was saying everything that they had not said.  And, in 1916, in a paper on the 
psychoses, Jung observed: 
I realise that my views are parallel with those of Bergson, and that in my book 
the concept of libido which I have given, is a concept parallel to that of “élan 
vital”; my constructive method60 corresponds to Bergson’s “intuitive” 
method”.  I, however, confine myself to the psychological side and to 
                                                 
57
 As discussed in Chapter 4. 
58
 Also, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
59
 Keller’s 1914 pamphlet on Bergson appears to pre-date the presentation, having been published in 
January of the same year, but an overlap between the two is not acknowledged. 
60
 The reference here by Jung to his constructive method alludes to a distinction, which he made in a 
presentation entitled On Psychological Understanding, before the Psycho-Medical Society in London 
in 1914, between Freud’s method and his own (Shamdasani, 2003, 64).  Based on a view of Freud’s 
method as a causal tracing back to antecedent elements, by comparison with his attempt to grasp living 
meaning through synthesising the symbol into a universal and comprehensible expression, he 
described Freud’s method as reductive and his own as constructive.  Later, he came to call his method 
the synthetic method. 
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practical work.  When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered 
to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but 
expressed in consummate language and in a wonderfully clear philosophic 
style.  (1916a, 351) 
By way of example, Jung gives a dream of a female patient: 
I am on the point of crossing a broad and rapid stream.  There is no bridge, 
only a ford, but as I begin to cross a crab lying hidden in the water seizes my 
foot and will not let go.  (Ibid., 418) 
The patient associates the crab to cancer, and a longstanding friendship with a woman 
who had this disease.  Jung (ibid., 420) points out that a causal, reductive 
interpretation would be that the friend will not let her go because of an unconscious, 
homosexual intention towards her.  A synthetic interpretation, by contrast, seeks the 
meaning of the crab lying hidden in the water of the patient’s own unconscious, and 
concludes that it is a symbol for mythological content from the collective 
unconscious, untamed energy that needs to be personalised and made conscious for 
the patient to be released (ibid., 426). 
Jung also acknowledged an influence on his typology in a letter of 4 June 1915 to 
Schmid, writing that “it was Bergson who gave me the notion of the irrational.  What 
I like is the unmistakable hypostasization of this notion.  As a consequence we get 
two intimately connected, mutually dependent principles: The rational and the 
irrational” (Beebe & Falzeder, 2013, 41-2).  Jung was not yet employing these terms 
in his typology, but they came to be applied with reference to his rational functions, 
thinking and feeling, and his irrational functions, sensation and intuition, which 
formed the subject of his first Tavistock Lecture attended by Bion in 1935. 
Thus, by his own admission, Jung’s notions of libido, his synthetic method and his 
typology owed much to the ideas of Bergson.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
effect a detailed comparison of Jung and Bergson, but Bergson’s descriptions of 
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instinct and intuition also lend themselves to comparison with Jung’s descriptions of 
the same, and point towards support for Jung’s accounts of the archetypes and thence 
of his psychoid unconscious.   
For example, Kerslake (2007) compares Bergson’s theory of instinct and Jung’s 
instinctual or primordial image.  Bergson (1907[1911], 181-3) describes the 
paralysing instinct of certain species of Hymenoptera (wasp), by which, prior to 
laying their eggs, they sting their victim to the point of paralysis, but not death, in 
order to ensure a living supply of fresh food for their larvae.  He describes this as the 
wasp having a sympathy for its victim, no longer considered as two organisms, but as 
a relation of one to the other wherein the mere presence of the two together is 
sufficient for the wasp to respond by instinct.   
Jung (1919, 18) gives an example of the refined instinct of the yucca moth, who once 
only in its lifetime lays its eggs in the yucca plant on the one single night that the 
plant is open, making a link with Bergson’s philosophy and his notion of intuition.  
He draws an analogy between instinct as a purposive impulse to carry out a highly 
complicated action, and intuition as the unconscious purposive apprehension of a 
highly complicated situation, as per Bergson, indicating that “Bergson’s philosophy 
suggests [a] way of explanation, where the factor of intuition comes in.  […] Just as 
instinct is the intrusion of an unconsciously motivated impulse into conscious action, 
so intuition is the intrusion of an unconscious content of an ‘image’ into conscious 
apperception” (ibid., 18).  In a later version of the same paper, Jung (1948, par. 278) 
relates this to Bergson’s revival of a primordial image with his conception of durée 
créatrice.   
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This leads us to the question of the body-mind relation addressed by both Bergson 
and Jung.  Bergson refuted the idea of psycho-physical parallelism, and gives an 
account of life as an undivided unity, in which intelligence and instinct are turned in 
opposite directions, the former towards inert matter and the latter towards life: 
In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of 
these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an 
undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in 
it the living beings along its track.  Of these two currents the second runs 
counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the 
second.  There results between them a modus vivendi, which is organization.  
(1907[1911], 243) 
Bergson, then, is promoting a panpsychic view of mind-matter relations, consistent 
with Jung’s dual-aspect monism in his psychoid concept.   
It is evident from the above that Jung was influenced by Bergson in the development 
of his early ideas generally, and in the development especially of those concerning his 
psychoid concept.  There is also evidence that Bion was so influenced, as Torres 
(2013c) discusses.   
According to Torres (ibid., 20), Bion possessed in his library a copy of Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory
61, which is marked with Bion’s manuscript comments.  Based 
both on the evidence of this book and on the parallels that can be drawn between their 
respective ideas, Torres argues that Bion was influenced by the metaphysics and 
process philosophy of Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead, and that these 
influences extended into Bion’s proto-mental concept. 
As discussed above, Bergson’s ideas were current with Freud, Janet and other 
psychoanalysts through the Society of Psychical Research, and certainly influenced 
Jung.  In the Tavistock Clinic, Crichton-Miller (1933, 33/138/185) himself wrote both 
                                                 
61
1896[1911]. 
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that Jung’s ideas bear a fundamental resemblance to Bergson’s, and that Jung’s use of 
the term libido is exactly analogous to Bergson’s élan vital or to McDougall’s hormé, 
while also noting that McDougall described Jung’s scheme as entirely reconcilable 
with the conception of creative evolution.  In all probability, therefore, Bion would 
have been well acquainted not only with Jung’s views but also with Bergson’s 
philosophy, when he was employed at the Tavistock Clinic.   
In Matter & Memory, Bergson (1896[1911]) sought to review the relation of spirit 
and matter through a study of memory, or aphasia, reaching the conclusion that 
memory constitutes the intersection of mind and matter.  In this work, Bergson (ibid., 
239) describes pure reality and intuition as an undivided continuity, which we break 
up into elements laid side by side, corresponding in the one case to words and in the 
other to independent objects, in adaptation to the exigencies of life.  For him, man 
exists in “pure duration, of which the flow is continuous and in which we pass 
insensibly from one state to another: a continuity which is really lived, but artificially 
decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge” (ibid., 243).  
Durée or true reality is thus an endlessly indivisible temporal succession, and a living 
unity or panpsychism.  
Bergson here describes the birth of consciousness in a vitalist fashion: 
The progress of living matter consists in a differentiation of function which 
leads first to the production and then to the increasing complication of a 
nervous system capable of canalizing excitations and of organizing actions: 
the more the higher centres develop, the more numerous become the motor 
paths along which the same excitation allows the living being to choose, in 
order that it may act.  An ever greater latitude left to movement in space – this 
indeed is what is seen.  What is not seen is the growing and accompanying 
tension of consciousness in time. … freedom always seems to have its roots 
deep in necessity and to be intimately organized with it.  Spirit borrows from 
matter the perceptions on which it feeds, and restores them to matter in the 
form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom.  (Ibid., 332) 
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Such a statement from Matter and Memory evidences a vitalist approach to the 
bodymind.  Coupled with Torres’ assertion of the influence of this work on Bion’s 
thinking, this implies that Bion was influenced by Bergson in his understanding of an 
undifferentiated layer as a function of his the proto-mental system.  Indeed, Torres 
draws a connection between Bergson’s panpsychism, as conceived in Matter and 
Memory, and Bion’s proto-mental matrix as a monism.   
It would, therefore, appear that Jung and Bion were both influenced by the vitalistic 
conceptions of Bergson, insofar as their two concepts designate a deeply unconscious 
stratum, combining body and mind in an undifferentiated field from which 
consciousness arises.  This is reinforced by evidence of some direct influence of Jung 
on Bion, as discussed above, and, it is here argued, account for the similarities 
between their psychoid and proto-mental concepts.  
Conclusion 
A comparison of the two concepts is shown in Appendix B, and yields some very 
interesting conclusions, since on the one hand both profit from a similar debt to 
vitalism, and a panpsychist or monistic account of the bodymind, leading to a 
conceptual notion of a deeply unconscious layer where body and mind are 
undifferentiated and out of which organisation and consciousness arise.  Likewise, 
both suggest that this layer is ultimately unknowable, and that it is a source of very 
primitive states, that may manifest as much physically as psychically, and may be 
encountered in regression.   
However, from this origin and almost certainly out of their actual WWI experiences 
and lived preoccupations, the two men ultimately developed entirely different 
accounts of the clinical experiences associated with such layer.  Jung develops his 
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thinking further along the abstract lines of his vitalistic forebears, expanding on the 
biological understanding of instincts into his instinctual image and his archetypal 
image, as discussed in Chapter 4.  His psychoid concept links body and mind, instinct 
and spirit, with the imaginal and the symbolic, emphasising the teleological aspect of 
its organising function in the service of individuation.  Bion, by contrast, links his 
proto-mental concept directly with fragmentation and psychosis, and with specific 
clinical experience, developing the trajectory of his ideas in detail in this direction, 
whilst paying only brief attention to the more life giving aspect of its vitalistic 
origins. 
Based on such history, this thesis argues that the fundamental similarities in the 
conceptual backgrounds and evolution of the two concepts render it appropriate to 
compare them both theoretically and clinically.  Furthermore, their complementary 
development in opposing directions, firstly in terms of Jung’s more abstract and 
universal conceptualisation versus Bion’s more clinical and applied application, and 
secondly in terms of Jung’s more teleological organizing function versus Bion’s more 
fragmented psychotic mechanism, supports a view that such comparison may usefully 
yield a theoretical expansion of Jung’s concept, by reference to Bion’s far more 
detailed exposition of psychosis, to derive an effective clinical instrument having 
extended practical application. 
The next chapter commences a discussion of the empirical strand of this project, and 
this comparison will be re-visited in the results of the empirical work and in the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 7 
The empirical work 
 
Introduction 
The investigation of the psychoid concept now moves into contemporary clinical 
practice, in an empirical study of a specific category of clinical event, through 
interviews with practising clinicians.  The aim is to determine how they conceptualise 
such category of event, namely to determine their private theories in relation thereto, 
and afterwards to compare the results with the formulation for the psychoid concept 
established in the historical part of this thesis.  The present chapter addresses the 
status of the analysts’ private theories, how they sit between clinical practice and 
public theory.  Accordingly, the chapter begins with some background on the 
relationship of clinical practice to public theory, and then, using a specific interview 
example, demonstrates the extraction of a respective set of conceptualisations, and 
reviews the nature and standing of these with respect to such relationship. 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a gap between public psychoanalytic theory 
and the clinical practice of analysis, and that what guides clinical practice may be 
thought of as the private theories or models of the practising analyst, which may be 
adapted from public theory and which may be partially explicit and conscious and 
partially implicit and unconscious.  These private theories both inform and at times, 
since they tend to be unexamined, interfere with the way the analyst practices.   
As Sandler states, the more we study private theories, the more we will be in a 
position to advance public theory (1983, 38).  Likewise, Dreher observes that 
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bringing private theories to the light through empirical research is an important task 
for the existing public theory, both for the purpose of monitoring variations that are 
unconsciously being introduced into such formal concepts, and for integrating new 
developments into and refining the existing state of the public theory (2000, 167).   
There is a considerable body of literature on such private theories, addressing 
variously how they originate, what their relationship is with the unconscious, with 
formal theory and with clinical practice, how they function in the mind of the analyst, 
and what their role is in the analytic encounter, virtually all squarely located in the 
psychoanalytic arena (as opposed to analytical psychology) and based on an 
assumption of Freud’s topological theory of the mind (cf, by way of example only, 
Sandler (1983), Fonagy (1982, 2003, 2006), Dreher (2000), Canestri (2006), 
Grossman (2006), Tuckett (2008)).  Most of the writers employ the expression 
‘implicit theory’, although they do not all appear to mean the same thing, even though 
they acknowledge the publications and ideas of one another as if they do, as will 
become apparent in the following discussion.   
Background 
The notion of implicit private theories influencing the clinical work of the practising 
psychoanalyst has a history that is usually acknowledged to commence with Sandler’s 
discussion of the dimensions of meaning of psychoanalytic concepts in meaning 
spaces within: the psychoanalytic field, certain groups of psychoanalysts, and even 
and especially the minds of individual practitioners (1983, 35).  Sandler proposes that 
psychoanalytic theories are pliable, elastic concepts that have a whole spectrum of 
context-dependent meanings and that are in a state of continuous organic 
development (ibid., 35).   
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He describes the development individually, within the mind of the practising analyst 
with increasing experience, of “a whole variety of theoretical segments which relate 
directly to his clinical work”, constructed preconsciously out of his training, his 
reading, the official theories, and his clinical work (ibid., 38).  Such body of ideas 
includes the products of unconscious thinking, and partial structures, whether 
theories, models or schemata, which coexist unconsciously in reserve unless 
conditions arise that are suitable for bringing them into consciousness (ibid., 38).  He 
terms this body the implicit private theories of the analyst, and he sees them as 
adaptations of public theories emerging to suit the immediate situation and general 
practice of the analyst. 
Sandler’s original contribution has been followed by a variety of papers, elaborating 
on his ideas and also raising a number of issues.  The following discussion focuses on 
these issues, lifting out the salient references, rather than summarising the entire field. 
1. Pre-conscious v. dynamic unconscious 
Sandler places implicit private theories in the preconscious, with reference to Freud’s 
topographical model of the mind, without elaborating on his reasons and without 
addressing the possibility of such theories having their roots in the dynamic 
unconscious, although he hints at it when he says, “one of the difficulties in 
undertaking … research is that posed by the conscious or unconscious conviction of 
many analysts that they do not do ‘proper’ analysis” (ibid., 38).  Accordingly, he 
implies that analysts have a tendency to repress their private models due to critical 
self-judgement, and therefore that some unconscious elements may be situated in the 
dynamic unconscious, since they are repressed.   
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With the benefit of hindsight, afforded, for example, by Tuckett’s statement, “insofar 
as they are dynamically unconscious, the analyst herself may well feel uncomfortable 
if aspects of her private theories, which are in conflict with the theoretical approach 
publicly held … get revealed”, it can be seen that Sandler does indeed encompass the 
dynamic unconscious as well as the preconscious (2008, 191). 
The importance of this issue concerns the potential for researching implicit theories.  
Starting from Sandler’s discussion of implicit private theories, Dreher divides implicit 
theories into two groups, namely preconscious thoughts based on training affiliation, 
and individual clinical development and practice, on the one hand, and dynamically 
unconscious ideas embedded in the analyst’s personal pathology on the other.  She 
thereby encompasses differing relationships of implicit theories both with the 
unconscious and with official theory and clinical experience.   
Based on Polanyi (1966, 95-6) and his view of the tacit or implicit dimension of 
personal knowledge, as “a subsidiary awareness [that] … functions as a clue to the 
object of our focal attention”, as employed in the social sciences, Dreher asserts that 
implicit theories that are primarily preconscious can be investigated in a systematic 
way by appropriate techniques from the social sciences.  She asserts that this 
understanding of implicit theories points to the role that such knowledge plays in the 
scientific process, and to the methods available to access it.   
By contrast, she argues that implicit theories that are dynamically unconscious could 
only be investigated by a psychoanalytic methodology, and would require the 
integration of psychoanalytic supervision and personal analysis into the research 
process (2000, 169).  She states, “those wanting to integrate the study of unconscious 
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ideas and motives … would have to propose a form of conceptual research 
supplemented by psychoanalytic methods” (ibid., 172). 
There are, however, difficulties in relying thus on Polanyi, firstly because he does not 
describe the tacit dimension in terms of, and indeed he specifically distinguishes 
himself from, Freud’s topographical model of the mind (1966, 95).  Next, he 
describes tacit knowledge as being based on intuition and participant observation.  
Consequently, while such knowledge may be investigated by the social sciences, it is 
arguable that it can be seen as part of a scientific process, although Polanyi does 
indeed argue this (ibid., 23-5).  Finally, he does not confine his tacit dimension to an 
area of mental functioning corresponding with the preconscious.  Rather, he also 
envisages a deeply unconscious area of functioning, which would more nearly be an 
equivalent of the dynamic unconscious of Freud or the collective unconscious of 
Jung, involving the bodily roots of all thought (ibid., 15).   
It is to be noted, in this latter respect, that Polanyi refers to Hans Driesch to 
substantiate his ideas concerning tacit knowledge as an emergent form, just as Jung 
refers to Driesch to substantiate some of his ideas on his deeply unknowable psychoid 
unconscious (ibid., 42-6). 
The above discussion highlights an important issue in relation to implicit theories, 
namely that their accessibility to research, and the methodology to be employed for 
investigating them, is considered to depend on their location in the Freudian 
unconscious.   
Whilst this appears to raise daunting problems for research into analysts’ 
conceptualisations of the clinical process, an alternative approach towards implicit 
theories may point the way out of the thicket. 
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2. Repression v. emergence 
As indicated above, Sandler and Tuckett, amongst others, imply that the defensive 
attitudes of analysts towards their own implicit theories results in a tendency to 
repress them.   
Fonagy (1982), writing before Sandler and referring to a personal communication 
from him proposing a study of private, preconscious theories, offers an alternative 
viewpoint.  Fonagy does not use the term ‘implicit theory’, but his description 
suggests that he is addressing a generally similar arena:  
It is possible that by using metaphoric language, theorists are able to 
incorporate into their developing ideas intuitions about the mechanisms of 
their own psychological functioning derived from preconscious sources.  Such 
preconscious knowledge concerning the psychological processes taking place 
within ourselves may be expressed in the scientific metaphors of 
psychoanalysis in a manner analogous to the preconscious understanding of 
phonological mechanisms contained in the phonetic metaphors of 
grammarians.  (1982, 135) 
Fonagy suggests that such metaphors may have value in directing the integration of 
psychoanalytic hypotheses and empirical research.   
Whereas Sandler implies that implicit theories tend to be repressed into the dynamic 
unconscious, and therefore introduce distortions, Fonagy through his discussion of 
‘metaphor’ suggests that what constitutes a private theory reflects an as yet unknown 
theoretical function, for which there is insufficient information concerning the 
underlying psychological process.  Sandler therefore appears to be considering a 
repressive process, while Fonagy appears to be considering an emergent one.   
In a later paper on the role of implicit knowledge, Fonagy (2006) offers the view that 
psychoanalysts do not understand how or why their treatment works but that theories 
orient clinicians and support understanding, whilst practice may be the inspiration for 
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and lead to the evolution of new theory.  He argues that implicit theories may be seen 
as metaphoric approximations at a subjective level for both analyst and patient of 
certain types of deeply unconscious internal experience of the analytic relationship, 
saying “Science uses metaphor in the absence of detailed knowledge of the 
underlying process” (2006, 82). 
He refers to a container of knowledge, designated the implicit psychoanalytic 
knowledge base, gained through and deepened by intensive psychoanalytic work 
when two human minds try to fit together ideas and meanings
62
.  Public theory, he 
asserts, grows out of the understanding of these processes through intensive 
psychoanalytic work, in that “proximity to another mind afforded by psychoanalytic 
treatment will inevitably deepen an implicit, non-conscious, procedural, action-
focused understanding of mental function” (ibid., 84). 
The importance of Fonagy’s approach is that he offers an emergent view of implicit 
private theory, by which conceptualisations come to light firstly as metaphor, before 
the underlying analytic process is fully understood, and later become elaborated.  This 
alleviates the pressure on allocating implicit theories to one or other of the 
preconscious and the dynamic unconscious, and also the difficulty of establishing a 
methodology for investigating either, since what can now be contemplated is the 
notion of a private theory emerging into consciousness and available for investigation 
on this ground. 
It is to be noted that the accounts of Sandler and Fonagy are not co-extensive, since 
Sandler specifically relates such implicit arena to a whole spectrum of context-
dependent meanings of psychoanalytic concepts, and thus to formal psychoanalytic 
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theory, whereas Fonagy refers simply to preconscious knowledge concerning the 
psychological processes within ourselves, implying more of a clinical bias for the 
term.   
This raises the question how far the implicit theories that are in question are actually 
to do with theoretical concepts and how far they are to do with clinical technique. 
3. Between theory and technique 
Canestri (2006) and the European Psychoanalytic Federation working party on 
theoretical issues address this question specifically, in a project referring to Sandler 
and exploring the relationship between clinical practice and theory.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the working party sought to design an instrument for identifying “in our 
clinical work the implicit theories of the analyst” (ibid., 25).   
An interesting aspect of Canestri’s approach is the attempt to define implicit theories 
more completely than hitherto: 
The psychoanalyst … constructs, preconsciously and descriptively speaking 
unconsciously, ‘theories’ or models adapted to the circumstances present in 
his clinical work with that particular patient.  … It is not only a question of the 
normal re-elaboration that concepts undergo merely because they are being 
used, inasmuch as they inevitably pass through the meshes of the user’s 
language.  A more complex operation comes into play; although it certainly 
includes this re-elaboration of the concepts of theory, it also, and perhaps 
above all, includes the integration of concepts drawn from different theories, 
in a mixture that incorporates … many other elements of different origin.  
(Ibid., 13-4) 
Such implicit theories may eventually be absorbed into the official theories, or 
alternatively they may invite proliferation and conceptual laxity, and thus the working 
party sought an instrument for discriminating implicit, private theories of value for 
integration into future public theory. 
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Acknowledging Dreher, Canestri (ibid., 23) sees the creative activity of the analyst as 
essential to the work of transformation in the analytic process, and knowledge as 
having a personal component that is the result of the combined creative working of 
the unconscious, preconscious and conscious and that is metabolized in the 
preconscious.  The preconscious is thus the arena where the part-theories, models and 
schemata that comprise implicit theories are organised, negotiated and elaborated.   
Following extensive discussion with analysts from different psychoanalytical 
societies, the working party arrived at a definition: 
Lived theory = public theory-based thinking + private theoretical thinking + 
interaction of private and explicit thinking (implicit use of 
public theory)   
where lived theory means the living process of conceptualisation taking place in a 
clinical session, conscious or unconscious (ibid., 29). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, they conceived a map of the private theories employed by 
the analyst in clinical practice, comprising six vectors: 
(i) A topographical vector, taking into account the location of the analyst’s 
theoretical thinking in the conscious, the preconscious or the unconscious, and 
the associated dynamics.   
(ii) A conceptual vector, covering the influences of cultural and clinical trends, 
and the analyst’s technical assumptions as to process elements, such as 
theories of change, meaning and the transference, as well as approaches to 
interpretation, and the prioritisation of image or language. 
(iii) An action vector, pertaining to the analyst’s actions towards his patient, 
including listening, formulating interpretations and delivering them.   
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(iv) An object relations of knowledge vector, concerning the analyst’s relationship 
with psychoanalytic concepts, and with his own internal objects relating to 
them.   
(v) A coherence versus contradiction vector, addressing the way that the analyst 
balances coherence and contradiction within his own process, tolerates 
contradiction, and handles these in his interactions with his patient.  The use 
of metaphor is noted to be important here. 
(vi) A developmental vector, concerning the analyst’s understanding of 
developmental models and attitudes to developmental stages/phases. 
The working party conceived this map as “a methodological instrument for analysing 
the private, implicit and preconscious theories of the analyst at work”, for identifying 
the theories or models that the analyst is employing (ibid., 42).  Accordingly, the map 
leads from practice towards theory.   
A key feature of Canestri is the way in which he links implicit theories with public 
theory, by demonstrating how lived theory is a product of public theory and implicit 
theory, and how public theory evolves out of implicit theory.  The map is useful in 
the number of specific guiding examples that it provides, and in the division of the 
areas potentially influencing implicit theories into a structured framework, although 
there is some ambiguity as to whether ‘implicit theory’ is to be conceived in terms of 
the analyst’s theoretical approach and his own private theoretical model or in terms of 
his actual clinical approach in the consulting room.  The examples given against the 
six vectors appear sometimes to be more inclined in one direction and sometimes 
more in the other.   
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Grossman notes the complex way in which the analyst builds up links between theory 
and technique, and argues for the need for systematic formulations of theory, 
technique, and process, and for greater attention to the role of consciousness in 
developing understandings of implicit processes (2006, 87-101).    
Tuckett and the EPF working party on comparative clinical methods designed an 
instrument based on Canestri’s map for use in their investigation of “the models that 
lay, usually implicitly, behind the different ways of working” of different analysts 
(2008, 1).  They used this instrument to guide the discussion of case material in small 
groups of analysts, with the aim of eliciting through such discussion the explanatory 
working model of analysis of a presenting clinician.   
4. Discussion 
This background to the empirical strand of the present project is important, because it 
provides a context firstly for the design of an interview structure based around a 
single clinical session for use with practising analysts, secondly for understanding 
what is expected to emerge from these interviews, and thirdly for locating with 
respect to theory and practice the conceptualisations obtained through data analysis of 
the interview transcripts.   
The writings discussed above reveal the complexity of the notion of implicit theories, 
whilst at the same time demonstrating their profound significance in relation to our 
actual clinical work.  These theories arise in our clinical work out of a considerable 
range of influences.  Most authors follow the early definition by Sandler of implicit 
theories as elastic, organically developing, context-dependent analytic concepts 
existing within a set of dimensions of meaning, or meaning-spaces.  Earlier authors 
have been preoccupied with the location of the implicit theories in the unconscious 
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mind of the analyst, but later ones offer more dynamic understandings, which rely 
more on the process by which implicit theories are repressed from or emerge into 
consciousness.   
In particular, Fonagy’s (1982, 2006) notion of two minds struggling together to find 
meaning and understanding, and his emergent model for metaphors representing 
implicit theories, provides an approach in which knowledge of the unconscious 
origins of the implicit theory is not needed and in which the content can be monitored 
as it emerges.  Fonagy describes implicit theories as metaphoric approximations of 
certain types of deeply unconscious internal experience, which reflect intuitions of as 
yet unknown mental function, implying that they first herald their appearance in 
metaphoric language.   
This suggests not only an emergent mechanism, more in line with an evolution of 
public theory than with distortion, but also an approach to investigating implicit 
theory, because he sees this emergence as taking place in a relational setting 
involving two human minds trying to arrive at meaning together.   
Such viewpoint is significant for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it is consistent with 
Polanyi’s view of tacit knowledge as being based on intuition and participant 
observation.  Secondly, it is consistent with a methodology for locating implicit 
theories that is relational but that does not have to replicate a psychoanalytic 
methodology in its attitude to the analyst whose implicit theories are being 
investigated.  And, thirdly, although Fonagy himself describes his ideas in terms of 
Freud’s topographical model of the mind, nonetheless this approach permits the 
possibility of, or is contiguous with, an alternative model of the mind. 
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Accordingly, Fonagy’s model offers a basis for the present interview-based approach, 
in which two people together, in a clinical discussion, seek to discover the 
conceptualisations of one of them.  These conceptualisations, undergoing formulation 
or already formulated in the mind of the interviewee, can be expected to emerge 
directly or indirectly, or through metaphorical approximation, within the interview 
process, thence to be uncovered through data analysis.  Furthermore, they may be 
delivered in theoretical or non-theoretical language, depending on the degree of prior 
theoretical or metaphorical formulation achieved by the respective interviewee. 
Canestri’s definition for, and account of the influences giving rise to, private theories 
is helpful in explicating, and providing specific illustrations for, the forms of private 
theory envisaged.  It is noted that he allows private theory to include process 
elements, acknowledged theoretical influences, internal conceptual objects, and 
metaphor, amongst other things. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Canestri’s map and Tuckett’s instrument have been 
adapted for use in the present project to provide an instrument for guiding interviews 
with practising analysts.  Therefore, the interviews may be expected to yield 
conceptualisations corresponding with Canestri’s map, which will assist in locating 
the influences giving rise to the private theories produced, as well as providing a basis 
for validly comparing such private theories with official theory in the form of the 
psychoid concept, in order to validate, confirm, extend or contradict such concept. 
As also explained in Chapter 2, the interview transcripts have been analysed by 
means of grounded theory techniques, since this approach is consistent with the 
generation of emergent theory. 
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In order to avoid confusion, in view of the variety of accounts for ‘implicit theories’ 
in the published literature, as discussed above, the term ‘private theories’ will be 
adopted, from now on, to cover the analyst’s personal theories, whether consciously 
elaborated or not.  It is postulated that the private theories generated in this project are 
likely to be partially consciously worked out and partially pre-conscious or 
unconscious, and that they will emerge in the interview process through two minds 
working together to understand the process notes and through the grounded theory 
process.  
Example 
An example of a specific interview process and the subsequent data analysis using 
grounded theory will now be given, to show how certain themes or clusters of ideas 
emerged in the course of this process.   
As with all the interviews, this one focused on a set of process notes including a 
vignette of a countertransference event combining the mental and the physical fact.  
The patient, a middle-aged woman, presented as dissociated from her feelings and her 
body.  At the start of the session, she speaks, without affect, of fear of sinking back 
into depression.  After the countertransference event, when the analyst experiences a 
sensory image of an adult offering a small carved object to a child, who snatches it 
with satisfaction, she engages much more directly. 
1. 1st interview 
S11(PA)
63
 was the eleventh analyst to be interviewed for the project, and accordingly 
the interview process was by now familiar.  Certain general topics, such as 
development and regression, were noted to be coming up frequently in the interviews, 
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and some initial ideas as to different ways of conceiving the transference, as mutual 
and symmetrical or as hierarchical and asymmetrical
64
, were beginning to crystallise 
out of the different interviews.  Other such themes included the significance attributed 
respectively to emergence, symbolic capacity, and a relational approach.  All of these 
formed a backdrop to the current interview, and meant in the data analysis that 
particular attention was paid to clues offering further evidence for them.  The results 
from each new stage were being applied in a re-evaluation of the earlier stages, and 
the overall data analysis was becoming increasingly refined.   
In a recent seminar, S11(PA) had presented some interesting case material about a 
somatising patient, and so he was felt to be able to offer relevant insights.  The 
interview commenced with an explanation of the task and discussion vertices, and 
with S11(PA) reading the process notes in silent deep concentration.  He then began 
discussing the session, and especially the vignette, guided by the discussion vertices, 
adding some associations from his own clinical experience.  Following the interview, 
the field notes commented that two themes stood out, namely that: words have an 
action component to them that informs S11(PA) about the unconscious dynamic in 
the patient and that gets into the session in a form of enactment; and, he compares 
psychoanalysis and early parent-infant experience as two arenas where sensory or 
physical images and metaphors may arise. 
2. Immersion and initial extraction 
In order to become familiar with his views, and ensure that the transcript was 
accurate, the recording was re-played, and the transcript corrected, repeatedly, before 
sending a copy to S11(PA) for his agreement, and before starting coding. 
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An initial line-by-line coding, sticking closely to the language employed by S11(PA), 
served to pick out themes.  Emphases, obscurities and potential queries were noted in 
the margins as comments.   
Memos made straight afterwards captured immediate thoughts on the emerging ideas, 
including understandings of sensory experience, models of the transference, and 
references to regression. 
The following excerpt picks up these themes
65
: 
Line coding 1
st
 interview transcript 
 
Seeing event as: the analyst 
having thoughts about the 
transference relationship, that 
are not getting through to the 
patient, and moving 
intuitively from words to 
somatic images 
 
 
Feeling this is a more direct 
expression of the infantile 
basis of the situation  
 
S11(PA): So, I would see that as [...] the analyst has 
a set of thoughts about the transference relationship 
and situation in that session, which in a way aren’t 
really getting through to the patient.  I mean they are, 
but they're not ... she's a bit stuck in this […] being 
all frantic and not being soothed. And the analyst 
intuitively moves from trying to express that in 
ideas, which the patient is not really doing much 
with, to a set of somatic images and experiences, 
which express something much more direct about the 
kind of infantile basis or the infantile version of that 
situation.  (I1, 5)
66
 
 
 
The memos commented that S11(PA) employed the expression ‘experience’ 
frequently, in a variety of contexts, indicating a close attunement to analysis as 
process.  Another significant theme was the notion that the words of both patient and 
analyst are unconsciously actions rooted in bodily experience.  S11(PA) related this 
with infancy, considering that baby dynamics are at the centre of all our 
communications at an unconscious level, manifesting in our selection of words, 
grammatical structure and sentence flow.  Linked with this, the interviewer observed 
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that S11(PA) believes that regression is a necessary and central part of the analytic 
experience, for both patient and analyst, in order to get to the more primitive, base 
level of issues that need addressing.   
S11(PA) implied a familiarity with sensory and somatic experience in sessions, both 
in the patient and in the analyst, ranging from symptoms, such as headaches, feeling 
sick, having restless legs, to experience in the form of ‘sensory’ or ‘somatic’ images.  
He specifically acknowledged that this latter kind of experience is known to him, 
giving an example from his own analysis, associated with an early state of mind.   
The memos then noted that, based on the action level of words, S11(PA) felt, at the 
start of the session, the patient was like a complaining child, pushing mother away, 
while the analyst was employing words in a soothing way.  He saw the event in the 
vignette as a turning point shifting the session into a different gear, ‘something 
emerging’ in the transference relationship, bringing the analyst and patient into 
engagement with one another at a primitive parent-child level.  He observed that the 
precise countertransference experience of the analyst would be predicated on their 
own internal world of imagination, and thus only they could know its interpretation 
by reference to their own meaning space.   
He referred a number of times to material ‘emerging’, although he did not highlight 
emergence as a primary characteristic of psychoanalysis
67
.  He described 
psychoanalysis as giving permission for self-disclosure, which opens the way for 
unconscious phantasy to emerge, and be recognised.   
In his model of the transference, a form of ‘resonating’ takes place at adult verbal 
levels of functioning, and projective identification takes over at more primitive levels.  
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He made one reference to baby and mother being fused, which did not seem to fit this 
model, and the memos noted a need to explore this further.  
Finally, the memos highlighted the comments of S11(PA) on the role of 
interpretation.  He feels that mere mirroring is insufficient, that the patient needs to 
receive an element of the analyst’s self, and see that the analyst has personally created 
something out of the patient’s communications.  Therefore, relationship is an 
important part of analysis. 
3. Shaping and further extraction 
Next, in a focused coding, related ideas began to be apparent.  The focused coding 
steps were re-done repeatedly, on each occasion noting key themes and commenting 
on them in the memos.   
The following cluster headings started to emerge as worthy of exploration in 
conjunction with the elaborations and connections associated with them: Sensory 
images; words as actions, and their links with sensory images; levels of functioning, 
linking both with words as actions and with sensory images; regression, linking with 
levels of functioning; shifts in functioning and relating, or turning points; emergence; 
the transference field; and psychoanalysis as a joint experience. 
The following examples pick up references to the transference field, levels of 
functioning and regression: 
Focused coding  1
st
 interview transcript 
 
 
 
 
 
Seeing the vignette event as 
Excerpt 1 
 
S11(PA): It's a two-way thing, isn’t it, because it 
feels to me as if the patient is managing to get 
through. It's not just that the analyst finds a way of 
getting through differently. But it's as if the patient, 
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two-way: the analyst gets 
through differently and the 
patient is felt on a more 
visceral level 
 
 
 
 
 
Noting levels of functioning: 
the drowning state of the 
patient is initially related to 
on an adult level, then a more 
primitive level is reached and 
the immediacy of the 
transference gets through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associating levels of 
functioning with resonance 
and projective identification 
 
 
Linking resonance with adult 
interaction  
 
 
Noting gradual joint 
regression opens up access to 
more basic levels of both, 
increasingly yielding 
projective identification 
 
 
Describing projective 
identification as one person 
directly interfering with the 
other’s psyche 
 
 
Linking with infant levels, 
and fusion 
 
the impact of the patient is felt on a more visceral 
sort of level, whereas previously [...] it felt like a 
patient being a patient and the analyst being an 
analyst ... and a bit too much on the level of 
thoughts, and not quite real enough. And so the 
reality of the drowning state of the patient, where 
she's feeling, you know, "I'm getting worse; I'm 
sinking into depression again. Nothing is getting 
better. I'm really disappointed and angry, and all this 
crap is going on that I have to deal with and nobody 
is helping." […] [A]nd she throws it all at the 
analyst. And yet it's related to as though it's an adult 
communication. And I think what then comes 
through, in that more visceral level of listening, is the 
immediacy, the panic actually, and also anger and 
frustration and clamouring quality of the 
transference.  (I1, 7) 
 
Excerpt 2 
 
S11(PA): I think that probably links to what I was 
saying about the different levels of communication, 
the adult self, the continuing adult self of the patient, 
assuming it's an adult patient, and then the baby self, 
and actually the same for the analyst. And that the 
thing of two people resonating and having things 
going on and associating and having an interaction 
between the two is more like the two adult selves. 
And I felt to some degree that at the beginning of the 
session there was a bit about feeling that the patient 
comes along and says, "blah-blah-blah." The analyst 
says, "Maybe it's this," and she thinks, "Maybe, but 
blah-blah-blah," some more, and then gradually there 
is a joint regression, if you like, during the session, 
where access is opened up to the more basic levels of 
both people. 
 
And then I think the more that happens, the more it's 
in the nature of projective identification, where one 
person quite directly, although in a way that I'm still 
not sure how it happens, but quite directly interferes 
with the other person's psyche. ... And I think you 
see that most powerfully, or at least it has been most 
powerful in my experience, between an actual parent 
and a very new baby [...] [T]he two are really much 
more fused than I think any two people normally are 
in any other context. And so, I think that's an 
extreme form of locked-in projective identification 
from, on both sides.  (I1, 14) 
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4. Uncovering confusions 
The memos at this point noted that the first interview yielded some important 
questions, having a bearing on the private theory of S11(PA): One question is the 
origin in the thinking of S11(PA) of words as actions, since this informs his 
understanding of psychic structure and is a significant element in his explanation for 
the existence of somatic images.  Another concerns the use by S11(PA) of the term 
‘emergence’, since he employed the term almost unknowingly, but this dynamic is 
seen as crucial by a number of the other interviewees in their understanding of the 
analytic process.   
Also, S11(PA) referred variously to  projective identification, instances of locked-in 
projective identification on both sides, and fusion, and these terms would benefit 
from clarification, in order to evaluate the form of the transference field envisaged by 
S11(PA).   
5. 2nd interview 
A second interview was therefore fixed.  This interview addressed only the transcript 
of the first interview, and not the process notes, to review these points.   
S11(PA) began by giving a full account of the origins of his ideas on words as 
actions, as discussed further below.   
Then, his attention was drawn to his use of the expression ‘emergence’ in the first 
interview.  He acknowledged that he had not noticed, and proceeded to contemplate 
forms of emergence, including: a person emerging more clearly; internal aspects of 
the patient emerging; and issues emerging from the work, ‘like something being 
born’, starting with somatic experience for the patient and/or the analyst.  He 
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observed how often a symptom that he had experienced had turned out to be key for 
the patient. 
Next, referring to the transference field, it became apparent that S11(PA) envisages a 
shared experience not actually covered by the term projective identification, as 
follows: 
Focused coding 2
nd
 interview transcript 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describing feeling that both 
regressed to a close, 
emotional place, where he felt 
part of the patient and 
intertwined with his situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describing ‘merging’: feeling 
the patient still owned his 
own experience but induced it 
in the analyst, and something 
travelled the other way 
enabling both to emerge from 
a profound experience of loss 
 
 
Excerpt 1 
 
S11(PA):  [H]e conjured up so, not so much in 
words but in affect, such a fragile, falling apart 
feeling, and he was able to, he began to cry a lot […] 
I felt as though we both slid into, and we regressed, 
regressed in the sense of very open and close and 
emotional, so that when he got to the bit where he 
started telling me how he visited X who's clearly 
near to death with cancer, and that they'd had a very, 
very important emotional conversation together 
about what they had meant to each other and so on, I 
felt as though I was right there with him almost in 
this deathbed scene, and his child-self […] being 
sent away and not knowing anybody and going to a 
country with a different language. I mean that's a 
very, very hard experience as a fairly young boy. I 
felt as though he'd become that young boy again, and 
I'd become somehow part of him or very intertwined 
with his situation.  (I2, 17) 
 
Excerpt 2 
 
S11(PA):  It was more of a merging of experience 
rather than that he was disowning anything or 
relocating it in me. I felt he completely still owned it 
all the way through. But that he did induce it in me, 
and then there was something that travelled the other 
way as well, which I think enabled, it felt like, both 
of us to emerge from that experience of really a near 
death, the emotional experience going with really, 
really losing something that you absolutely need. 
And that of course, there is a transference dimension 
to that too, and by the end of the session we were 
talking again about […]68 the reality of losing X […] 
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Contrasting with something 
disowned and split off into the 
analyst as projective 
identification, and not feeling 
this accounts  
more in an ordinary adult way. But I think in the 
middle of the session both of us had felt almost like 
helpless, panicked children [...] I was aware that I 
was feeling it on his behalf, but I was remembering 
times that I had felt like that myself and really 
feeling for the degree of loss that he was 
confronting. […] But I think I would, yes, I think 
projective identification in that case is not really ... I 
don't know what the right expression would be, 
exactly, for it.  (I2, 17-18) 
 
 
6. Clusters 
Having coded both interviews, and noted the various themes emerging, clusters of 
linked themes began to form: 
a. Words as actions, sensory images, levels of functioning  
It emerged that S11(PA) had a structural notion of the psyche, relying on levels of 
functioning along a number of axes, adult and infant, cognitive and primitive, more 
rational and more physical.  Commencing from what he called ‘the embodiment of 
thinking’, meaning that the roots of thinking and feeling lie in bodily experience, 
S11(PA) described words as having a level at which unconsciously they are actions, 
expressing bodily processes, like eating, vomiting or hitting.  The choice of words, 
the smoothness or choppiness of their flow, the looping back or complexity of a 
communication, all give the lie to the kind of word actions taking place.  In the 
second interview, he explained that this view derived partly from Isaacs (1948) on 
unconscious phantasy, and partly from work undertaken by Fonagy and Target (2007) 
on embodied cognition, linguistics and attachment.  That opened up an understanding 
of the idiosyncratic forms of interaction arising between two people in analysis, 
comprising phantasy-to-action expressed through words, metaphor and images.  
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Referring to the vignette event, S11(PA) spoke about sensory and somatic images as: 
a more direct expression at an unconscious level of words as actions; a primitive base 
level of mental experience without the overlay of cognitive wrappings and cortical 
trappings; an expression of a shape of sensory experience, a tactile or action 
experience; a primitive or base level of mental experience; and imagery based on 
bodily infantile phantasies from the earliest baby experiences of sucking, taking in, 
getting hold of, pushing off, feeling breathless, internal-external negotiation, and 
parental holding.  He also associated physical symptoms with infantile bodily 
phantasies.   
With reference to the session, the memos summarised the views of S11(PA):  
The session started with the patient like a grizzling child using words as 
though fussing about what was being offered, pushing mother away, feeling 
nothing was right; and with the analyst employing words that at an action 
level were soothing, reaching out, like an adult kneeling down to the level of a 
child.  The patient’s words were echoed by her posture on the couch, staring at 
the ceiling, giving the same message of refusal.  The analyst then moved 
intuitively from words into a more somatic arena, expressing directly an 
infantile basis of the situation.  Both analyst and patient then got through to 
one another, and the analyst’s next words could be seen at an action level as 
an act of giving, received as such by the patient.  (Memos) 
Thus, S11(PA) felt the event represented a shift into a more primitive and accessible 
level, where, in Bion’s terms, some alpha functioning gets applied to the beta 
elements.  The question of shifts like this can go either way, according to S11(PA).  
Something experienced at a thought level may emerge in a physical metaphor, as 
here, or bodily experience may become more abstract verbal representation:  
Just as adult verbal communication unconsciously incorporates bodily 
experience and bodily intention and impulses, I think that the things that are 
actually experienced as bodily impulses and intentions also have implicit 
within them the other side, which is the more represented, cognitively 
represented thought.  (S11(PA), I1, 5) 
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b. Regression, levels of functioning 
In the first interview, this led to a discussion of the nature of the psychoanalytic 
process, in which S11(PA) sees regression, conceived as openness to more primitive 
levels of mental functioning, as central and necessary.  This may take various forms, 
including increased contact with physical experience, an emergence of previously 
unconscious phantasy, and greater access to material from infantile experience.  He 
indicated that regression in psychoanalysis is to be distinguished from actually going 
back to being like a child, since an aspect of the patient continues to function as an 
adult and the patient reverts to normal adult life at the end of a session.  Rather, a 
unique state of separation arises between different levels of functioning, including 
reality and phantasy.  As analyst, S11(PA) described himself as being attuned to the 
baby in the adult, even when the adult is speaking in a cerebral manner.  Furthermore, 
he said, regression needs to occur in both patient and analyst for psychoanalysis to be 
effective (S11(PA), I1, 14).  
c. Emergence, regression, turning points 
Early memos recorded that, for S11(PA), the regression of patient and analyst to more 
primitive levels of functioning gives rise to unconscious phantasy, in that 
“constellations of previously unconscious anxieties, wishes, physical states, and the 
need to express them, emerge” (S11(PA), I1, 10).  He defined regression as an 
openness, both to unconscious phantasy in a way that allows the recognition and 
elaboration of the phantasy through the analytic process, and to more physical and/or 
infantile kinds of experience.  By way of example, he thought the session began with 
the analyst being an analyst and the patient being a patient, so that the encounter does 
not initially feel very real, and then there is a joint regression and a more vital level of 
195 
 
 
 
listening is engaged and the immediacy and clamouring quality of the transference 
come through.  He described this episode as a typical crisis in a session, a turning 
point, where something breaks through or emerges.  
In the second interview, he contemplated the nature of emergence in analysis: 
[There are] issues emerging from work, and quite often I think it goes through 
that sequence, which involves some sort of sensory or physical experience, 
and commonly for the patient and sometimes for the analyst. And sometimes 
I've been cued into something, which I probably might not have made contact 
with otherwise, through a physical symptom of my own, which has alerted me 
to something about the patient, which then has turned out to be a key thing, 
either a physical issue that they've got or some phantasy that they have. … 
[T]here's that kind of emergence where something... It’s almost like being 
born, something is introduced into the analysis as something that can be 
known and worked on … almost indirectly through some much more visceral 
kind of resonance.  (S11(PA), I2, 11) 
He gave two examples of this kind of ‘painful birth’ from his own practice, where 
‘something going on between’ patient and analyst produced quite specific symptoms 
in him that were fundamental to the analysis, in the first instance migraine headaches 
and in the second asthma.  These symptoms were very significant in the life history of 
the respective patients, and led eventually and quite spontaneously to something that 
proved a turning point for the patient. 
d. Transference field, resonance, projective identification, fusion, 
merging, symmetry 
In the seminar mentioned above, S11(PA) had spoken about a form of play arising in 
psychoanalysis where the analyst resonates with something played out by the patient, 
and in the first interview he spoke about the analyst resonating with the patient’s 
action speech.  Enquiring what he meant by ‘resonating’, and how this linked with 
projective identification, he said, “I probably don't sufficiently distinguish between 
those two things, because I think there's a whole spectrum between the two ... I think, 
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practically always, there's both going on” (S11(PA), I1, 14).  He described two people 
resonating as interaction at the level of their adult selves.  Then, the more there is 
regression, the more access is opened up to the more basic levels, and the more the 
interaction is in the nature projective identification (S11(PA), I1, 14). 
S11(PA) mentioned that projective identification can be witnessed most powerfully 
between a parent and a very new baby: The two are really fused in an extreme form 
of locked-in projective identification on both sides.  He described this state as the 
infusion of one person's psychic experience with contents of the other person's 
experience, in a way that forces the recipient to take it in and react to it in some way.  
The memos noted that he spoke in terms of projective identification as a dynamic 
whereby one party (the baby/patient) acts on and interferes with the psyche of the 
other (the parent/analyst), which implied a hierarchical and asymmetrical notion of 
the transference field.  However, when S11(PA) went on to describe the parent and 
very new baby as fused and existing in an extreme form of locked-in projective 
identification on both sides, it seemed that in his mind the field was actually more of 
a symmetrical one, where the two parties are at least in some respects in a relatively 
undifferentiated state and where differentiation is the developmental task.   
Reverting to this in the second interview, S11(PA) gave an example, from his own 
analytic practice, of a brief moment in a session with a patient, confronting the loss of 
his dying guardian and facing childhood memories of his parents’ deaths, where he 
felt there was a merging of the experience of analyst and patient.  The patient did not 
disown anything, but S11(PA) had a very real sense of being right beside him in the 
presence of death.  He described himself as feeling fused into the patient’s 
experience.  Similarly, he felt that he was able to share his own strength with the 
patient, and this enabled them both to emerge from the experience. 
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S11(PA) displayed some confusion over the language to be employed for this 
account, saying “I think projective identification is not really … I don’t know what 
the right expression would be, exactly, for it” (S11(PA), I2, 18).  He offered that these 
events are more of a shared experience than people tend to acknowledge.  
Consequently, the conclusion was reached that what he was describing was a 
transference field having levels, and that in the more primitive level what occurs is 
not projective identification or unconscious communication but an experience of a 
shared symmetrical field.  
e. Psychoanalysis as a joint experience, interpretation, relationship 
This discussion of the transference led to a consideration of the analyst’s role as 
container.  The memos recorded that ‘relationship’ is key, in a very particular manner 
having two separate aspects, namely: the content of the analyst’s countertransference, 
and the nature of the analyst’s analytic response.  Regarding the former, they noted 
that, for S11(PA), countertransference may be seen as a function both of the analytic 
relationship and of the analyst’s own history.  In regression, the affect state in the 
patient constellates something in the analyst, calling forth something personal out of 
the analyst’s own imaginal world, so that the meaning can be divined only by the 
particular analyst by reference to their own self-analysis.  Patient and analyst thus 
relate unconsciously, each out of their own experience.  
The analytic response may simply comprise the insight thus achieved on the part of 
the analyst, even if not verbally communicated, since the patient may feel met.  
However, to achieve a shift in the patient’s situation, S11(PA) feels that the process 
needs also to include action on the part of the analyst, in the form of an interpretation.  
A significant point is that S11(PA) sees the otherness of the analyst as vitally 
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important.  In his view, the primitive levels of both patient and analyst are processed 
in the analyst’s mind as a joint experience.  On attaining a meaningful form in the 
mind of the analyst, the analyst seeks to find a way to feed this back to the patient, 
such that the patient can recognise that it is centrally about what he/she has been 
struggling with, but is also about ‘us’ and has become a combined experience with 
additional meaning: 
So, the otherness is really important in that, because the patient needs to 
recognize … what's communicated back eventually, or over a number of 
interventions, as centrally to do with him or his ... and not all about the 
analyst, for example, but also not all, not only about him or her, but about us. 
… [F]or me that feels very important. That it is an experience of a relationship 
that, that's built up … the relationship is actually the central thing that's 
represented.  (S11(PA), I1, 17) 
 
7. The private theory of S11(PA) 
From the above clusters, a profile for S11(PA) was constructed.  In his private theory, 
psychoanalyst and patient both regress to more primitive levels of functioning, and, 
depending on the extent of the regression, thereby find themselves jointly in a 
symmetrical unconscious field, from which insight emerges.  In this aspect of the 
transference, the dynamic is not unconscious communication in the form of projective 
identification, but rather a shared, mutual and synchronous experience, in which each 
party arrives at something from their own history and personality.  The analyst out of 
their own self-analysis seeks to create something from this joint experience to offer to 
the patient as an interpretation. 
In this understanding, S11(PA) sees psychoanalysis as a unique situation, in which 
different levels of body and mind, development, and functioning, of the patient and 
also the analyst, become bound with one another through regression, and can enable 
199 
 
 
 
the issues needing to be addressed to emerge.  The body may play a key role in this, 
as primitive functioning is reached through the regression, in which material is 
released as symptoms and somatic images, and thus experienced in a direct form.  
Body and mind are closely woven together in this view, being seamlessly linked by 
levels of functioning, stages of development, and the action level of words, to 
produce symptoms, sensory images and metaphor, and ‘shapes of sensory, tactile and 
action experience’.  This leads to the conclusion that S11(PA) effectively has a 
monistic understanding of a unified bodymind, manifesting different aspects in 
different contextual environments.   
Discussion 
The most salient of the above findings, for the purposes of the present project, are a 
symmetrical transference field and a monistic bodymind.  The manner in which these 
findings emerged will be traced in the light of the discussion on implicit theories.   
1. Symmetrical transference field 
In the 1
st
 interview, S11(PA), asked to speak about the nature of the analytic process, 
gave a relatively theoretical account of regression to primitive levels of functioning, 
describing unconscious communication in terms of projective identification.  He 
employed standard terminology, adding his own understanding of the meanings that 
he was attributing to his terms.  He then referred to the session forming the interview 
instrument, and the joint regression in patient and analyst that, he said, allowed 
projective identification to take place and the analyst to apply some alpha function to 
the patient’s beta elements.  Thereafter, he shifted to a developmental comparison, 
and began referring to fusion and locked-in projective identification on both sides 
(S11(PA), I1, 14).   
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These inconsistencies prompted a query in the 2
nd
 interview.  At this point, he 
spontaneously produced a clinical example, and after recounting an unfolding clinical 
moment, reverted to his theoretical understanding in a new way.  Now, he spoke 
about transient moments of merging and shared experience, and made the observation 
that the term ‘projective identification’ did not cover such experience.  In the 
subsequent data analysis of both interviews, this generated an understanding of a 
symmetrical field existing at certain primitive levels of functioning. 
Here is evidence of a private theory in accordance with Canestri, having 
topographical aspects in terms of thinking at conscious levels, as discussed in 
interview, pre-conscious levels, in terms of partially thought through ideas, and 
unconscious levels, accessed by reference to clinical material.  A conceptual vector is 
demonstrated in terms of S11(PA)’s account of the transference field, referring to 
Kleinian ideas of projective identification and Bion’s notion of alpha functioning.  
The reference by S11(PA) to his clinical material may be seen as recourse to 
metaphor to assist in clarifying something not as yet understood, and this brings in 
Canestri’s coherence versus contradiction vector, and its reference to the function of 
metaphor in dealing with contradiction.  It also brings in Fonagy’s understanding of 
the role of two minds trying to fit together understandings of the analytic process, and 
arriving at metaphor as a way of integrating psychoanalytic hypotheses and empirical 
research. 
2. Bodymind monism 
In the 1
st
 interview, S11(PA) spoke of words having an action level.  He referred to 
the embodiment of thinking rooted in bodily experience, mainly in early infancy, and 
the way that this shapes language.  He went on to describe primitive equivalents of 
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words as actions, manifesting as sensory images and symptoms, these more direct 
versions of words as actions often being released in analysis. 
Asked in the 2
nd
 interview about the origins of such understanding, S11(PA) gave a 
detailed account of the evolution of his views, starting from Isaacs’ paper on 
unconscious phantasy (1948).  Next, he referred to work on embodied cognition, and 
various training and research projects involving evaluation of tape recorded sessions, 
bringing together ideas from the fields of linguistics, attachment and cognition.  His 
account was full and coherent, and demonstrated views based in years of careful 
thinking. 
Referring to Canestri, it was clear that by now the topographical vector was operating 
mainly in the conscious mode, supplemented in the conceptual vector by a range of 
well-formed technical assumptions, demonstrating S11(PA)’s established relationship 
with his own internal conceptual objects in the object relations of knowledge vector.  
Canestri’s developmental vector also features in an elaborated fashion. 
Conclusion 
The above description shows how two interviews with S11(PA), and an 
accompanying data analysis, yield a private theory for S11(PA), which is partially 
conscious and partially unconscious, in accordance with the literature on implicit 
theories.  It takes the interviews of S11(PA) as a detailed example of the manner in 
which the other interviews were conducted and analysed, to yield the results of the 
empirical aspect of this project, as set out in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 8 
Analytic method: dialectic between undifferentiation and differentiation 
We need differentiating knowledge to clear up the confusion which the discovery of 
the soul has brought in (Jung, 2009b, 471) 
 
Introduction 
The present chapter introduces the results of the empirical strand of the present 
research.  More especially, Chapter 7 discussed the notion of the analyst’s private 
theories and demonstrated, by example, how the private theories of 12 interviewees 
have been extracted from 24 interviews
69
, using grounded theory techniques.  The 
present chapter and the next, Chapters 8 and 9, now assess these private theories in 
comparison with one another.   
As noted in Chapter 5, the empirical researches undertaken by Jung and The Berlin 
Group, foreshadowing the psychoid concept, delineated two strands of enquiry, 
pertaining respectively to: 
(i) The dynamic of undifferentiation/differentiation. 
(ii) The transference field. 
For the sake of consistency, Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, take up these same 
strands, the present chapter focusing on the first.   
                                                 
69
 As stated in Chapter 2, the empirical study also included a small group discussion with 6 
discussants.  The transcript of this discussion was also subjected to data analysis by grounded theory, 
and yielded results entirely similar to those of the individual interviews.  For this reason, these results 
are omitted from the present account. 
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Jung’s early work on The Red Book led him to conceive the process of individuation, 
in the sense of becoming oneself, as a dialectic between undifferentiation, defined as 
regression to unconscious states of unification of self and other and/or body and 
mind, and differentiation, defined as progression to conscious states of increasing 
distinction of self from other and/or mind from body.  As described in Chapter 5, 
such dialectic may be seen as a series of such regressions and progressions, each 
cycle increasingly separating the individual out from the collective and enabling 
further integration of his/her personal psychological function and individual 
corporeity.  Jung’s conceptualisation of the psychoid concept has roots in this work.   
The present chapter interrogates the dynamic of undifferentiation and differentiation, 
by reviewing respectively the attitudes of different interviewees towards unconscious 
and conscious states within the analytic dyad, and by contemplating the analytic 
techniques they employ for fostering a dialectic between them.  These techniques 
compose the analytic method, and this chapter proposes that such method is a living 
and adaptive conceptual situation, in which the particular conceptual elements 
selected as important, and the analyst’s attitudes towards them, are part of the private 
theory of the individual.   
As Dieckmann (1991, 7) writes, “there are certain fundamental ideas that have 
crystallized as methodological essentials with which every analytical psychologist 
works.  Each of us must create the necessary conditions for setting an analytic process 
in motion, and certain techniques are part of it”.  The unfolding analytic process then 
“cloth[es] the archetype per se in a specific imago capable of giving a symbolic 
direction and meaning to drives and instinctual energies”, in the service of 
individuation (ibid., 8).   
204 
 
 
 
Dieckmann does not specify particular techniques, but Canestri (2006) and Tuckett 
(2009), discussed in Chapter 2, list certain factors defining the analytic method, 
including for Canestri (2006, 36-9) ‘clinical generalisations’ employed to manage the 
clinical situation, for example: privileging relationship or here and now with the 
patient; prioritizing image or language; the analyst’s theory of change; and his 
approach to action, in terms of listening and interpretation.  Tuckett (2009, 148-9) 
refers to dimensions, which he terms ‘How does analysis work?’ and ‘Furthering 
interventions’, concerning the analyst’s ideas about how an analytic session can bring 
about change and how the analyst can assist the analytic process.  Here, he offers 
such elements as: working through conflicts; facilitating representational capacity; 
and working through unconscious repetitions; as well as the prioritization of clinical 
facts for interpretation.   
Certain of these elements arose in the interviews, including both the analyst’s 
understandings of and attitudes towards: regression; development; unconscious 
interaction; enactment; symptom and image; symbolic capacity; a relational 
approach; the here and now; interpretation; and theories of change. 
Accordingly, in the present chapter, such elements that define a dialectic between 
unconscious and conscious will be isolated in the accounts of the different 
interviewees, and then a comparison will be made with the counterpart dialectic of 
undifferentiation and differentiation, as an aspect of Jung’s psychoid concept.   
The private theories of both psychoanalysts and Jungian analysts
70
 are reviewed and 
are individually compared, but it is to be emphasised that the present chapter does not 
set out specifically to compare the Jungians as a group with the psychoanalysts as a 
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 Referred to as PA and AP, respectively, herein. 
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group.  Rather, it proceeds from the assumption that there is merit in drawing 
interviewees from both traditions, on the grounds that: Firstly, this ensures that the 
results are not contaminated by affiliational influence, and, secondly, it acknowledges 
the fact that any conceptualisations by the psychoanalysts in accord with Jung’s 
psychoid concept, albeit employing alternative language, would carry greater weight 
than such conceptualisations by the Jungians.  In fact, confirmation of the concept 
through the psychoanalytic channel would count as Popperian evidence for the 
validity of the concept.   
Overview 
Although the interviewees
71
 were all given the same process notes, and the same set 
of discussion vertices, their responses varied widely linguistically and conceptually, 
which brings in a complication over terminology.  Every analytic concept mentioned 
has its own public, i.e. established, meanings, but, in their private theories, each 
interviewee may have their own personal, but possibly not conscious, definition for 
any term, and be employing public theory in their own idiosyncratic, but possibly 
neither conscious nor accurate, fashion.  Further, the interview process was designed 
to encourage free association, and so it was not practical to interrupt interviewees 
repeatedly for definitions.  Accordingly, the meaning in the moment is prioritised 
here over conceptual precision applied to public theory. 
Some interviewees tracked the process notes closely from a clinical or theoretical 
standpoint, while others used them to free associate into metaphorical accounts of 
theory and practice, only loosely based around the session.  The different voices were 
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 All interviewees are referred to as ‘he’, for reasons given in Chapter 2.   
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all, without exception, distinctive and idiosyncratic, and an attempt is made to convey 
this.     
The data analysis results will now be discussed, starting with observations on the 
session, and then moving on, respectively, to method elements serving to mobilise the 
patient’s unconscious dynamics (undifferentiation) and method elements serving to 
render these dynamics conscious for integration by the patient (differentiation).  For 
practical reasons, only the most prominent such elements are addressed.  
Session 
The session
72
 took place just before the Christmas break in a 5x per week treatment.  
The patient, a woman in her mid-50s, came into treatment for depression, saying that 
she felt dissociated from her feelings, her body, and other people.   
Initially, she mentions fear of going back into a black cloud of depression, and 
describes a family conversation about homeless people making demands.  Her words 
are delivered in a cut off manner, without any affect.  Interpretations about the break 
are dismissed.  Eventually, after an interpretation about being pushed out and made 
homeless by the analyst, she says that what comes to mind is how busy she is, and 
produces an agitated account of everything pressing in.  When the analyst interprets 
the way that busy-ness pushes out an aspect of herself that then feels made homeless, 
she quietens.  At this point, an event occurs (‘the phenomena’), in which the analyst 
experiences a visceral image of an adult placing a small carved object on a child’s 
bedside table, accompanied by a sensory shape incursion into the analyst’s stomach 
of a small hand grabbing the object, and by an instinctual sense of satisfaction 
apparently coming from the child.  This leads to interpretations of the child’s 
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 The process notes are omitted for reasons of confidentiality, but researchers wishing to view the full 
text may contact the author on abaddi@me.com. 
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experiences of absence, now received by the patient.  Towards the end of the session, 
the patient recounts a dream of a woman diving over a cliff, leaving the analyst 
anxious and floundering to find an interpretation. 
Results 
1. The session 
Some interviewees (S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) began 
with the session opening, while others (S2(AP), S5(AP), S6(PA), S9(PA)) launched 
straight into a consideration of the phenomena.  A few (S3(AP), S8(PA)) made direct 
links between the phenomena and the closing dream.  The responses generally fell 
into two camps, namely those (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), S8(PA), 
S9(PA), S11(PA)) who felt the event marked a real moment of meaning, a turning 
point in the session, and those (S6(PA), S7(PA)) who acknowledged the event simply 
as one clinical fact amongst a number.  Only one interviewee (S10(PA)) felt that the 
phenomena were not significant.   
It is interesting to look at the beginning, middle and end of the session in terms of 
these different responses. 
Beginning: Those who commenced here picked up on a quality of dissociation, 
observing that the analyst was tracking the patient’s words, and the patient 
responding, but the interchange lacked life.  S3(AP) commented that the analyst did 
not feel very embodied when she took up the patient’s anger over the approaching 
break: the interpretation was probably correct, but not something the patient could 
use.  S11(PA) said that it was like the analyst being an analyst and the patient being a 
patient.  S8(PA) noticed how cut off the patient was from an attentive, available 
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analyst, saying he would be monitoring this splitting.  These interviewees stressed a 
dynamic involving two separate people speaking to the conscious material and not 
managing to meet one another. 
Middle: All but one interviewee felt that the session shifted gear, and an unconscious 
element took over, when the event occurred.  For example, S1(AP) described the 
moment as a significant shift, bringing the analyst to something deeper or earlier, the 
approaching break having engendered in the patient psychoid memory at a level of 
early separations where body and mind are the same thing (S1(AP), I1, 10)
 73
.   
S3(AP) referred to Jung’s psychoid concept: 
[W]here distinctions between people do not really exist.  […]  [T]his thing 
that happened in your body and in your fantasy, that's the deepest level of 
communication from her to you, around the deepest issue requiring healing 
still. […]  [T]his is psychoid material in the body.  (S3(AP), I1, 12/15)  
For S2(AP), the phenomena emerged from “the complex system, which results from 
the meeting of the analyst and the analysand.  […]  [I]f we talk about unconscious, I 
would say that it's the unconscious of the meeting” (S2(AP), I1, 3). 
These interviewees envisaged a shift to body-mind and/or self-other undifferentiation. 
S8(PA) described the patient’s fear of ‘going back’ as fear of regression to an earlier 
stage involving a powerful, visceral demand for someone to watch over her, as in the 
phenomena.  He observed that patients in the more somatic range of experience bring 
a literal need for objects that reassure, linking this with a central confusion on the part 
of this patient as to what belongs where and with whom.  S9(PA) noted a deep level 
of aloneness in the patient, and the need for regression to a more primitive state of 
mind, to get to a place where the aloneness could be reached through the analyst 
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 interview; I2= 2
nd
 interview, herein 
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being present in silence beside the patient.  And, S11(PA) contemplated regression as 
a move to more primitive levels of mental functioning, involving the emergence of 
unconscious phantasy and/or increased contact with physical experience.  He noted 
that the phenomena indicated a shift, where: 
[T]he analyst intuitively moves from trying to express [the transference 
relationship] in ideas, which the patient is not really doing much with, to a set 
of somatic images and experiences, which express something much more 
direct about […] the infantile version of that situation.  (S11(PA), I1, 5) 
S1(AP), S8(PA), S9(PA) and S11(PA), therefore, isolated a dynamic of regression.   
End: Various interviewees highlighted a flow from the phenomena to the patient’s 
final dream, and some (S3(AP), S8(PA)) specifically moderated their view of the 
dream, on the ground that a turning point took place when the phenomena arose.  
S3(AP) felt that the phenomena constituted a transitional object signalling that the 
patient could now manage separation, and in consequence the final dream was 
prognostic of the disappearance of an old, out-moded complex.  S8(AP), likewise, 
considered that the phenomena represented something for the patient to hold onto, 
and that they indicated a clinically significant shift or turning point in the session, 
possibly in the treatment, from a dissociation, where the analyst feels cut off, towards 
a real capacity for primitive communication.  He thought this enabled her actually to 
bring the final dream, but that such forwards movement might also terrify her.  
Therefore, he felt that the dream was probably more about the patient’s fear that the 
analyst might not catch her rather than any intimation of actual disaster.  S9(AP), 
whilst not specifically linking the phenomena and the dream, nonetheless juxtaposed 
comments about the primitive state of the patient, leading in the phenomena to 
somatic states of mind, with observations about her teasingly withholding information 
that she is alright in relation to the dream. 
210 
 
 
 
These interviewees, therefore, implied that, by the end of the session, some self-other 
differentiation has taken place, enabling the patient to bring the dream as a disclosure 
of her own and to be less exercised about the potentially disastrous dive in the dream. 
Aliter: By contrast, S6(PA) viewed the session in terms of splitting.  He felt that the 
patient was resistant to interpretations about the break, and then the phenomena came 
in a direct way, representing a form of transitional object to provide comfort over the 
break; this was helpful in assisting the analyst to understand what was split off and to 
shape an interpretation that could be received.  However, he saw the closing dream as 
representative of disaster, and hence a worrying, disturbing attack on the abandoning 
object, indicating another split.  The first split involved something comforting, the 
second something disastrous.   
S10(PA) felt that the phenomena should have been ignored, being the analyst’s 
material, and that the focus should have been the patient’s conscious communications 
about ‘black cloud’ and ‘being made homeless’.  
The discussion will now move onto the wider observations of the interviewees, 
starting with those concerning method elements serving to mobilise unconscious 
dynamics. 
2. Unconscious dynamics 
a. Regression and development 
Clinical regression was a prominent topic, and S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA) emphasised 
its importance linked with development.  Only S10(PA) specifically indicated that he 
did not believe in regression. 
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S7(PA) observed that “the patient experiences the analyst and everything that is 
connected with the analyst [… as] connected with early experiences, with early 
objects.  [...]  [T]here's an enactment based on these experiences” (S7(PA), I1, 5).  
The patient thus regresses to early developmental states, and object relations, and 
these are then enacted in the analytic setting, either by the patient or by the analyst.   
S9(PA) considered that both patient and analyst need to regress: 
[A]s Freud says, if it can't be done that way [through words], it has to be done 
through enactment.  And then we get to the interesting idea about, what of 
regression.  […]  I think that in regression there’s the possibility of hearing a 
great deal which can't be put into words, which then becomes the royal road to 
discovery and uncovering of history and the possibility that one gets into the 
room with the patient as an alive object.  (S9(PA), I1, 5) 
He defined regression: 
Regression figures early in Freud.  […]  Patients come with all their baggage, 
which includes not just the present tense of their life, or the present tense of 
what they think their problems are, but all the imagos that they have lived 
through, have experienced as well as their relationship systems.  So, a 
regression is going back to a previous state, which might be a more primitive 
state, it might be a more juvenile state, or the patient giving up some of their 
grown up autonomous sense of being the age they are and finding themselves 
thinking, feeling, dreaming of an earlier structure, structures of their life.  
(S9(PA), I2, 12) 
For S11(PA) also, regression of both patient and analyst is a central part of analysis, 
seen in terms of an openness to more basic, primitive levels of functioning, at which a 
separation of reality and phantasy occurs with respect to a number of axes, adult and 
infant, cognitive and primitive, more rational and more physical:  
I think constellations of previously unconscious anxieties, and wishes, and 
physical states, and the need to express them, emerge in analysis in a way 
that's uncommon [...]  I think one would call that regression, because I'm 
assuming it does pull in, pull from quite infantile experiences.  But it's not 
regression, in the sense that there's a separation. I think there's a part of the 
self, which remains quite adult, […] so that […] at the end of 50 minutes […] 
you pull yourself back together and go off back to work. And so, it's not a 
total regression of the person, I think it's a separation into different levels of 
functioning, and different levels of experience.  (S11(PA), I1, 9) 
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These interviewees all relate regression with a shift to earlier and/or more primitive 
levels of functioning, in which infant-adult and psyche-soma experiences are less 
clearly demarcated.  The function of the regression is discovery, in order to allow 
isolation and integration of early material. 
b. Unconscious interaction (self-other) 
This section addresses interviewees’ understandings of unconscious interaction 
between analyst and patient.  Only a brief account will be given here, since the 
subject is covered fully in the next chapter on the transference. 
Basically, three categories of interaction emerged, namely: a condition of mutual self-
other immersion, designated by some as participation mystique (S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S12(AP)); a condition wherein a shared imaginal third area exists between self and 
other (S5(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA)); and a condition wherein the patient communicates 
their unconscious material to the analyst by means of projection or projective 
identification, thereby ‘putting’ their material into the analyst and creating an area of 
self-other mix-up within the psyche of the analyst (S6(PA), S10(PA)).  Some referred 
to more than one of the above categories (S1(AP), S2(AP), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S11(PA), S12(AP)).   
S3(AP) described participation mystique: 
Jung used that term of Levy-Bruhl’s at the beginning, then eventually he 
replaced it, in my opinion, with the psychoid.  […]  [A]ll he’s really saying is 
psyche emerges out of something that is en route to being psyche but it isn’t 
exactly psyche yet.  That something is the psychoid.  […]  [It’s] a more basic 
level in which there is no real subject/object split, and there also is no 
body/psyche split.  […]  [A]ttachment and healing are psychoid phenomena.  
(S3(AP), I2, 5-6) 
S2(AP) referred to a third, to which he gave the mythical term ‘chimera’: 
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[T]he meeting of the analyst and the analysand […] creates a new system, 
which is neither the one nor the other, which is the encounter.  [….]  I am 
thinking when I say that about what Winnicott says "There's no baby without 
a mother." At the beginning, we don't have a mother and a baby. We have a 
mother-baby and baby-mother.  (S2(AP), I1, 3) 
Likewise, S9(PA) offered a model of mutual unconscious interaction, discriminating 
between a hierarchical model of analysis, where the analyst is the expert, and a 
situation where the analyst and patient are engaged in something together and an 
emergent dynamism between them aids transformation: 
I think that when you come into an analytic consulting room, you have the 
potential for the emergence of things other than the usual repressed stuff.  It’s 
a potential space.  […]  The deeper the repression, the more vital the 
emergence of something else, and the more difficult to allow that to happen.  
No, emergence is a potential space.  (S9(PA), I2, 20-1)   
These analysts thus envisaged the first and second categories above.  The following 
covered the last. 
S6(PA) conceived the analytic process primarily in terms of splitting, envisaging a 
“value appearing in the analyst”, which is the patient’s projected split off material, 
and the analyst resonating to this split off experience (S6(PA), I1, 11).  S8(PA) also 
referred to splitting, describing a developmental model of projected emotional states, 
with active processing by the analyst as container.  S10(PA), too, defined his model 
in terms of projective identification and containment, seeing the patient as repeating a 
dynamic with an early object, such as mother, and looking for a container for their 
anxiety. 
Accordingly, for these interviewees the patient’s material is projected to create areas 
of unconsciousness lodging temporarily within the psyche of the analyst. 
The remaining interviewees employed terminology from two or more of the above 
categories.  S1(AP) used language, such as meshing, identifying, empathising, 
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sympathising, to describe the way that the infantile stuff of both analyst and patient 
combine, and linked the countertransference with a psychoid level of experience, in 
which self and other are not separate.  He then acknowledged using Kleinian ideas of 
splitting and evacuation in his work with borderline people.  S7(PA) initially 
distinguished between communication from one party, the patient, to the other, the 
analyst, and a shared situation, in which both are affected.  Subsequently, he 
employed the term ‘projective identification’ but, when queried, observed that 
actually he considers the total situation is not clearly demarcated between patient and 
analyst.   
S12(AP) struggling to find language for the analytic process, offered a range of terms 
both technical and otherwise, including splitting off, projective identification, 
unconscious identity and participation mystique, as well as mirror-touch synaesthesia, 
a third area, a shared imaginal field between patient and analyst, a psychoid area 
linking with the unconscious of both patient and analyst, and the Pleroma.  He also 
employed descriptions of a more symbolic nature, such as umbilical connection, the 
patient growing into the veins of the analyst, and a silence between two people, out of 
which something may emerge.  Accordingly, his understanding embraced, both 
theoretically and symbolically, all three categories, firstly in participation mystique 
and the Pleroma, secondly in a shared imaginal space, and thirdly in a hierarchical 
situation of projective identification.  He contemplated that different ones of these 
variants might apply in different stages of an analysis.   
S11(PA) came to a similar view, referring generally to projective identification, then 
describing a situation, where both parties are fused in an extreme form of locked-in 
projective identification on both sides (S11(PA), I1, 14).  He gave an example from 
his practice, an emotional moment of meaning, where he had really felt part of the 
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analysand and very entwined with their situation.  “It was as though we’d been 
together through some sort of fire or flood”, he said (S11(PA), I2, 17).  Musing, he 
felt that projection was the wrong word in this instance, “it was more of a merging 
experience” (ibid., 17). 
Accordingly, the models offered by the different interviewees were very varied, and 
some were more internally coherent than others.  
c. Unconscious interaction (body-mind) 
Embodiment was generally found to be more important for the Jungians than the 
psychoanalysts.  Some interviewees (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S4(AP), S11(PA), 
S12(AP)) were familiar with embodied experience in the countertransference, and 
considered imagistic sensory phenomena to be common.  These analysts tended to 
have relatively developed ideas about, and language for, such experience, some 
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP)) believing the sensory experience of the analyst to be 
central to the analytic process.  Other interviewees (S6(PA), S8(PA), S9(PA), 
S10(PA)) were not familiar with sensory forms of image but could recollect having 
vague symptoms, e.g. sleepiness.  These interviewees tended to place less importance 
on sensory aspects of the analytic process, although some (S6(PA), S9(PA)) had well 
developed models for understanding patients’ psychosomatic symptoms.  A few 
interviewees (S4(AP), S11(PA), S12(AP)) spoke of a taboo in the analytic 
community against mentioning embodiment in the countertransference.   
For S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S4(AP), S12(AP), the analyst’s sensory experience is 
crucial.   
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At the outset, S3(AP) framed the field of enquiry as ‘what is happening in the body’, 
indicating that he considers the embodied response of the analyst the most reliable 
source of information about the analytic process (S3(AP), I1, 2).  For him, the 
personal is in the body, and the body is needed in order to process the archetypes, 
since: 
This thing that happened in your body and in your fantasy, that’s the deepest 
level of communication [from the patient] around the deepest issue requiring 
healing still.  […]  [T]his is psychoid material in the body.  This is the part of 
all of our organisms that's below the cerebral cortex.  It’s the level of the 
sympathetic nervous system.  (Ibid., 15)  
S1(AP) said that he had developed his own theory for an ‘embodied 
countertransference’74 informing his understanding of the patient.  He described this 
theory as an internal theoretical object, combining ideas from Jung, Bion, other 
psychoanalysts, and especially from philosophers, such as Spinoza, Herder and the 
German Romantics.  Noting that Jung described body and mind as two aspects of a 
unitary bodymind, he said, “it’s interesting to always have in mind and in experience 
that they [body and mind] are not different” (S1(AP), I1, 13).  Such dual aspect 
monism is thus a lived experience, for which he had coined his own term, ‘sensuous 
imagery’, meaning imagery that has an effect on all the senses, the body, the brain 
and the emotions, that conveys “the hardness of things, the colour of things, the 
emotional tone of things” (S1(AP), I2, 3/6).  He related this to Jung’s psychoid 
concept, described as intimacy at the level of the autonomic nervous system, 
activating an unconscious meshing of experience in both patient and analyst, 
generating in the analyst psyche-soma information that then requires critical 
                                                 
74
 Acknowledged as a reference to terminology coined by Andrew Samuels, to refer to physical, 
sensual, embodied expression in the analyst of a patient’s emotional experience in their inner world of 
a significant other. 
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reflection on his part, in order to discriminate out material that belongs to the patient 
(ibid., 5/9).   
S2(AP) described clinical meaning as “emerging from the unconscious through the 
body”, implying that the analyst lends his body to being shaped by ‘the encounter’ 
created by the meeting of analyst and analysand (S2(AP), I1, 7).  He clarified this, by 
reference to Winnicott, commenting that the developmental process of differentiation 
begins with the differentiation of the bodies of the baby and the mother.  The analytic 
process is similar, and the analyst assists this by bringing consciousness to bear and 
enabling meaning to emerge in his own imagination through his body.  S2(AP) 
emphasised that true imagination involves the whole body.   
Thus, these two interviewees consider the analyst’s sensory experience to be crucial, 
but also link embodiment with imagery. 
Whilst, for S1(AP) and S2(AP), sensory countertransference images yield symbolic 
understanding and meaning generally, S12(AP) described suffering sensory images 
that later turned out to correspond quite literally with physical memories of the 
patient, which are un-thinkable.  He referred to Jung’s psychoid concept to explain 
this situation, and also mentioned research on mirror-touch synaesthesia conducted at 
UCL by Banissey and Ward (2007)
75
.   
Amongst the psychoanalysts, S11(PA) considered it normal for the analyst to 
experience the countertransference in a sensory fashion.  Commencing from what he 
called ‘the embodiment of thinking’, meaning that the roots of thinking and feeling lie 
in bodily experience, S11(PA) described words as having a level unconsciously at 
which they are actions, expressing a shape of a sensory or tactile experience, like 
                                                 
75
 This research describes how synaesthetic touch, in the form of tactile sensations that are 
phenomenologically akin to actual touch, arises in response to the witnessing of physical touch.   
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eating, vomiting or hitting.  Physical images and metaphors are more direct versions 
of words as actions, arising at a primitive base level of experience associated with 
regression.  Symptoms arise at an even more primitive level.  For S11(PA), therefore, 
body and mind are seamlessly linked by levels of functioning, implying that S11(PA) 
has a monistic understanding. 
S9(PA) associated an analyst’s sensory experience with primitive states of mind and 
regression in the patient.  Elsewhere, in his published work
76
, he mentions an 
interpenetrating psychotic muddle, and the need for the analyst to bear the auditory, 
visual and tactile hallucinations that occur in such states.   
In summary, the Jungian interviewees generally approach embodied 
countertransference as essential to analytic work, and two of the psychoanalysts 
(S9(PA), S11(PA)) were clearly familiar with embodied countertransference.  These 
interviewees all consider body and mind to be inextricably bound together, S2(AP) 
and S3(AP) both referring to deeply unconscious levels where body and mind are 
undifferentiated, and S1(AP), based on the ideas of Spinoza and Jung, quite 
specifically referring to a dual aspect monism.   
In contrast, most psychoanalysts gave less credence to embodiment.  Specifically, 
S6(PA) described himself occasionally having vague symptoms, but being more 
focused on psychosomatic patients.  S10(PA) indicated that analytic listening 
involves getting into a particular state of mind, corresponding to Bion’s ‘abandoning 
memory, desire and understanding’, Freud’s ‘evenly suspended attention’, and 
Heimann’s ‘freely mobile sensibility’.  Accordingly, he seeks to avoid being drawn 
into events, including his own internal images and sensory experiences, which would 
                                                 
76
 Included in the bibliography but here omitted for anonymity. 
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disturb such state of mind.  He observed that it would be different if he felt that 
sensory experience was due to the patient, and gave an example where he could not 
shake off the idea that intense stabbing headaches were caused by elements that are: 
[P]rojected, either into the patient's own body or into their analyst’s body, 
pretty directly, sometimes by resonance of voice, or what Meltzer used to say 
temperature of voice, or a mysterious way that we don't yet understand.  […]  
But whatever it is that's projected, it's not, as Bion would say, it is not suited 
for articulation, symbolic thought, communication.  It's suited only for 
expulsion.  […]  In fact, one often ends up feeling something the patient 
doesn't want to feel, doesn't want to know about and doesn't want back, in any 
shape or form. […]  That probably might have to be sat with for a year, before 
you could say anything about it.  So these phenomena, proto-mental, I would 
take to be β elements.  (S10(PA), I1, 15-6) 
Thus, virtually all the interviewees acknowledged the existence of sensory 
countertransference phenomena. 
3. Conscious dynamics 
Next, conceptualisations of the interviewees concerning the manner in which analyst 
and patient develop understanding of the patient’s unconscious situation will be 
reviewed.   
This section will cover method elements, such as: enactment, symbolic capacity, and 
the selection of clinical facts for interpretation. 
a. Enactment 
All of the psychoanalysts, save S6(PA), but only one Jungian, S5(AP), spoke about 
enactment.  The focus varied from enactment by the analyst, by the patient, and as a 
mutual event, to enactment as an important communication of the patient’s 
unconscious scenario, as collusion, and as offering either such possibility.   
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More especially, S5(AP) highlighted enactment by the analyst, while S9(PA) noted 
the significance of enactment by the patient, both considering the positive benefits.  
S7(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA) and S11(PA) spoke about mutual enactment, variously 
considering positive and negative aspects. 
For S5(AP), the phenomena in the session represented an enactment by the analyst 
from a deeply unconscious level of the psyche, constituting a congruent response to 
the patient of a kind that advances the analysis (S5(AP), I1, 15).  Enactment may here 
be seen as a response to an archetypal stimulus, enabling something to be made 
conscious.     
S9(PA), associating enactment with regression, sees it as the door to the patient’s 
unconscious: 
[M]y model is that most of the time we live an unconscious life, and the little 
bit that we're conscious of is the smallest bit.  One can occasionally reach 
back to the other bit that's unconscious, through dreams, through daydreams, 
and through enactments.  I don't know that I can say more than that.  It seems 
a good Freudian position.  (S9(PA), I1, 13) 
He described enactment as a psychic holding of the patient’s early history, until 
something emerges through the analytic process enabling the patient to break free. 
Making conscious is an important function of enactment.  S7(PA) described the 
transference as the analyst having thoughts, feelings and fantasies that are a product 
of the psychoanalytic relationship: these are to be considered enactments.  In his 
model, the relationship between patient and analyst produces in the patient a 
regression to early object relations, and both then enact in the present a range of 
experience evoked by such relations.  He added that “maybe we tend to enact more 
when sometimes we could reflect more”, implying that enactments may be 
destructive (S7(PA), I1, 7). 
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For S8(PA), likewise, early experience informs the internal world of the patient; that 
drama gets played out in the session, and the pressure to re-enact is very real (S8(PA), 
I2, 8).  Similarly, S11(PA) indicated that enactment is going on all the time in every 
session.  Asked for a definition, he said: 
[W]hat I mean is making concrete, palpable, not necessarily an action in a 
completely literal sense that somebody moves or whatever, but making real in 
the room something which had been unconscious and usually in a way that is 
unconsciously meant to change something.  […]  For example, there could be 
[…] the prolonging of the session, where there's a wish to prolong intimacy or 
a truce after a difficult period in the relationship [… and] the analyst doesn't 
notice that the session has ended and the patient also doesn't do anything, […] 
which is expressive of, quite a deep underlying wish, perhaps on both parts, 
and which is enacted jointly.  (S11(PA), I2, 6-7/9) 
Finally, S10(PA) described enactment as the action component of the 
countertransference.  In a session, when two people meet, there is turbulence, an 
emotional storm and two frightened individuals, as described by Bion.  The patient 
gets into a repetition compulsion, involving: a negative transference in the sense that 
the patient repeats with the analyst uncomfortable patterns from the past; the here and 
now in the sense that the patient is doing it in the room in the present; and enactment 
in the sense that the patterns are being repeated in the relationship with the analyst.  
As he said: 
The way transference works is that there's a scene, or a scenario, and the 
patient is attempting to make it actual.  Instead of talking about it and working 
it through, they're trying to make it happen between two people, so that it 
becomes real through, not symbolization, but mutual acting out.  (S10(PA), 
I2, 11) 
Accordingly, these psychoanalysts all saw enactment as an expression of unconscious 
content, some associating enactment more with making material conscious and some 
more with collusion.  Further, they individually envisaged differing kinds of 
enactment, in the complete range from behaviour, to thought, to fantasy. 
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b. Symbolic capacity 
Almost all of the interviewees were interested in symbolic capacity.  In some 
instances, the significance of symbolisation was implicit, being evident rather in their 
personal use of symbolic language than stated as a clinical aim (S1(AP), S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S4(AP), S9(PA), S12(AP)).  For example, S1(AP) employed the term 
‘sensuous imagery’ to describe imagistic experience having a sensual component, 
associated with the psychoid unconscious, that informs his understanding of the 
patient and hence his interpretations.  Likewise, S2(AP) mentioned Jung’s reference 
to true imagination, in relation to interpreting, dreams and active imagination, as 
informing both his own emerging understanding of his patients and their developing 
sense of self (S2(AP), I2, 4). 
S5(AP) offered a more developed view of symbolizing function, which he discussed 
in relation to patients who bring apparently symbolic dreams and yet have no 
conscious capacity for formulating symbolic meaning: the symbolic meaning is at a 
higher level than their conscious attitude can accommodate.  He proposed the idea 
that symbolic meaning requires the addition of consciousness, on the ground that it is 
the “unconscious that’s organizing all the information, and therefore what comes into 
consciousness has already got a lot of organization and symbolic potential in it, but it 
needs to have this extra thing that consciousness does, to bring it alive” (S5(AP), I1, 
8).  This suggests that the analyst may at times need to provide consciousness and a 
symbolising function for the patient.  
By contrast, S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA) and S11(PA) all referred specifically 
to the development of the patient’s symbolic capacity as a clinical aim.   
223 
 
 
 
S11(PA) contemplates assisting the patient to shift from a more symptomatic concrete 
level to a more symbolic level, and S8(PA) described himself as interested in a 
patient’s ability to represent things in their mind, seeing “part of the therapeutic 
process being facilitating some movement from something that's less metabolised, 
less digested, less conscious, less formed, into something that becomes more 
conceivable, more elaborated” (S8(PA), I2, 4).  He implied that enactment is a step on 
the way to symbolisation (S8(PA), I1, 14-5).  S7(PA) made a link between the body 
and symbolic capacity, indicating that he contemplates how the body is used by the 
patient, and whether it is connected to a capacity to mentalise and symbolise (S7(PA), 
I1, 6).   
S6(PA) described an analytic model, which seeks to help patients elaborate their 
symptoms symbolically.  He considers symptoms to be split off paranoid-schizoid 
objects displaced into the body, seeing them as primitive symbols approaching the 
symbolic equation of Hanna Segal.  They are often associated with early 
developmental difficulties over symbol formation, and may be difficult to convert in 
the direction of symbolisation, but working through generally begins to be possible 
when affect or representations arise.  He gave an example of a man with hair loss: 
[It was] as if the hair loss represented the painful loss of the object […] which 
the patient is quite unaware of, since it's been projected, and split off and 
projected into the body. […]  He feels he's lost his beautiful hair, and his 
attractiveness, and so on, but it doesn't contain feeling and it is a very limited 
symbol as it were.  […]  There’s feeling about the distress of the symptom, the 
sense of pain and loss in the symptom but it is not ... It's nowhere represented 
or symbolized as the relation to the loss of the object.  (S6(PA), I2, 2-3) 
He described working this through: 
It moves from something like quite a primitive thought that might be lodged 
in the body, in a rather persecutory way, because the important thing about the 
psychosomatic individual is he suffers from a persecutory object lodged in the 
body, his hair falls out or his stomach is terrible.  And it seems that the 
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symbol would be something that represents that partly verbally, perhaps partly 
in a dream or a picture, that makes sense of that and contains it and allows it 
to be worked with.  For example, the alopecia patient starts to think about 
loss, of being abandoned, and he starts to, he feels angry.  He can represent 
that.  And, I think there was a dream about a damaged house that was very 
helpful.  (Ibid., 6) 
S10(PA) is interested theoretically and clinically, in a lack of symbolization, but he 
also described seeking hidden parts of the patient and trying to help them to make a 
shift towards the depressive position, to enable symbolic work and thinking to take 
place (S10(PA), I2, 13-4). 
Accordingly, these interviewees aim to develop symbolic capacity. 
c. The selection of clinical facts for interpretation 
Approaches to interpretation varied considerably, some interviewees considering that 
this should be determined by emergence of meaning in the mind of the analyst, and 
others based on a ‘here and now’ approach favouring a close tracking of the patient’s 
words, in order to frame interpretations based on the patient’s psychic position in the 
moment.  Still others leaned towards a relational approach, in which interpretations 
highlight the relationship between patient and analyst.   
i. Emergence 
The interviewees for whom emergence occupies a significant role were S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S5(AP), S9(PA) and S11(PA).   
S2(AP) (I1, 3) was the most articulate, stating that “he would like to use the word 
‘emergence’” to describe the phenomena: 
For me, the important [thing] is not the phenomena itself, it is how the 
phenomena is going to shape our thoughts.  And to allow us to think what we 
would be unable to think without that.  […]  It is an emergent process.  [… 
T]hese phenomena are linked to the complex system, […] which is the 
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encounter. […]  [F]rom this system emerges something which would not have 
emerged in another system.  [….]  I would say that, in this moment, the 
important thing for the analysis is that you have been able to accept to lose 
your […] boundaries, so that this complex system, which is the transference, 
will then take the place of your ego, inside your psyche, inside your body first, 
and then your psyche. And will create inside you some shape or 
representation, using your consciousness for that.  And then you recovered 
your boundaries, and you have been able to think something, to be conscious 
of a thinking, which has emerged from this experience inside you.  [… There 
is also] the necessity of time for the analyst to lose his boundaries and the 
necessity of time for the patient to be able to hear something about an 
important insight.  And what is very mysterious for me is that this necessity of 
time is coming from the encounter, and no one decides, it emerges.  And 
usually, when it emerges like this, […] if the analyst is able to say something, 
usually the analysand is able to hear.  (S2(AP), I1, 3-5) 
He emphasised that this emergence can assist in reuniting a split in the analysand, 
observing that the area from which such emergence arises is ‘the psychoid’ (S2(AP), 
I1, 10). 
S3(AP) described emergence in terms of Jung’s Seven sermons to the dead: 
[M]ost Jungians tend to get more excited about what the Sermons call the 
Pleroma, because that is the ultimate, unknowable source from which 
archetypes emerge to foster psychological development.  But, the Sermons 
also speak of the Creatura.  […]  Creatura is the Latin word for creature, i.e. 
our creatureliness, the body.  […]  You need the Creatura to process [the 
archetypes] so that what they have to offer can become your own.  (S3(AP), 
I1, 8-9) 
[Jung] presents these two ideas, the Pleroma, out of which all the archetypes 
are constantly emerging, and the Creatura, which is the needy, human 
embodied creature that has to experience things, with attachments needs and 
with interdependence.  And he creates his psychology of a relation to 
emergent archetypes, which may have the capacity of building psychic 
structure, experienced by a Creatura who is still a creature, a human creature, 
very much living in what I would call the psychoid realm.  (S3(AP), I2, 16) 
S11(PA) also discussed the process of emergence: 
[Q]uite often I think it goes through that sequence, which involves some 
sensory or physical experience, commonly for the patient and sometimes for 
the analyst.  And sometimes I've been cued into something, which I probably 
might not have made contact with otherwise, through a physical symptom of 
my own, which has alerted me to something about the patient, which then has 
turned out to be quite a key thing, either a physical issue that they've got or 
some phantasy that they have. So, there's that emergence where something ... 
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It’s almost like being born, something is introduced into the analysis as 
something that can be known and worked on, but almost indirectly through 
some much more visceral kind of resonance.  (S11(PA), I2, 11-2) 
The remaining interviewees made brief references.  For example, S5(AP) described 
the session phenomena in terms of: 
[A] purposive unconscious, or perhaps as I might say an unconscious that is 
organized and organizing, so that the material that comes out of the 
unconscious is not random and is not simply chaotic or instinctual but I think 
there is also a lot of work that goes on in the direction of meaning, and 
formulation, that goes on unconsciously before things emerge into 
consciousness.  (S5(AP), I1, 4) 
He indicated that he found ‘the emergence idea’ helpful, because it means that 
organization arises through process (S5(AP), I2, 7). 
S9(PA) did not employ any of the same terminology, but he implied that his model of 
unconscious interaction is emergent.  Regression enables the history of the patient, 
and understanding, to emerge.  Interpretations should also emerge and be made in the 
authentic moment for both patient and analyst.  He described the analytic consulting 
room as a potential space, where there is “the potential for the emergence of things 
other than the usual repressed stuff” (S9(PA), I2, 21).   
S12(AP) referred to unconscious imagery bubbling up out of the blue, saying that the 
phenomena might be described in various ways, including Jung’s transcendent 
function, emergence and synchronicity: “They're just different ways of describing 
phenomena that come from [the psychoid realm] and that have their feet in it, that are 
rooted in it.  And there is a dynamic, energetic movement, between mind, between 
body, between spirit and psychoid” (S12(AP), I1, 15). 
Accordingly, these interviewees contemplate an organising function in the 
unconscious, actively shaping material to produce an emergent understanding in the 
analyst that fosters interpretation. 
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ii. Here and now 
Not many interviewees described interpretation based on the here and now.  S10(PA) 
was the main proponent, while S8(PA) discussed the demerits of this.   
S10(PA) observed that he had been taught to work in the here and now in the 
transference, seeing all the communications by a patient as observations about his/her 
current mental state right now.  Influenced by Bion, his model of the transference is 
based on projective identification of early infantile states of anxiety, including 
nameless dread and fear of dying, originating in the deepest instinctual layers of the 
psyche, and on container-contained.   
Clinically, S10(PA) is tracking the processes in the session, by noting what the 
patient says prior to an interpretation, indicating the patient’s state of mind, and what 
the patient says after an interpretation, indicating what they consider to be the 
analyst’s state of mind.  With reference to the process notes, he made an interesting 
comment about the transference being close enough to consciousness to be grasped, 
and it became apparent that his interpretations might generally follow the conscious 
level, until he felt convinced that something more unconscious should be addressed.  
S8(PA) described a struggle between working in the here and now and a relational 
approach: 
So, I would think about [the phenomena] very relationally, and about what is 
going on between us.  I struggle because my own training is a Kleinian 
training.  I know within it there's a lot of variation, in terms of actually being 
very much in the here and now focused, that everything is transferential 
phenomena, and I personally struggle with that.  I struggle with it because I 
think it can so easily be used in a cold, mechanical way.  So the patient says "I 
feel my boyfriend is remote and unavailable”.  “Oh, you feel that here with me 
too."  Clunk!  [… F]or me one of the challenges, and I think it's what is 
difficult about this work but also extremely interesting, is being able to really 
feel that what is being described, about ‘there out there’ with someone else, 
might in a way pertain to ‘here with me’ between us, that actually can be 
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talked about in a way that has some authenticity, by really finding the words, 
different words from the patient’s words, to talk about that.  (S8(PA), I1, 11) 
Thus, he combines dialogue with the patient to open up their history, and self-
reflection on the transference, before interpretation, and he would note how the 
patient responds.  A balance is needed between ‘there out there’ and ‘here with me 
now’.   
iii. Relationship 
By contrast, the following interviewees contemplated a specifically relational 
approach to the patient, distinguishing this from the transference: S1(AP), S3(AP), 
S5(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA).  S5(AP), S9(PA), S11(PA) described the intimate 
relationship built up in analysis as key.  Its importance was also implied by S2(AP), 
S12(AP), S6(PA). 
Asked about the aims of analysis, S5(AP) observed that, for him, the relational 
aspect, including attachment, is primary: 
[E]specially because analysis is such a long term therapy, in which the 
relationship is so crucial and what happens to people over time through being 
in a relationship, and the slightly more controversial end of it is that I actually 
think all the things that can be summed up by the word ‘love’ are enormously 
important.  (S5(AP), I2, 15) 
S9(PA) spoke in terms of authenticity.  He described waiting, simply being there 
alongside the patient and waiting for something to emerge.  He mentioned the 
importance of being in the authentic moment for both analyst and patient for meaning 
to be reached.  The implication is that in this moment, the analyst and the patient are 
alive and in relationship with one another, and that is when the patient can experience 
being met through interpretation. 
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S11(PA) believes that a shift in the patient’s situation is only achieved by 
interpretation that is more than a mere mirroring of the patient’s communications.  It 
must include an aspect of the analyst’s self, in order to show that the analyst has put 
something together with their own mind, created something.  In his view, the 
primitive levels of both patient and analyst need to be processed in the analyst’s mind 
as a joint experience, and to be fed back to the patient, such that the patient can 
recognise that it is centrally about what he/she has been struggling with, but also 
about ‘us’.  “[F]or me that feels very important, that it is an experience of a 
relationship that's built up, not just an experience of the self, that's built through a 
relationship, but the relationship is actually the central thing that's represented” 
(S11(PA), I1, 17). 
S1(AP) related the question of relationship to Jung’s psychoid concept, seeing the 
psychoid as “something that's happening to mind and body, not just to me but 
between us and trying to see it as relational, interpersonal” (S1(AP), I1, 12). 
These interviewees, therefore, are very mindful of the reality based relationship with 
their patients, as well as the transference, and incorporate this knowledge into their 
interpretations. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion demonstrates clearly that all of the interviewees give 
consideration to an analytic method aiming firstly to mobilise the unconscious 
dynamics of the patient, and secondly to assist their emergence into, or bring them to, 
consciousness, for interpretation and for integration by the patient.  Further, this 
process may be seen as a dialectic.   
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Certain clusters of ideas appeared to be independent of the interviewee’s theoretical 
orientation, namely: familiarity with sensory experience in the consulting room, 
language difficulties for describing such experience, dissociation/splitting, primitive 
states of mind, development, regression, enactment, and symbolising 
function/symbolic capacity
77
.   
Most of the interviewees displayed an interest in symbolic capacity as a clinical aim 
of analysis, and communicated that this would involve a trajectory towards a living 
symbol rather than a mere sign or designation.  Further, all of the interviewees 
conveyed a sense of an alive and vital process in their own work, and in their 
attention to the process notes brought for discussion, and this leads to a conclusion 
that Jung’s original distinction between a reductive method according to Freud, i.e. 
seeking causal origins in the past, and his own synthetic method, i.e. seeking 
prospective living meaning and purposive construction, is not apt.   
Hence, all the interviewees aim to enhance their patients’ understandings of, and 
abilities to manage, their lives in ways that would seem to fit with a definition of 
individuation generally as a process of becoming oneself.   
Comparing the results with Jung’s description of individuation as a dialectic between 
undifferentiation and differentiation, in the particular sense of regression to 
unconscious states of unification of self and other and/or body and mind, and 
progression to conscious states of increasing distinction of self from other and/or 
mind from body, a number of things are to be said:  
Firstly, it is to be noted that ‘regression’ is employed by Jung in a different sense than 
it is by the majority of the interviewees, who considered regression to be a reversion 
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 All defined in various ways, as indicated. 
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to earlier or more primitive states, not necessarily involving unification of self-other 
or body-mind.  Secondly, most of the Jungians, and two of the psychoanalysts, 
S9(PA) and S11(PA), envisaged unconscious dynamics involving states of self-other 
undifferentiation.  Thirdly, all but one of the Jungians and the same two 
psychoanalysts conceived unconscious dynamics involving unified body-mind states, 
and S3(AP) quite specifically referred to the Pleroma and Creatura as did Jung.   
Turning to the issue of making conscious the patient’s dynamics, this was the aim of 
all the interviewees, albeit via attention to different process elements, and via 
different mechanisms for the selection of clinical facts for interpretation.  Again, the 
Jungians, as well as S9(PA) and S11(PA), all spoke of a model involving emergence 
in the countertransference for increasing differentiation of self from other and of the 
patient’s mind from body.   
Consequently, the conceptualisations of these particular interviewees accord with 
Jung’s description of individuation generally, and with this particular aspect of Jung’s 
notion of the psychoid.  The contrary views of the remaining interviewees will be 
discussed in the next chapter on the transference, and Chapter 10 will review the 
empirical results against the definition of the psychoid concept derived from the 
historical study. 
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Chapter 9 
The transference field 
“The psychoid nature of the archetype contains very much more than can be induced 
in a psychological explanation.  It points to the sphere of the unus mundus, the 
unitary world” (Jung, 1958, par. 852) 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter, Chapter 8, began discussing the results of the empirical study, 
by starting to assess the private theories of 12 interviewees in comparison with one 
another.  The present chapter continues this evaluation.   
As noted in Chapter 5, the empirical researches undertaken by Jung and The Berlin 
Group, foreshadowing the psychoid concept, delineated two strands of enquiry, 
pertaining respectively to: 
(i) The dynamic of undifferentiation/differentiation. 
(ii) The transference field. 
Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, take up these same strands, the present chapter 
focusing on the second.  Chapter 8 discussed various elements of the analytic method 
according to the interviewees, and noted three categories of conceptualisation for 
unconscious self-other interaction: 
(i) Mutual self-other immersion, namely participation mystique;  
(ii) An imaginal zone between self and other, constituting a shared third;  
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(iii) A hierarchical condition, wherein the patient communicates events to the 
analyst by means of projection or projective identification, thereby creating an 
area of self-other mix-up within the psyche of the analyst.  
These three categories lead to very different notions of the transference field, and of 
the dynamics pertaining thereto.  Categories (i) and (ii) designate a symmetrical field, 
to which analyst and patient contribute equally, and category (iii) designates an 
unequal and asymmetrical field, as discussed below.  These two designations for the 
transference field emerged directly from the data analysis: they were not terms 
employed by the interviewees but were coined for the purposes of the present 
research.  The use of similar terminology by Matte-Blanco (1988) is acknowledged, 
but can be distinguished because he is referring primarily to forms of logic applicable 
in clinical work to the conscious and unconscious thinking of the patient, including 
the effects of this in projective identification, whereas here the two terms designate 
the overall field encompassing the whole of the analyst-patient dyad
78
.   
The nature of the model employed by the interviewees for unconscious interaction 
was isolated as a key distinguishing factor in the empirical results.  Accordingly, the 
present chapter interrogates these results, and considers their implications, as 
discussed below. 
Unconscious interaction 
Some interviewees, primarily but not solely the Jungians, described the transference 
as an undifferentiated field, in which differentiation is the task.  Here, the 
unconscious arena may be considered as symmetrical, although the fact that the 
analyst has had a training analysis, and is therefore better able to process and 
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Matte-Blanco’s account is elaborated in considerable detail, but reasons of space here prohibit a 
complete discussion of the differences. 
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discriminate his own material, means that there is inequality in the analytic dyad at a 
more conscious level.  As already indicated, there were differences of understanding 
as to whether patient and analyst are both are immersed in this undifferentiated field 
or whether it is situated between them.   
Others of the interviewees, primarily the psychoanalysts, described a transference 
field between patient and analyst, in which the focus is on the patient and their 
unconscious, the patient is seen as projecting onto or into the analyst, and the analyst 
whilst seeking to discriminate out their own material before making interpretations 
nonetheless is viewing the dynamic primarily as being generated by the patient.  This 
is considered to be an asymmetrical model. 
A few managed to combine both models, with a greater or lesser degree of coherence, 
for example contemplating an asymmetrical field at a personal level or at the 
beginning of analysis, and a symmetrical field at an archetypal level or as analysis 
progressed.  A further possibility embraced moments of symmetry, based on 
regression, in an otherwise asymmetrical field. 
Interestingly, it was found that this distinguishing factor effectively determined 
whether or not the data results were congruent with the psychoid concept.  It will be 
recalled from Chapter 5 that the psychoid concept relates to a deeply unconscious and 
unknowable area, in which there is no differentiation between self and other, and 
body and mind, and that the research of the Berlin Group found such characteristics 
to be prevalent in the transference.  Accordingly, they demonstrated a symmetrical 
transference.  It may, therefore, be assumed that those interviewees displaying 
symmetry in their models of the transference hold psychoid-congruent views, while 
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those interviewees having solely asymmetrical models display psychoid-antithetical 
views.   
Common clusters of ideas in the interviews of those inclining to a symmetrical field 
were: undifferentiation, participation mystique, emergence, moments of intensity and 
meaning or turning points, and embodied countertransference, leading on to Jung, 
psychoid, and synchronicity.  In the interviews of those favouring an asymmetrical 
field, the following clusters of ideas were prominent: projective identification, 
pushing material onto/into the analyst, Klein, Bion, container-contained, alpha/beta 
elements, proto-mental.     
A number of the psychoanalysts, albeit employing entirely different language from 
the Jungians, were amongst the interviewees having symmetrical models, and this is 
especially significant.  Whilst it might be expected that the Jungians would produce 
psychoid-congruent results, such views amongst the psychoanalysts would not be 
foreseen and therefore constitute Popperian evidence in support of Jung’s concept.   
The discussion below divides the results according to the symmetry or asymmetry of 
the model for the transference field.   
Session 
The previous chapter addressed interviewees’ observations on the session forming the 
basis for the interviews from the point of view of the flow from beginning to middle 
to end, noting that some saw the designated event as a turning point.  The present one 
briefly addresses the question whether the event is to be considered as 
countertransference, and, if so, the nature of the transference field. 
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All of the interviewees considered that the event constituted countertransference, save 
S10(PA), who thought that it comprised primarily the analyst’s own material.  The 
following described the mechanism as based on an undifferentiated self-other state or 
participation mystique: S1(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP).  S5(AP) referred to the 
unconscious connection
79
 in Jung’s symmetrical transference diagram (1946, 221).  
And, the following felt that the mechanism was based on the generation of a third 
zone between analyst and patient: S2(AP), S9(PA).  The next set of interviewees 
considered the mechanism to be projection or projective identification: S6(PA), 
S8(PA), S11(PA).  The remaining interviewees did not specify a mechanism, S4(AP) 
simply describing the analyst’s countertransference as “the sense of being one has 
contemporaneously with the patient”, and S7(PA) speaking about the event as 
countertransference, and then observing that he would resist definitions as being too 
concrete.  General views are elaborated below. 
Psychoid congruent results 
This section focuses first on conceptualisations, which are consistent with the 
psychoid concept, whether or not this particular terminology is employed, and then it 
reviews how the concept is understood by the Jungian interviewees.   
1. Symmetrical model 
Most of the Jungian interviewees conceived a purely symmetrical model for the 
transference field, as defined above.   
S3(AP) contemplated a total self-other undifferentiation, and distinguished two levels 
of clinical work, namely a process level associated with the ego, and an analytic level 
associated with the unconscious:  
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 Described by Jung in certain phases of analysis as participation mystique (1946, par. 376). 
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[I] draw on Jungian theory throughout: first by invoking an understanding of 
the psyche and of psychic interaction that's connected with [Jung’s] 
psychological types, i.e. types of consciousness that either meet or don't meet 
when people interact, including analyst and analysand in their present 
realities, and then Jung’s theory of the psychoid to explain that level in which 
patient and therapist are just commonly human at the somatic level, which is 
always connecting us to each other.  Probably, all of this turns into a very 
elaborated Jungian theory of attachments.  (S3(AP), I1, 12) 
In the case of the psychoid level, he employed the term ‘participation mystique’, 
acknowledging that Jung borrowed the term from Levy-Bruhl to refer to a 
relationship in which the subject and the object are undifferentiated, and implying 
joint immersion in the transference field.  In the opinion of S3(AP), Jung employed 
the terms ‘participation mystique’ and ‘psychoid’ as coterminous, using participation 
mystique earlier on in his theoretical development, and psychoid later.  For S3(AP), 
individuals are “amazingly connected” at this level, where “there is no real 
subject/object split, and there also is no body/psyche split” (S3(AP), I2, 6).  
According to S3(AP), analysis fosters the development of an individual psyche, that 
has the capacity to reflect and that gradually becomes more and more differentiated 
(ibid., 7). 
S2(AP) was also clear about this.  For him, the meeting of patient and analyst in the 
clinical session creates a new system, which he calls the encounter, that is neither one 
nor the other but both.  He had his own metaphor of the chimera for this, a symbol 
having a mythical aspect, as creature combining bodily parts from lion, goat and 
serpent, and a biological aspect, as a single organism combining cells of two zygotes, 
being neither one nor the other.  There is a lack of differentiation in the encounter, 
which may be conceived like Winnicott’s mother-baby unit, that there is no mother 
without a baby and no baby without a mother, but only a mother-baby and a baby-
mother, and the task of analysis like the task of life is differentiation.  When the 
analyst is able temporarily to let go of his ego boundaries, so that the encounter takes 
238 
 
 
 
the place of the ego, a shape or representation may emerge as an affective event first 
within the body, and then within the imagination, of the analyst.  He considered the 
phenomena in the session to be an instance of this process.  As a result of the 
inhibition against acting imposed by analysis, eventually, through reflection, a 
thought may emerge in the mind of the analyst.  Furthermore, the emergence of 
timing is also a feature of the encounter.  If this is respected, then when the analyst is 
able to interpret, the patient is often able to hear, and this may assist the patient to 
heal a dissociation within themselves.   
Accordingly, the encounter constitutes a third area between the patient and the 
analyst.  The analyst moves in and out of this undifferentiated zone, allowing himself 
to be possessed by the encounter and then bringing his consciousness to bear to 
differentiate his experience.   
The next few interviewees also conveyed notions of a shared unconscious arena. 
S12(AP) employed terms, such as participation mystique, Pleroma and psychoid, as 
well as imaginal third zone, and mirror-touch synaesthesia.  His overall account 
emphasised primarily a shared imaginal zone or third area, a transference field 
between patient and analyst, where sensual images can be experienced, and he spoke 
of his own work in a manner clearly displaying a sense of two people with such a 
dynamic between them.  He described different stages of analysis, an early stage 
when analyst and patient are struggling together, and a later stage when this 
transference field arises.  For him, the phenomena in the session represented the heart 
of the analytical process, an indication that patient and analyst are now in harness 
together and that such transference field has instantiated, with the phenomena 
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bubbling up (emerging) from the depths out of the blue.  Often, this kind of 
experience reflects turning points in a session or in the analysis as a whole.   
He also made a distinction with projective identification: 
I think [there] is a crucial difference between projective identification and 
participation mystique. So, projective identification is seen, certainly by some, 
as a means of getting rid of unwanted unconscious material from one person 
into another, so that they feel it.  And that's, you can certainly look at it that 
way, but that's not my standpoint.  (S12(AP), I2, 4) 
He sees participation mystique as something that many patients need: 
[I]n the hope that we will listen under the words, below what is visible, and 
pick up something that probably goes back to a mother-infant experience in 
terms of togetherness.  And particularly to do with early infancy and the way 
that the sensory system is, certainly for very small babies, it is all interlinked. 
[…]  It's both archetypal and developmental, because it comes from such an 
early stage that it has to have big archetypal elements.  (Ibid., 5) 
Although S12(AP) did not link this account of the difference between projective 
identification and participation mystique with different stages of analysis, nonetheless 
such link can be inferred from the above account.  
S1(AP) referred to a meshing of experience between patient and analyst, in which the 
analyst is affected and infected at the level of the autonomic nervous system.  He 
described it as something that is happening to the mind and body, not just of the 
analyst but between analyst and patient, i.e. in a third zone, engendering in the analyst 
experiences that he terms sensuous imagery.  S1(AP) considered the phenomena to be 
an example of this, arising out of infant experience of the patient “terribly 
reactivated” at a psychoid level of early separations and intimately shared in the 
psyche-soma of the analyst (S1(AP), I1, 5/9).  Critical reflection is then required on 
the part of the analyst, by contemplating his own pathology and potential influence on 
the interaction, in order to differentiate himself from the patient.   
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A few of the psychoanalysts also envisaged a shared unconscious area enveloping or 
between analyst and patient, although they did not employ the same terminology.   
The account of S11(PA) at first presented some ambiguity: The analytic process, 
according to S11(PA), involves the analyst resonating with a scenario of the patient 
that is being played out, where resonating may be seen as two people associating and 
having an interaction at the level of their adult selves.  Gradually, a joint regression 
takes place, where access is opened up to the more basic levels of both people.  Then, 
the interaction is more in the nature projective identification, where one person's 
psychic experience is infused with that of the other in a way that forces the recipient 
to take in and react to the other’s experience.  Such projective identification can be 
witnessed most powerfully between a parent and a new baby.  He described this state 
as the two being fused in an extreme form of locked-in projective identification on 
both sides.  This mutuality combined with use of the term ‘projective identification’ 
lent some confusion to the nature of the transference field being envisaged.  
Asked for further elaboration, he gave an example of a brief clinical moment, where 
he felt a merging of experience took place with a patient, who was confronting the 
loss of his dying guardian and facing childhood memories of his parents’ deaths.  
There was a very real sense of being right with the patient in the presence of death.  
He described himself as feeling fused into the patient’s experience, and as sharing his, 
the analyst’s, strength, thus enabling both to emerge from the experience.  S11(PA) 
displayed some confusion over the language to be employed for this account, saying 
“I think projective identification is not really … I don’t know what the right 
expression would be, exactly, for it” (S11(PA), I2, 18).  S11(PA) thinks in terms of 
levels of the unconscious, and, therefore, the interviewer concluded that his model 
envisaged levels in the transference field, including a primitive one in which the 
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experience is not hierarchical but shared and symmetrical.  S11(PA), therefore, may 
be considered to hold a model displaying asymmetry normally but symmetry at a 
deeply regressed primitive level.   
S9(PA) also implied that his model embraces a deeply unconscious area that is 
mutual.  For him, patients in primitive states of mind are often in one person states, 
where words do not reach them and the analyst does not exist.  Referring to Freud, he 
observed that regression is then needed to get into the room with the patient as an 
alive object, regression of the analyst as much as the patient.  Only then can the 
history of the patient, and understanding, emerge.   
He implied that transformation involves an emergent dynamic between patient and 
analyst: 
I think that when you come into an analytic consulting room, you have the 
potential for the emergence of things other than the usual repressed stuff.  It’s 
a potential space.  So, I think that it’s always there, potentially, whether it’s 
used or not at any given time, or might take time to be used.  The deeper the 
repression, the more vital the emergence of something else, and the more 
difficult to allow that to happen.  No, emergence is a potential space.  
(S9(PA), I2, 20-1)   
Noting to him that he had not used the expressions ‘projection’ and ‘projective 
identification’, he responded that this was astute, and discriminated between a 
hierarchical model of analysis, where the analyst is the expert, and a shared situation 
where analyst and patient are engaged in something together:  
[T]here’s nothing special about being an analyst because, if an analyst doesn’t 
have a patient, they actually can’t do analysis.  It needs an analyst and an 
analysand to do analysis. […] What we have is two different positions in 
analysis.  You’re in one, I’m in another, but each on their own is not about 
analysis.  Each, one on the couch, one on the chair behind, together, the we-
ness of that structure is that analysis can happen.  (Ibid., 16-7) 
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This account is remarkably similar to that of S2(AP) of Winnicott’s mother-baby unit.  
Thus, S9(PA)’s description of the consulting room as a potential space involving two 
positions implies a symmetrical field situated between analyst and patient. 
S7(PA), referred to projection just a few times, rather describing analysis as a shared 
situation, a complex whole, in which the patient experiences everything associated 
with the analyst as linked to early objects, and fantasies are evoked and enacted by 
both patient and analyst.  He resisted any notion of delineating the process, saying, “I 
am more interested in this ongoing relationship in interaction between two people” 
and emphasising that he looks for the meaning within the complex wholeness of 
particular work (S7(PA), I2, 9).  Asked how he arrives at interpretation, he 
responded: 
I'm smiling because it would sound very strange.  It has to be dreamed.  [… 
I]t's about allowing experience to evolve to the level of thinking, but not to 
forget the experience, because experience is crucial, staying with experience, 
staying with ambiguity, staying with, not rushing into thinking.  (Ibid., 7) 
This account also implied a symmetrical model for the transference field.   
2. Psychoid theory 
Some of the Jungians (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP)), unprompted, brought in 
Jung’s psychoid concept as the theoretical underpinning for their model of 
unconscious self-other interaction and/or the body-mind relationship.  S3(AP) also 
worked in the historical development of Jung’s ideas, which is of particular interest in 
relation to the historical strand of this project.  S4(AP) and S5(AP) both mentioned 
the psychoid concept briefly, S4(AP) simply to acknowledge it as relevant.  Likewise, 
S5(AP) noted that the psychoid concept applied to ways of thinking in and with the 
body, but indicated that he himself found phenomenology more helpful for this. 
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For S1(AP), the significance of the psychoid concept lies in its linking of the body-
mind relationship and the transference field:  
I’ve tried to bring the idea of the psychoid as something that's happening to 
mind and body, not just to me but between us and trying to see it as relational, 
interpersonal.  And I'm interested in where one would locate the psychoid 
under such circumstances.  Is it between us?  Are we both sitting on it, so to 
speak?  Or is it a state we create around us?  And this is a question of how 
imaginal it is, or how actual it is.  (S1(AP), I1, 12)  
In his view, the concept encompasses a developmental standpoint, early mistakes 
being alive in the patient, and psyche-soma information from this early experience 
informing the body-mind of the analyst at a level where body and mind are the same 
thing.   
S1(AP) described psychoid fantasy as sensuous imagery affecting the mind and body 
of each individual in the session.  He described Jung’s psychoid concept as a 
materialist concept, and referred to Santayana’s materialism:  
I find that tremendously healthy, as I also find the idea of how matter stops us 
from being free imaginal beings, to a certain extent.  We’re constrained by 
matter.  He calls this animal faith.  We've got to have faith in matter, which is 
Santayana.  And I find this, like faith in body, faith in the fact that we're 
physical beings sitting together in the analytic room, conditioned by our 
gender, by our sex, by our physical illnesses, by our age, by our genes, I find 
that terribly liberating, the fact that we're constrained by this.  I find it 
liberating to know that I'm predetermined, which is why the psychoid is so 
important to me.  (S1, I1, 14-5) 
When it was pointed out that he had not anywhere used the word ‘spiritual’, he 
countered that “it must be a part of the psychoid whole” but is almost too difficult to 
talk about (S1(AP), I2, 11).  For S1(AP), this sets limits on what can actually be said 
about Jung’s psychoid concept.  
S2(AP) defined Jung’s psychoid concept as “the field of complexity that we are 
completely unable to be conscious of, just because all consciousness is an emergence 
from this field” (S2(AP), I1, 8).   
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He sees the psychoid as Jung’s way of writing about the complex system of life, in 
the body, between bodies, and in nature itself, and about a process organising 
differentiation in an undifferentiated field of energy (S2(AP), I2, 7).  Associating the 
psychoid with analysis, he said, the job of the analyst is just to be and to allow 
whatever is going on inside himself to happen and emerge. 
Turning next to S12(AP), he spoke of a psychoid area linking the unconscious of both 
patient and analyst, and generating images that come out of the blue, bubbling up 
from the depths (S12(AP), I1, 12).  He attributed qualities of the Pleroma to the 
psychoid, as if it is filled with a dark energy that we do not understand, a difficult 
territory between body, mind and something divine (ibid., 12-3).   
He offered a metaphor: 
The god Indra made this wonderful net that extends in every single direction 
as far as eternity. And at every single intersection, where threads cross, there 
is a jewel, and if anything changes in any one of the jewels, it's reflected in all 
the jewels. So, it's a lovely ancient Hindu myth about interconnectedness.  
(S12(AP), I2, 6) 
S3(AP) offered a similar metaphor, describing the psychoid as a basic underlying 
matrix of embedded human attachment and referring to a childhood fantasy of his 
bedspread extending out to join with the bedspreads of every other individual in the 
world and create a single overarching canopy connecting him with everyone else.  As 
an adult, he saw this as an expression of a need to re-connect with an initial state of 
human interdependence residing in the psychoid level, in order to promote simple 
human attachment and healing (S3(AP), I2, 5).   
According to S3(AP), “the individual psyche is a developmental achievement.  I think 
probably the first thing was the human group” (ibid., 3):  
245 
 
 
 
[B]efore we have a psyche, we have to have a matrix out of which a psyche 
emerges.  Moreover, psyche can never forget it’s embeddedness in that 
original psychoid level, because it does so at its peril.  In other words, we can 
only be individual consciousnesses so much, attachment matters to us.  We 
are surprised by joy and embarrassed by tears all the time, because our 
connection to each other is being felt in all these ways. [… T]hese processes 
that link us all are far more fundamental to the human condition than the 
psyche that is able to reflect on them, which is built out of certain dramatic 
disappointments at that psychoid level that have become certain necessary 
evolutionary complexes, unconscious anxieties about survival. [… What Jung 
is] really saying is psyche emerges out of something that is en route to being 
the psyche but it isn’t exactly psyche yet.  That something is the psychoid.  
(Ibid., 5-6) 
In analysis, the first order of business is thus to undo dissociation from the psychoid 
level, the second order of business being to develop a psyche.   
In his view, The Red Book was Jung’s attempt to overcome precisely this 
dissociation, having estranged himself not least through getting involved with Freud 
and the psychoanalytic movement.  Through recording his experiences of his 
unconscious in his Black Books, and then through entering into a sensate imaginative 
dialogue with such experience and developing his technique of active imagination, he 
came to the Seven Sermons to the Dead, in which he presents: 
[T]he Pleroma, out of which all the archetypes are constantly emerging, and 
the Creatura, which is the needy human embodied creature that has to 
experience things with attachment needs and with interdependence.  And he 
creates his psychology of a relation to emergent archetypes, which may have 
the capacity of building psychic structure, experienced by a Creatura who is 
still a creature, a human creature, very much living in what I would call the 
psychoid realm.   
So both these elements of the psychoid give us a kind of the dynamics of the 
psychoid: The embodied creature with needs for attachment, and these 
amazing symbolic archetypes that give us the opportunity to engage with them 
en route to building psychic structure.  (Ibid., 9) 
For S3(AP), therefore, the Pleroma is the ultimate unknowable source of the 
archetypes, and the Creatura provides the embodied experience that is needed to 
process them by discriminating, incarnating and humanising them, in order to make 
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what they have to offer our own.  Both of these elements constitute the psychoid 
realm.   
To S3(AP), the contribution of Jungian analysis is its understanding of how valuable 
it is for individuals to dip back into that level of experience in the moment when the 
psychoid is at its earliest emergent state of becoming psyche.   
[P]atients need to live at the threshold between psychoid and psyche.  They 
have to have a kind of borderline state for the longest time in which we’re 
partly relating to them in a very interdependent way en route to their building 
individual psychic structure, which will one day take them away from us.  
And take them away from us profoundly connected to that realm, and perhaps 
never forgetting it.  (Ibid., 10) 
3. Summary 
These interviewees offered varying degrees of coherence in their private theories.   
S3(AP) and S12(AP) gave accounts that were almost entirely in terms of Jungian 
concepts and language, supplemented in both cases by personal metaphorical 
examples.  Among the psychoanalysts, S9(PA) relied primarily on Freudian theory, 
also supplemented to a large extent by metaphorical illustration.  S11(PA) had 
elaborated his own theoretical model, based on Freud, Klein and developmental 
theory.  All of these accounts displayed a remarkable degree of internal consistency. 
Paradoxically, both S1(AP) and S2(AP), while describing their private theories in 
terms consistent with Jung’s ideas, also referred to ideas terms from psychoanalysis, 
such as projective identification, and Bion’s alpha and beta elements.  Their ideas are 
further discussed in the next section. 
The key common themes, arising out of these interviews, were: 
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(i) A model of the transference based on an undifferentiated self-other 
unconscious area, namely a symmetrical field (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S5(AP), S12(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
a. Having a developmental aspect (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S7(PA), S11(PA)) 
(ii) An embodied countertransference (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
a. Implying an undifferentiated, monistic bodymind (S1(AP), S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S12(AP), S9(PA), S11(PA) 
b. Needed for healing a dissociation in the patient (S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S12(AP), S11(PA)) 
(iii) An organising function in the unconscious combined with an emergent 
dynamism (S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), S9(PA)) 
a. Associated with pivotal moments or turning points (S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S5(AP), S12(AP)) 
b. As a source of meaning and imaginal material (S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S5(AP), S12(AP), S9(PA)) 
(iv) A psychoid factor responsible for the above features (S1(AP), S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S12(AP)) 
(v) A psychoid unconscious as ultimately unknowable (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S4(AP), S12(AP)) 
Whilst only the Jungians actually employed the term ‘psychoid’, nevertheless the 
cited Jungians and psychoanalysts all recognise a deeply unconscious and 
undifferentiated arena relating to primitive, archaic or developmental states of mind, 
an arena that is seen as a source of embodied transferential experience and of an 
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emergent dynamism yielding an authentic, living process that brings about 
transformation.   
Psychoid contrasting results 
This section focuses on conceptualisations by interviewees that contrast with the 
psychoid concept.   
Then, it addresses the associated theory, in particular that concerning Bion’s proto-
mental concept, brought by one interviewee.  
1. Asymmetric model 
The psychoanalysts, with the exception of S7(PA) and S9(PA) discussed above, all 
described a model for unconscious interaction based primarily around projection and 
projective identification, implying that there are two people in the room in a 
hierarchical situation.  Accordingly, the models of S6(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA), and to 
some extent S11(PA), may be considered asymmetrical.   
S6(PA) described the transference in terms of a primitive arena, filled with the 
patient’s persecutory objects and anxious phantasies80.  In his model, the patient deals 
with events, such as unmanageable affect and loss that cannot be mourned, either by 
projecting them into the analyst, in whom “a value” then appears, representing the 
split off experience in the countertransference, or by displacing them into his own 
body, as a symptom, leaving the analyst stuck in a rather stark position as an 
observer, worrying about the symptom but feeling powerless to make sense of it.  
Consequently, S6(PA) is monitoring for the splitting occurring in a session.   
                                                 
80
 In each case, the psychoanalytic interviewees were queried as to whether they would employ the 
expression ‘phantasy’ or ‘fantasy’.  Some (e.g. S6(PA)) indicated they were talking about unconscious 
phantasy, some (e.g. S11(PA)) employed both expressions depending on whether they were speaking 
about conscious or unconscious material, and some (e.g. S7(PA)) felt that theory was too delimiting 
and so chose not to specify. 
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His descriptions of his own work suggested an idea of analysis functioning as a 
relationship, in which the transference serves to convey crucial information about the 
patient’s split off elements and in which the analyst works on this basis and his 
knowledge of the history of the patient to formulate and make interpretations in the 
appropriate moment, which may be quite a struggle.  On a number of occasions, he 
referred to a patient having a fight with him as the analyst, and then he employed 
pronouns like ‘we’ or ‘us’ to indicate that it was thus possible for them mutually to 
contain or survive something paranoid-schizoid.  He also employed the pronoun “we” 
to indicate that analyst and patient were trying to understand something together.  He 
spoke about split off affect coming into the relationship between patient and analyst, 
as if the relationship helps to bring this about, and therefore gave a strong sense of 
mutual work in a relational approach.   
S8(PA) indicated that, for him, analysis has a significant relational aspect and the 
actual life experience and history of the patient are important.  The challenge is how 
to bring the history of the patient and the transference together in an authentic 
fashion.  He seeks to track the projective processes in the session:  
[T]ransference is actually the way in which you are perceived by the patient, 
which fits with their earlier experiences and with other significant 
relationships.  And in that way you're being cast into a particular kind of role.  
The pressure of that is very real.  (S8(PA), I2, 8) 
He added that he also monitors for symbolic capacity, considering that patients who 
are in primitive states of mind, including the somatic register, are the ones who seek 
concrete demonstrations of interest.  He described this as a model of self-other in the 
domain of projection and introjection, based on an early developmental approach to 
projected emotional states, and active processing by the analyst as container.   
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S8(PA) said that he sees change as occurring when the transference is most alive and 
immediate and direct and, when asked what he meant by alive, he said: 
[I]t has something to do with affect and emotional connectedness.  [… 
B]ringing it into the here and now and working with the transference makes it 
a much more emotionally laden experience.  And I think that the emotionally 
laden experience actually means that you are more able to effect therapeutic 
change.  (Ibid., 11) 
Both of these interviewees conveyed a very alive sense of their work combining 
working in the here and now with knowledge of the history of the patient, and 
bringing in a relational approach at the same time.  The ways in which they described 
the transference were consistent with an asymmetrical understanding but they also 
gave a sense of being alongside their patients.   
As mentioned earlier, S11(PA) conceives the transference field mostly as an 
asymmetrical situation.  He also sees the otherness of the analyst and the role of 
relationship as vitally important.  In his view, the primitive levels of both patient and 
analyst are to be processed in the analyst’s mind as a joint experience, to be fed back 
to the patient such that the patient can recognise not only their personal issue but also 
the relationship of the analyst and patient.  The relationship is the central thing being 
represented, not just the self of the patient. 
Next, there is a contrasting approach from S10(PA).  S10(PA) works mainly in the 
here and now, observing that reconstruction of the patient’s history does not play 
much part in his work.  He acknowledged himself to be strongly influenced by Bion, 
describing his model of the transference as being based on an early stage of 
development involving a powerful degree of anxiety, for which the patient seeks a 
container, and thus as based on projective identification of early infantile material and 
container-contained: 
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[T]he theory of containment suggests that if projective identification is too 
severe, or the containment is too thin, a person might not even be able to 
develop a mind that is structured enough, or has enough of a distinction 
between conscious and unconscious.  It renders someone too vulnerable to 
severe breakdown.  (S10(PA), I1, 12) 
He observed that countertransference is the analyst’s most useful instrument, and the 
issue is whether this can be grasped and brought to a focus, which as Freud said is 
painful for both patient and analyst.  He also discriminated between genuine 
countertransference, and affective responses that are more of a resistance or 
avoidance on the part of the analyst:  
I think countertransference is very informative. It’s the most useful tool that 
we have about what's being projected into us, but only if we have really 
allowed ourselves to be stirred up enough.  The danger of countertransference 
is that, in order not to be so stirred up by what's being projected powerfully, 
we may have experiences which are not so much experiences of the 
countertransference, they may be affective responses. So part of my thinking 
is that David Tuckett's distinction
81
 between affective responses to the patient 
and countertransference, because in the early days, in the 50s, Paula Heimann, 
they used to say countertransference was all the analyst’s experiences, the 
emotional experiences in relation to the patient, which I don't think that can be 
right, because it doesn't make a distinction between affective responses and 
things which actually genuinely are a resonance to what's being projected.  
(Ibid., 8)  
Referring to the session on which the interview was based, S10(PA) felt the 
phenomena constituted such an affective response of the analyst.  In his view, based 
on the here and now, the patient’s actual descriptions were transference 
communications, and there was enough that was “graspable and close enough to 
consciousness to address” (ibid., 19).  Interestingly, this suggests a model for analysis 
that involves monitoring manifest content, as much as any unconscious dynamics 
experienced in the countertransference.   
                                                 
81
A number of publications by Tuckett (1993, 2005, 2011, 2012) show an evolution in his thinking on 
this topic, at least some partially at variance with the understanding of S10(PA), rendering this an 
example of implicit theories at work in the moment in the interview, as discussed in Chapter 7.   
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Tuckett (2011) proposes two different modes for analytic listening, based on a theory 
of free association and free-floating attention.  The first, employed by S6(PA) and 
S8(PA) as discussed above, assumes that something happening outside the room has 
been brought inside it for discussion and insight, enabling the analyst to sense and 
interpret unconscious patterns in the patient’s material to show the patient how what 
happens outside and inside the room have something in common.  The second, here 
proposed by S10(PA), regards the analytic material as solely originating inside the 
room
82
. 
Certain of the Jungians also need to be mentioned: S1(AP) seemed to manage to 
combine an asymmetric model with his primary symmetric model discussed above, 
since on a few occasions he employed Kleinian terms, such as splitting off, pushing 
out, evacuation, whilst qualifying his comments with the caveat that for him it is all 
information irrespective of the mechanism.  Asked about this paradox, he said:  
I do think in terms of evacuation, I certainly think in terms of splitting, I do.  I 
do, I do, because evacuation, the idea of evacuating something, partly in 
communication, is surely, it's poetically at least, or conceptually, it is an 
incredibly psychoid idea, isn't it? 
Projective identification, I mean it's, good God, what is, so to speak, pure 
psychic and what is, happens almost somatically, which seems to me 
incredibly mixed up. [...] That's where my sort of monism comes in.  It's so 
basic as an experience, I just think yes, it's a projective identification.  And, 
bloody hell, I feel it.  And it's just a psychic event, but it isn't.  I don't find that 
difficult, it's both.   
But the other one, splitting, is much more of a really useful concept to me, 
because I work a lot with borderline people, and I see it in groups too, the 
process of splitting, going on, [...] it’s what people do, splitting, to defend 
themselves, to play people off against each other, or parts of themselves, it's 
just the process, which I can observe and watch, and it's bloody powerful too.  
[...]   
                                                 
82
 However, in response to a request for clarification, he did indicate that he also takes note of the 
patient’s external situation. 
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I don't think these two ways of looking at something transferentially, 
countertransferentially, those two different angles, are they that far apart?  
(S1(AP), I2, 12) 
Comparing this statement with the account of S1(AP)’s Jungian views given above, it 
appears that S1(AP) manages to combine mutually exclusive viewpoints and both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical models for unconscious interaction (which of course is 
possible in the arena of implicit theories, having as they do a significant unconscious 
component).  
S2(AP), with a symmetrical model, also referred to Bion’s alpha and beta elements as 
a way of describing understanding coming through the body.  When asked if he was 
making a link to Bion’s proto-mental matrix, he responded, “but is that not simply 
beta elements” (S2(AP), I2, 12)?  He did not overtly bring in the concept of projective 
identification, although this is an established aspect of beta functioning.       
2. Theory 
The psychoanalysts mentioned various theoretical approaches to somatic functioning, 
including Freud and his body ego, Joyce McDougall and her work on alexithymia, 
and the Paris School of Psychosomatics.  Concerning embodiment in the 
countertransference, some referred to Bion’s alpha and beta functioning, as did some 
of the Jungians, but most confined themselves simply to discussions of projective 
identification and/or splitting.   
S10(PA) spoke in some depth about Bion and his proto-mental concept, unprompted 
making a link to a physical countertransference and saying, “I’ve had intense stabbing 
headaches with one particular patient, and I can't shake off the idea that it might be to 
do with them, forcibly projecting something at a deep proto-mental level” (S10(PA), 
I1, 15).  He linked the concept to elements that are suitable only for expulsion and 
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that are projected either into the patient's own body or into their analyst’s body in a 
mysterious way that is not understood, observing that he would take these elements to 
be beta elements (ibid., 15).  Seeking to clarify the term ‘proto-mental’, the 
interviewer asked whether he was referring to the work of Bion on groups or to 
something that might be described in ordinary language as ‘proto’ mental.  S10(PA) 
responded that he was talking about groups, and that he thought what Bion said about 
groups, including his proto-mental concept, was just as true about the individual 
psyche, “because to my mind there is complete continuity between his work on 
groups and individuals” (S10(PA), I1, 18).  He said he meant both that Bion’s work 
on groups can be applied to the individual psyche and that the individual has a group 
mentality:  
If you read Experiences in Groups after having had quite a bit of experience 
of the individual situation, you realise just how much of Experiences in 
Groups comes from the fact that, even at that stage, Bion in the '50s was not 
making a big distinction between groups and individuals, he was interested in 
mentality.  So he was interested in the mentality that we have in a group 
situation and the mentality that we have in a situation with one other person in 
a consulting room.  And, recently, I've been teaching Experiences in Groups 
again and there're so many pages, which just come right off the page in terms 
of the individual psyche.  If you look at pages 148 and 149 of Experiences in 
Groups, there is a definition there pretty much of countertransference and 
projective identification.  And it's all taken from his experience in a group 
situation.  But it’s directly related to what goes on between two people in the 
consulting room.  So if you look back at proto-mental, but then you look 
forward into Learning from Experience and Catastrophic Change, proto-
mental and beta elements are, I think, so connected.  (S10(PA), I2, 6-7) 
He described the proto-mental arena as a very primitive stratum, a base level, which 
brings body and mind into relation through Bion’s notion of beta elements: 
So proto-mental, he said I think was the matrix, a primitive matrix, from 
which a lot of these other things flowed or emerged. [… T]o come back to 
beta elements in a clinical situation, I think clinically a state of hallucination 
and bodily states, such as psychosomatic conditions, are often linked as well 
with the pressure on the analyst to act, to be reassuring, or to make 
suggestions.  (Ibid., 7) 
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Asked for a more definitive definition, S10(PA) offered: 
[T]o me, proto-mental means all those layers of the mind, where there's hardly 
any symbolization, and organization even, it's like the deep unconscious, that 
Freud felt we probably couldn't plumb, that not everything can be known. And 
Hannah Segal talks about symbolic equation, doesn't she, not just symbolic 
relations, where there's a huge degree of concreteness.  So, to me, these are 
the things which link with the concept of proto-mental.  (S10(PA), I1, 18) 
He added: 
Plumbing, I mean that is like, plumb the depths. It reminded me of one of 
these Attenborough programmes, where they show the kind of organisms that 
live in the deep oceans, they don't look the same, they're adapted to different 
conditions.  (S10(PA), I2, 12) 
You realise you are in this area, he indicated, when: 
[Y]ou're having all kinds of ideas about the content of what's happening and 
the symbolic links, and you suddenly realize that the patient is not thinking 
symbolically, they're thinking really concretely.  And so all the interpretations 
that you might have had, which suggest that you have a patient in front of you 
who is functioning in a way, a normal creative way, is not actually 
representing things.  […]  And what it usually suggests is that the level I'm 
thinking with a patient is not right, it needs to be more basic, and what I 
sometimes end up reflecting on is, why have I then been on the wrong level?  
Is it that the patient wants to be thought of as more neurotic than anything 
else, functioning fairly well, or is it that there's something really deeply 
fractured, crazy, despairing, unmetabolisable? (Ibid., 11) 
This account of S10(PA) leads to some important points concerning Bion’s proto-
mental concept.   
Firstly, the concept applies as much to the individual as to the group, and it can be 
understood not only by reference to Bion’s statements in Experiences in groups but 
also through his work on alpha and beta functioning.  Secondly, the proto-mental 
arena according to S10(PA) may be defined as: 
(i) A layer so deeply unconscious that it cannot be known 
(ii) A layer wherein body and mind are undifferentiated 
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(iii) A primitive matrix from which emerge or flow beta elements, and experience 
that manifests in a huge degree of concreteness, lack of symbolisation and 
symbolic equation and that is associated with hallucination, bizarre states and 
psychotic functioning. 
3. Summary 
Various common themes arose out of the interviews discussed in this section: 
(i) A model of the transference based on projection or projective identification by 
the patient, namely a hierarchical and asymmetrical field (S1(AP), S6(PA), 
S7(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
(ii) Embodiment, mainly symptoms, associated with primitive states of mind, 
seen as split off elements projected into the body of the analyst or the patient 
(S6(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
(iii) Accordingly, a dualistic view of the body and mind (S6(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)). 
As can be seen, from the above discussion, the notion of an asymmetrical field 
attracts various clusterings of ideas concerning projective identification and 
projective processes, by which aspects of the patient’s psyche are communicated to 
the analyst.  A linked theme is splitting, referring to elements that are projected or 
displaced, including elements that are split off either into the body of the analyst or 
into the patient’s own body.   
The asymmetrical field is associated with the particular theoretical models of Klein 
and Bion, all implying duality, in contrast to the undifferentiation respectively of 
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analyst and patient, and body and mind, propounded primarily but not solely by the 
Jungian analysts with respect to a symmetrical field.   
Discussion 
For reference, a table summarising the overall results discussed in this and the 
previous chapter is attached as Appendix C, it being noted that the complexity of the 
ideas expressed by the interviewees does not lend itself well to this kind of chart, and 
that each chart entry therefore represents a very considerable simplification.   
The methodological significance of these results is profound.  The interviews yielded 
two very different conceptual models of the transference, symmetrical and 
asymmetrical, linked with differing approaches to understanding and technique.  
Interviewees supporting the symmetrical model mostly conceive analytic work to be 
directed towards a deeply unconscious, undifferentiated and unknowable area, from 
which emerge, in moments of intensity or meaning, both the issues needing to be 
addressed and the analytic response or interpretation.  At least some of these 
interviewees felt that there was a numinous aspect to such area, which fosters the 
healing function.  Those favouring the asymmetric model tended to locate analytic 
work in a more personal unconscious arena and to focus more closely on the tracking 
of projective processes for determining their analytic responses.  These analysts 
conceive an evolving process, which is directed at overcoming deficit and in which 
understanding and transformation are seen as emerging gradually over time.  
Attached as Appendix D is a chart showing a comparison of the two different models, 
it being appreciated that a considerable simplification is again involved in producing 
this kind of chart. 
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More especially, many of the analytical psychologists (S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), 
S4(AP), S12(AP)) start primarily from an assumption of an equal and 
undifferentiated couple in a symmetrical transference field.  By contrast, many of the 
psychoanalysts (S6(PA), S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) hold primarily hierarchical and 
asymmetrical models for the transference field, relying as they do on ideas of 
projective identification and splitting elements off into the analyst: at least overtly, 
the focus is on the patient’s material and the analyst is seen as the recipient and the 
one who processes, discriminates and knows.  Alongside this, however, the relational 
aspect, whether avowed or manifest but not discussed, as in the cases of S6(PA), 
S8(PA), S11(PA), suggested to varying degrees something shared and mutual at a 
relatively conscious level in their asymmetric models and hence a more living and 
equal balance.   
Importantly, one psychoanalyst, S9(PA), eschewed notions of projection and 
projective identification altogether and described a symmetrical model with a 
potential unconscious space shared between analyst and patient. 
Further, the exceptions to the classification entirely either by symmetry or by 
asymmetry, namely S1(AP), S2(AP), S10(PA), S11(PA), S12(AP), bear mention.   
Firstly, both S1(AP) and S2(AP) managed, albeit briefly, to contemplate, alongside 
their symmetrical models, hierarchical models from Klein and Bion.  The former 
described the psychoid concept as situating experience symmetrically between the 
analyst and patient and happening to both at the level of the autonomous nervous 
system, whilst also bringing in asymmetrical notions of projective identification onto, 
and evacuation into, the analyst by the patient.  The latter felt that Bion’s notion of 
beta elements was compatible with his description of understanding emerging from 
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an undifferentiated field through the body of the analyst, but without acknowledging 
the mechanism of projective identification attached to such elements.  Thus, the 
private theories of these interviewees lack conceptual coherence in the way proposed 
by Canestri (2006, 41). 
S11(PA) and S12(AP), respectively, started out from entirely asymmetrical or 
symmetrical viewpoints, but then brought in contrasting examples.  S11(PA) began 
by referring to projective identification as the mechanism normally taking place in the 
transference, then described an analytic situation of locked-in projective identification 
on both sides, and finally, working from an example from his own practice that felt 
more like fusion, came to the conclusion that projective identification could not 
account for this and instances of symmetry must be accommodated.  Set in the 
context of his model of levels of functioning arising in analysis
83
, the conclusion may 
be drawn that projective identification accounts for less deeply unconscious, and 
mutual identity for more deeply unconscious, processes.  S12(AP), by contrast, 
produced an account of a deeply unconscious and symmetrical transference field, but 
offered the view that early stages of analysis might not have reached this depth and 
might thus be based more on projective identification and an asymmetrical position.  
Both of these interviewees thus appeared to have coherent accounts, envisaging a 
similar, symmetrical model for the transference field when working with deeply 
unconscious processes or primitive states of mind. 
Finally, S10(PA), although firmly declaring an asymmetrical model based on 
projective identification, nonetheless spontaneously brought in Bion’s proto-mental 
concept, acknowledging that at that deeply unconscious level elements are 
                                                 
83
 Discussed in Chapter 7. 
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communicated in some “mysterious way that we don’t yet understand” (S10(PA), I1, 
15).   
These last examples all bring in notions of unconscious levels, respectively 
conceptualised differently according to depth.  Most of the Jungians, S1(AP), S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S4(AP), S12(AP), mentioned the deeply unknowable nature of the psychoid 
realm.  Whilst a number of the psychoanalysts also mentioned depth, in relation to 
shifts to something deeper and developmentally earlier, only S10(PA) spoke about a 
deeply unconscious layer of the psyche, which he linked variously with Bion’s proto-
mental concept, Freud’s deep unconscious, and Hannah Segal’s symbolic equation.  It 
could, therefore, be helpful here to compare Jung’s psychoid concept and Bion’s 
proto-mental concept, as depicted in the interviews, respectively, of S1(AP), S2(AP), 
S3(AP), S12(AP) on the one hand and S10(PA) on the other.   
The two concepts are similar in encompassing a deeply unconscious arena, that the 
Jungians conceived as unknowable and that S10(PA) described in terms of Freud’s 
deep unconscious, which we cannot plumb and of which not much can be known.  
The Jungians all associated the psychoid concept with an undifferentiated field, 
described in various ways, including participation mystique, and emergence.  
S10(PA) did not identify Bion’s proto-mental concept with such a field, and yet he 
described it both as a primitive matrix from which emerge or flow a lot of things and 
as those layers of the psyche lacking in organisation, which implies an area that is not 
differentiated. 
Both concepts were also described in terms of a bodymind connection, which in the 
clinical arena may generate in the analyst a bodily response in the 
countertransference.  For the Jungians, such response comes out of a unified 
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bodymind, and an emergent dynamic in an undifferentiated transference field.  For 
S10(PA), it comes out of an uncertain mechanism that might possibly be splitting and 
forcible projective identification of beta elements. 
Significantly, however, these Jungians and S10(PA) held mutually exclusive views 
concerning the effects of psychoid processes and proto-mental processes.  
For the Jungians, psychoid processes mediate between body, mind and spirit in a way 
that acts as an organising function, promoting the emergence of new positions and of 
symbolisation, as well as the integration of dissociative splits, and therefore healing.  
For S10(PA), the proto-mental arena lacks organisation and is linked with hugely 
concrete experience, as described by Hanna Segal in relation to symbolic equation.  
S10(PA) related such arena to hallucination, and bodily experience in the form of 
psychosomatic symptoms.   
Following on from this distinction, the emergent dynamic associated with psychoid 
processes is believed by the Jungians to create insight in the analyst in the service of 
the patient, whereas S10(PA) sees the lack of organisation of the proto-mental arena 
as being communicated by the patient to the analyst in a concrete and potentially 
disturbing symptomatic form.  According to his account, S10(PA) would then refer to 
Bion’s ideas concerning alpha and beta functioning for assistance with the analytic 
processing, given his belief that there is complete continuity between Bion’s ideas on 
mentalisation for groups and for individuals, and that the proto-mental concept is a 
forerunner and direct pre-cursor of his notion of beta functioning. 
Within the ambit of this thesis, it is not possible fully to explore the implications of 
this distinction, but nonetheless it is highly significant, since it implies that Jungians 
ideas about the possibility of healing dissociation through the psychoid unconscious 
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are not sufficiently developed to address the psychotic or borderline functioning that 
is often an indication of dissociation.  This will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 10 
Comparison of historical and empirical results 
 
Introduction 
This chapter compares and evaluates the results of the historical and empirical strands 
of the present project, drawing together the threads from Chapters 4-6, 8 and 9.   
A number of comparisons have been made already.  In particular, the historical strand 
has compared Jung’s psychoid concept with Bion’s proto-mental concept, and the 
empirical strand has compared symmetrical and asymmetrical models of transference 
field.   
Further, Chapter 8 has compared the empirical results with Jung’s notion of 
undifferentiation and differentiation as aspects of the individuation process, as set out 
in Chapter 5, and Chapter 9 has compared the empirical results with notions of the 
transference according to Jung and various post-Jungians, as set out in Chapter 5.  
Such comparisons have yielded the view that the symmetrical transference field 
demonstrated in the empirical study is in accord with Jung’s earlier notions of 
individuation, and the associated transference in the clinical setting, whereas the 
asymmetrical transference field demonstrated in the empirical study is not. 
In the present chapter, it is proposed to carry these comparisons further, by comparing 
the empirical results, divided according to the symmetrical and asymmetrical 
transference models, with the overall results of the historical study, especially the 
definition for the psychoid concept obtained from this.  
264 
 
 
 
It will be shown that such comparisons are sufficient to demonstrate quite 
conclusively the research finding that Jung’s psychoid concept is valid and useful and 
current in clinical practice today.   
Before proceeding with these comparisons, however, it is necessary to place the 
findings in a context, since both the historical study and the empirical study have 
been set generally against a European tradition with respect to the theory of the 
transference.  Developments elsewhere have proceeded along different paths and 
accordingly have generated alternative understandings of the transference.   
More especially, the empirical work has involved Jungians from a global base, 
whereas the psychoanalysts were all from the British Psychoanalytical Society 
(BPAS) in U.K.  Accordingly, the empirical results need to be set in the context of 
local transference models, as between different schools, Jungian and psychoanalytic, 
and different regions, Europe and elsewhere, since had the empirical study been 
carried out in an alternative geographical location, this would undoubtedly have 
influenced the findings, as discussed later in this chapter. 
The transference 
The extent and variety of approaches to the transference in analytical psychology and 
psychoanalysis today, and the complexity of the topic, mean that it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to do the subject justice, but a general appreciation of certain main 
differences is needed.   
The starting point and main source for the Jungian model of the transference is Jung’s 
original fourfold diagram (1946, par. 422).  This has not been superseded in the 
Jungian literature, even in the present: 
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Conscious 
  Analyst  Patient 
   
Analyst  Patient 
Unconscious 
The vertical arrows represent an intrapsychic link between conscious and 
unconscious, in each of analyst and patient.  The horizontal arrows represent an 
interpsychic link between them, respectively at conscious and unconscious levels.  
The diagonal arrows represent interpsychic links from the conscious of one to the 
unconscious of the other.  In each instance, the arrows represent a two-way flow.  As 
Jung (1946, par. 414) indicates, the different possibilities cannot always be kept apart, 
because they are invariably mixed up, and, especially in the initial stages of analysis, 
an unconscious identity
84
 arises.  The model is entirely symmetrical.   
In the empirical study, it was evident that this symmetrical model underpins the 
private theories of all of the Jungians interviewed for the present research, 
irrespective of their geographical location.  
The psychoanalytic literature on transference models in Europe is manifold, 
including, by way of example only, Heimann (1950), Little (1951), Money-Kyrle 
(1956), Racker (1957), Sandler (1976, 1993), and Brenman Pick (1985).  Freud’s 
initial view of the transference was that it was a hindrance to psychoanalysis and 
needed to be eliminated, although later he came round to the idea that it could be 
employed in the service of understanding the patient.  Hinshelwood (2002) gives a 
                                                 
84
 He describes this as participation mystique (1946, pars. 376, 462). 
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useful contemporary account of the different schools and their attitudes, starting with 
the designation by Heimann (1950, 81) of the countertransference as the analyst’s 
total response to the patient.  He highlights a number of different strands to be found 
in the BPAS, depending whether the aim of analysis is viewed as knowledge or as the 
creation of new patterns of relationship.  In the first instance, the countertransference 
is considered an indication of the role projected onto the analyst by the patient, and 
therefore a clue to the intrapsychic dynamics of the patient; and, in the second, the 
countertransference is considered an enactment of the analyst facilitating the creation 
of a transitional
85
 space between analyst and patient (Hinshelwood, 2002, 58-9).  In 
both cases, the countertransference is instantiated in response to projection or 
projective identification on the part of the patient.   
These hierarchical or asymmetrical models were found to underpin the views of most 
of the psychoanalysts interviewed for this project, all of whom practice in UK.  This 
is important, because different models are to be found amongst psychoanalysts in 
USA and Latin America, for example. 
In USA, the intersubjectivists, such as Renik (1993) and Ogden (1994), for whom the 
emphasis is on the subjectivity of both patient and analyst, constitute a significant 
grouping.  For them, the analyst’s subjectivity is an inherent and irreducible part of 
the analytic process.  In their transference model, patient and analyst form an 
interdependent subject and object through projective identification, constituting a 
jointly created analytic third.  Both parties contribute to a body of intersubjective 
clinical facts, including mutually created moments of meaning. 
                                                 
85
 Referring to Winnicott’s notion of a third area, the transitional space, having characteristics of me 
and not-me at the same time. 
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In Latin America, a similar model is advanced by the field theorists, including Racker 
(1953) and the Barangers (2008).  Racker proposes the existence of an 
interdependence between the phenomena of transference and countertransference, 
creating an interpersonal relationship.  He describes different forms of identification 
occurring in this unit, respectively concordant and complementary 
countertransferences.  In the former case, the analyst identifies with the patient 
through empathy and understanding, and, in the latter, the analyst also finds their own 
infantile neurosis reactivated, which may have a disturbing effect on the analytic 
process.   
The Barangers have developed an idea of the analytic situation as a dynamic field, 
including its own spatial structure, temporal structure, functional configuration, 
dynamics, and developmental aims, namely everything to do with the analytic 
process.  Their main focus of interest is the unconscious dynamic prevailing in the 
dyad, which they designate bipersonal unconscious fantasy.  “[T]he analytic couple 
depends on the process of projective identification and the unconscious phantasy of 
the bi-personal field is an interplay of projective and introjective identifications and 
counteridentifications” (Baranger & Baranger, 2008, 808).  They view such dynamic 
as participation, after Levy-Bruhl, and consequently envisage a corporeal aspect to 
the identifications, going in both directions. 
Accordingly, the transference models prevalent in USA and Latin America are closer 
to a symmetrical model as described in Chapter 9 than the European model.  None of 
the psychoanalysts interviewed for this project was located outside UK, and therefore 
it was to be expected that their views would approximate more to an hierarchical 
European model than to either of those from USA and Latin America.  This proved to 
be true. 
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These latter traditions are mentioned, however, to highlight the fact that their 
influence could have biased the results (even) more towards a mutual, symmetrical 
theoretical understanding of the transference according to Jung than was actually 
demonstrated. 
Comparisons  
1. Historical research and empirical results relating to a symmetrical field 
a. General comparison 
Referring to the historical strand of the research, Chapters 4 and 5 yielded a definition 
for Jung’s psychoid unconscious as a deeply unknowable arena, thereby limiting what 
can be said about it, and an area of undifferentiation, where psyche and soma are two 
aspects of the same unit, i.e. monistic, and self and other are in a participation 
mystique, from which the individual separates and differentiates himself in the 
process of individuation.  The historical study also envisaged a purposive, structuring 
and organising principle giving rise to psycho-physical patterns: having emergent 
properties, by which the psyche is differentiated out of the body-mind matrix and new 
individual positions come to be realised; manifesting in a symmetrical transference, in 
the synchronising of associations of analysand and analyst in terms of physiological 
and psychic facts; and symbolically linking instinct and spirit by means of instinctual 
images and archetypal images.  Finally, a vitalising function of the psychoid 
unconscious has meaning-making or dissociation-creating aspects, depending on ego 
strength. 
Turning now to the empirical strand of the research, the combined results of Chapters 
8 and 9 yielded for all of the Jungians and two of the psychoanalysts a symmetrical 
transference model including, at least during certain phases or moments of analysis, a 
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shared undifferentiated area of unconsciousness.  This model also envisaged a 
dialectic between undifferentiation and differentiation of self and other
86
, for five of 
the Jungians and two of the psychoanalysts.  Further, four of the Jungians and two of 
the psychoanalysts incorporated in their transference model notions of embodiment in 
the countertransference, and notions of a dialectic between undifferentiation and 
differentiation with respect to body and mind, which for the Jungians was needed for 
healing dissociation in the patient.  For four of the Jungians and one of the 
psychoanalysts, the empirical findings further yielded a model of analysis including 
an organising function in the unconscious combined with an emergent dynamism, 
seen as a source of meaning and imaginal material.   
The Jungians applied the term ‘psychoid’ to these models, attributing a deeply 
unknowable unconscious factor to the dynamic, but naturally enough the 
psychoanalysts did not employ the same terminology, even though their 
conceptualisations were congruent in all respects except for the deeply unknowable 
aspect (on which most of them were silent). 
Even a brief comparison of these two outcomes shows immediately that the empirical 
results match the historical ones to a very significant extent, but for closer inspection 
a table of comparison is attached as Appendix E.   
A very important aspect of this match is that not only the Jungians but two of the 
psychoanalysts offered private theories in accord with the psychoid concept. 
These empirical results are completely free of bias, in that none of the interviewees 
was led to discuss particular theory; they were simply asked to talk about a set of 
                                                 
86
 Defined here, according to Jung, as regression to unconscious states of unification of self and other 
and/or body and mind, and progression to conscious states of increasing distinction of self from other 
and/or mind from body, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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process notes and embodied clinical experience and to offer their own associations 
and conceptualisations.  The Jungians spoke, unprompted, about psychoid processes 
from their own perspective, while the psychoanalysts offered their own private 
theories on embodiment and the transference, in their own terminology.   
Significantly, this demonstrates that the psychoid concept is current and applicable 
today, for the following reasons.   
Especially, the psychoid concept was found to be relevant to present day Jungians.  It 
is familiar, incorporated in their private theories, and guides their thinking in their 
clinical work.  Specifically, S2(P), S3(AP) and S12(AP) had all incorporated it in a 
very developed and thought-through fashion to their understandings of the analytic 
process, and of the ways in which a) the analyst arrives at understanding through their 
countertransference, and b) change emerges in the analytic process.  
In other words, the psychoid concept is a prominent element of the theoretical 
thinking of the Jungian interviewees, even though Jung himself did not lay especial 
emphasis on it in his published works and thus Jungian practitioners might not be 
expected to recognise its full significance.  This in itself validates and supports Jung’s 
theory. 
More importantly, however, even though there is a substantially lower probability of 
the psychoanalysts supporting such a concept, because it is not part of their official 
language, and they have no real counterpart in their theoretical structure, nonetheless 
two of them espoused private theories concordant with the psychoid concept.  This is 
particularly significant, because it provides an unexpected confirmation of the 
validity of the psychoid concept, in the tradition of the philosophy of science as 
proposed by Popper. 
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An interesting aspect of these results, and further finding, is the manner in which the 
various clinicians had applied the notion of the symmetrical transference, and hence 
the application of the psychoid concept, to their notions of different stages of the 
analytic process and/or different moments within a session.   
For example, the private theory of S11(PA) embraced a symmetrical transference 
model applicable to certain clinical moments, arising occasionally in emotionally 
intense periods during specific sessions only.  By contrast, the private theory of 
S12(AP) incorporated a symmetrical transference model as the norm, but only after 
an initial transitional period of analysis when an asymmetrical model would be 
expected.  Thus, the work would shift from an asymmetrical model to a symmetrical 
model when it deepened.  This is something that emerged from the data analysis, but 
was not consciously manifest in their interview comments. 
Accordingly, the application of Jung’s psychoid concept to clinical work may be 
considered valid in certain clinical circumstances.   
b. Historical psychoid concept and views of S3(AP)  
Reverting to the historical strand of this research, and the discussion in Chapter 5, the 
vitalist origins of Jung’s psychoid concept in his Red Book work, his active 
imagination, and its product in his seven sermons, were discussed.  This generated a 
view of the psychoid unconscious as a deeply unknowable area of undifferentiation in 
the Pleroma, where psyche and soma are monistic, and self and other are in a 
participation mystique.  Through the Creatura, the individual differentiates himself 
out of such undifferentiation by means of a separation of, and negotiation or dialectic 
between, the opposites, in the course of individuation.  Such differentiation is assisted 
through the action of psychoid processes, which offer a pattern-creating, structuring 
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and organising principle, symbolically linking instinct and spirit by means of 
instinctual images and archetypal images, and which engender an emergent 
dynamism, lifting the psyche out of the body-mind matrix and out of the self-other 
participation, so that new individual positions come to be realised.  They also impart 
a vitalising function having meaning-making aspects.  Psychoid processes, therefore, 
have a purposive aim in driving towards individuation.   
Jung’s imaginal experimentation, and interrogation through his active imagination, 
followed by his later and ongoing theoretical conceptualisations led him to this view.   
Very interestingly, S3(AP) had incorporated elements of the seven sermons into his 
clinical understanding, with some modification according to his own private theory.  
For him, the Pleroma “is the ultimate, unknowable source from which archetypes 
emerge to foster psychological development”; and the Creatura is the personal in the 
body, “our creatureliness” where our “self is palpably felt by us in an ongoing 
experiential way” (S3(AP), I1, 9).  Through such embodied experience, the 
archetypes are “discriminated, humanized, and incarnated by the patient”.  The 
Creatura is needed to process the archetypes, so that “what they have to offer can 
become your own” (ibid., 9-10).  
As S3(AP) stated: 
[Jung] presents these two ideas, the Pleroma, out of which all the archetypes 
are constantly emerging, and the Creatura, which is the needy human 
embodied creature that has to experience things with attachments needs and 
with interdependence.  And he creates his psychology of a relation to 
emergent archetypes, which may have the capacity of building psychic 
structure, experienced by a Creatura who is still a creature, a human creature, 
very much living in what I would call the psychoid realm.  So both these 
elements of the psychoid give us a dynamics of the psychoid: The embodied 
creature with needs for attachment, and these amazing symbolic archetypes 
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that give us the opportunity to engage with them en route to building psychic 
structure.  (I2, 16) 
Accordingly, S3(AP) was directly employing Jung’s original hermeneutic, 
experiential work on the psychoid concept in his own lived theory and practice, which 
provides additional corroboration of the concept’s validity. 
c. Summary 
These results confirm Jung’s psychoid concept as currently valid and more especially 
relevant, in a definitive manner.  Not only do most of the Jungians subscribe to Jung’s 
theory, applying it in their clinical work, but also certain of the psychoanalysts 
demonstrate a similar understanding, albeit employing alternative terminology.   
It is to be noted in these results, however, that both the historical research and the 
empirical research lay emphasis on the aspect of the psychoid unconscious that 
concerns an organising function and an emergent dynamic, in other words on its 
purposive or teleological direction in individuation.  Little was offered in either strand 
concerning its relationship with pathology.   
Jacobi (1959), mentioned in the literature review, discusses how dissociation may 
result from an overwhelming of the ego by archetypal material constellated through 
the psychoid unconscious.  One of the Jungians interviewed in the empirical study 
discussed his work with borderline patients, commenting how his understanding of 
psychoid processes informs his views of the transference, which is very powerful 
with these patients, and how it assists him in addressing the difficulties of converting 
schizoid states into affective relationship by giving him a solid theoretical base.  
However, more of the Jungian interviewees, namely four of the six, focused on the 
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beneficial, purposive aspects of the psychoid concept, and certain of them even 
mentioned the healing effect of psychoid processes with respect to dissociation.   
Thus, neither the historical study nor the empirical study addressed in any detail or 
depth a potential relationship between psychoid processes and psychotic functioning.  
This leads on to the results of the empirical study relating to an asymmetrical 
transference field, as indicated below, which results proved to be psychoid-
antithetical. 
2. Historical research and empirical results relating to an asymmetrical field 
a. General comparison 
The combined empirical results of Chapters 8 and 9 from two of the Jungians and five 
of the psychoanalysts generated an asymmetrical transference model, displaying a 
hierarchical field based on projection or projective identification by the patient, 
although the views of the psychoanalysts were more developed than those of the 
Jungians.   Embodiment, mainly in the form of symptoms, was associated by the 
psychoanalysts with regression to primitive states of mind and seen as split off 
elements projected into the body of the analyst or the patient, implying a dualistic 
view of body and mind.  In this model, only one of the psychoanalysts saw 
embodiment in the countertransference as central to the analytic process. 
A comparison of the asymmetrical empirical model with the historical view of Jung’s 
psychoid concept is shown in Appendix F, and really shows how completely at 
variance the two approaches are, since the asymmetrical model is based on a 
hierarchical transference field, a dualistic approach to body and mind, splitting and 
symbolic equation, by contrast with a mutual shared field and participation mystique, 
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a monistic bodymind, and a purposive growth or individuation through symbolic 
functioning, in the case of the symmetrical model.   
It makes more sense to compare the psychoid-antithetical asymmetrical model with 
the historical definition for Bion’s proto-mental concept, as per Appendix G, since 
both envisage a hierarchical transference field based on projection or projective 
identification, splitting as a defence against anxiety, and primitive states of mind 
involving psycho-physical experience.  As shown, there is a considerable overlap 
between these two conceptualisations, apart from the two areas of: group functioning; 
and the relation of body to mind, respectively, as dualistic or monistic.   
Significantly, S10(PA) actually offered Bion’s proto-mental concept as a theoretical 
underpinning for certain forms of embodied countertransference experience, and 
therefore it is interesting to make a comparison of his understanding with the 
historical concept. 
b. Historical proto-mental concept and views of S10(PA)  
Chapter 6 provided an historical definition for Bion’s proto-mental concept, as a 
deeply unconscious matrix, where body and mind are undifferentiated.  Such matrix 
has a collective or group aspect, arising in regression to early, primitive states, when 
the individual is threatened by loss of his distinctiveness through identification with 
the group.  These states are associated with the respective basic assumptions of 
dependency, fight-flight and pairing, where splitting and projective identification, in 
attempts to rid the psyche of accretions of stimuli and persecutory objects, act as a 
defence against unbearable suffering and give rise to part-object functioning and 
bizarre objects.  Such dynamic was seen by Bion as arising in situations where 
psychotic anxiety and elements emerge, although he does indicate that proto-mental 
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phenomena are also a precursor to emotional and psychological functioning, and a 
function of all group situations, both pathological and healthy.   
In Chapter 6, it was argued that Bion’s theorising is continuous between his group 
work and his individual analytic work, so that understandings from one may be 
applied to, and thereby elaborate, understandings from the other.  Accordingly, his 
proto-mental concept may be applied to individual functioning, and his ideas on 
psychosis may be applied to his group work and his proto-mental system.  The proto-
mental arena may thereby be associated with his ideas concerning beta elements and 
the raw sensory experience of the infant, requiring metabolisation by the mother’s 
alpha function to be made manageable, as well as with his developed views on 
projective identification and psychotic functioning. 
To this theoretical view may be added some important points concerning Bion’s 
proto-mental concept, offered by S10(PA), who held an asymmetrical model of the 
transference but elaborated, in his private theory, by parameters associated with the 
proto-mental concept, since he attributed certain instances of countertransference 
symptom to proto-mental processes.   
To S10(PA), this concept represents a layer so deeply unconscious that it cannot be 
known or plumbed, in which body and mind are undifferentiated, and which applies 
as much to the individual as to the group.  He observed that the proto-mental arena 
can be understood not only by reference to Bion’s statements in Experiences in 
Groups but also through his work on alpha and beta functioning.   
Accordingly, he defined the proto-mental arena as a primitive matrix from which 
emerge or flow beta elements, and experience that manifests in a huge degree of 
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concreteness, lack of symbolisation and symbolic equation
87
 and that is associated 
with hallucination, bizarre states and psychotic functioning.   
Comparing the historical definition of Bion’s proto-mental concept with the empirical 
view of an asymmetrical transference field, combined with the observations of 
S10(PA), yields an interesting view of current thinking on the proto-mental concept, 
in which Bion’s ideas on groups and on the individual are much more integrated than 
the historical review suggests.   
This view associates the proto-mental system specifically with the transference and 
with concrete experience, hallucinations, bizarre objects, psychotic functioning, and 
symbolic equation, and thus elaborates the historical view of defensive mechanisms 
arising in the face of psychotic anxiety, bizarre objects and part-object functioning.  
Further, the contemporary view brings in Bion’s notions of alpha and beta elements, 
and thus points the way, in an asymmetrical model, towards addressing and 
overcoming proto-mental events in the consulting room.  For closer inspection, a 
table of comparison is attached as Appendix H. 
c. Summary 
Consequently, these empirical results offer an asymmetrical model for the 
transference field, which is psychoid-antithetical but which is in accord with Bion’s 
proto-mental concept.  More especially, these results generally confirm Bion’s proto-
mental concept, and in the case of S10(PA) do so specifically.   
And, in this latter instance, such confirmation demonstrates current thinking on 
Bion’s proto-mental concept to be in line with a view, discussed in Chapter 6, that his 
group work and his individual work are to be seen as continuous, or coterminous. 
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 Referring to Hanna Segal. 
278 
 
 
 
With reference to these results, it is to be noted that the emphasis on a hierarchical 
and asymmetrical transference field amongst the psychoanalysts might have been 
significantly reduced had the interviewee profile included individuals practising in 
USA or Latin America.   
Discussion 
These results demonstrate a number of points concerning current understandings of 
Jung’s psychoid concept and Bion’s proto-mental concept.   
A fundamental similarity in the two concepts resides in their assumption of a deeply 
unconscious and unknowable layer, in which body and mind are undifferentiated, and 
self and other are indistinct, and out of which organisation and consciousness arise.  
Both concepts are similar in attributing primitive states to such layer, states that have 
developmental roots with an instinctual foundation and that may manifest physically 
quite as much as psychically.  And, both concepts also embrace an individual 
concerned with psychological growth. 
However, here the similarities end.  Whilst Jung’s formulation of the psychoid 
concept permits of dissociation within its ambit, since he has written of dissociative 
states in relation to pathological conditions, such as hysteria and dementia praecox, 
and since Jacobi has noted dissociation resulting from archetypal effects swamping a 
weak or undeveloped ego, nonetheless, the bulk of Jung’s writing on this concept 
envisages a teleological ordering function associated with the archetypes and an 
emergentist dynamism.  Such dynamism is present from birth and manifests first in 
the constellation of instinctual images and later in the constellation of archetypal 
images, leading to individuation. 
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By contrast, Bion’s original formulation of the proto-mental concept touches only 
briefly on organisation, in terms of the proto-mental system serving as a precursor to 
emotional and psychological functioning.  Rather, it focuses almost entirely on 
psychotic mechanisms, including part-object modes of being and bizarre objects, 
designed to rid the psyche of accretions of stimuli and persecutory objects through 
splitting and projective identification.  Hence, an important function of Bion’s 
concept, namely its purposive intent, is defensive.  His early conceptualisations 
attribute this experience to group processes, manifesting in the individual, who is 
faced with the conflict of identifying himself with the current unconscious emotional 
state of the group or with the more sophisticated attitude of a wished for work group 
in order to develop as an individual.  His later accounts assume a group mentality in 
the individual alone and elaborate on the nature of psychotic functioning.   
As discussed in Chapter 6, this leads to a bifurcation between Jung’s psychoid 
concept and Bion’s proto-mental concept.  They have a common root in a deeply 
unconscious layer prior to the differentiation of mind from body, but diverge over 
their purposive drive.  The former is teleological and seeks wholeness in terms of 
growth and individuation, while the latter is defensive in the face of conflict over 
individual growth and consequent anxiety.   
As in the historical study, so it is in the empirical study. 
A comparison of the two concepts is useful, however, because their common root 
ensures that both provide models of a similar, unknowable, undifferentiated level of 
the unconscious, and their differences in each case highlight potential deficiencies in 
the other.   
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Whilst Jung’s psychoid concept has been demonstrated, in the present research, to be 
current and relevant in the Jungian community today, there is not such strong 
evidence from this research that the same applies to Bion’s proto-mental concept.  
The historical study has produced clear supporting evidence for the relevance of this 
concept in group and individual work, and in the theoretical thinking of clinicians, 
and the empirical strand has offered evidence from one interviewee, in particular, 
whose data is unbiased and supports the hypothesis that the proto-mental concept is 
current and relevant. 
Thus, a contemporary comparison is appropriate.  Further, it is of particular interest in 
the area of clinical application.   
Such comparison shows that the psychoid concept has lacunae, in its approach 
towards psychotic functioning, where elaboration is lacking and practical clinical 
guidance is absent.  By contrast, it is in just this area that the proto-mental concept is 
more complete in the clinical arena, being elaborated by Bion with his many papers 
on psychotic mechanisms and his notions of alpha and beta elements, and by current 
psychoanalytic practice, as evidenced by the views of S10(PA).  
Interestingly, both concepts have been found to have a purposive function applied to 
clinical practice, albeit of a completely different nature.  The psychoid concept offers 
a teleological aim directed at becoming more completely oneself in individuation, 
and, with its organising and emergentist dynamic, is thus seen inherently as 
something that mobilises integration for the patient and as an aid to clinical efficacy.  
By contrast, the purposive nature of the proto-mental concept is in its defensive 
aspect, where unmanageable and as yet undifferentiated experience is split off and 
expelled and needs to be processed and made manageable by the analyst before it can 
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be accepted by the patient.  Accordingly, in the case of the proto-mental concept, the 
emphasis is on analysing and/or interpreting the defensive nature of the dynamic, and 
on metabolising experience for the patient.   
It can be seen that the two concepts are complimentary in this respect, and that both 
offer important assistance in furthering the aims of analysis. 
Conclusion 
The primary finding of the present research falls easily out of the above comparisons, 
namely that Jung’s psychoid concept is valid, and relevant and useful in clinical work 
today.  It provides theoretical understanding of an area of clinical experience in the 
transference, where body and mind are in relation and where issues concerning early 
developmental deficits, such as trauma and separation, are prominent. 
The complementary nature of Jung’s psychoid concept and Bion’s proto-mental 
concept, both historically and empirically as discussed above, also points to the 
usefulness of Bion’s concept for addressing lacunae in Jung’s concept in the clinical 
treatment of dissociation, and the associated psychotic functioning and schizoid 
states.  Whilst such argument is primarily derived from the historical strand of the 
research, it also follows through into the empirical strand, where a significant 
proportion of the Jungian interviewees were more concerned with notions of 
organisation and emergence, while a significant proportion of the psychoanalysts 
were more concerned with splitting mechanisms and projective identification. 
The present thesis thus demonstrates, as a secondary finding, that a combined view 
furnishes a more comprehensive frame than the psychoid concept alone, for 
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understanding dynamics surrounding clinical experience of psycho-physical 
phenomena.   
These are important findings, in that they validate, clarify and advance a current 
definition for a clinically useful concept, namely the psychoid concept, in line with 
the methodology for conceptual research proposed by Dreher (2000) and modified for 
this particular piece of research, as discussed in Chapter 3.  But they are also 
significant in advancing a practical proposal for addressing and elaborating clinical 
use of the psychoid concept by reference to the proto-mental concept. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has demonstrated the findings of the present conceptual 
research, as follows: 
1. Jung’s psychoid concept is valid, and relevant and useful in clinical work 
today.  Especially, it is useful during certain periods within analysis in 
application to states that are pre-mental and unified, of which the clinical 
example employed in the interview process is one.  And, it is useful as a way 
of naming and mapping trends in the clinical process associated with these 
states, within and across sessions. 
2. Theoretically, a contemporary definition features a deeply unknowable area of 
the unconscious, where self and other are undifferentiated and in a 
participation mystique, and body and mind are undifferentiated and monistic.  
A psychoid factor is immanent as potential in the human organism and as a 
source of living meaning and imaginal life, providing a purposive, organising 
function associated with an emergent dynamism, which engenders the 
development of psyche out of the bodymind matrix, and fosters individuation. 
3. Clinically, the psychoid concept pertains to an area of experience, prior to the 
differentiation of psyche from soma, often encountered in regression to earlier 
or more primitive states, where issues concerning early developmental 
deficits, such as trauma and separation, are prominent.  It is associated with a 
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mutual or shared unconscious area in a symmetrical transference field, 
manifesting in experience of the analyst in the countertransference in events 
where body and mind are in relation, and further manifesting in analytic 
sessions in the emergence of moments of meaning, or turning points, shared 
between analyst and patient, representing change or advance in the analytic 
process. 
4. The psychoid concept, however, has lacunae in its clinical relevance, since 
theoretically it relates more to development and growth than to understandings 
of borderline conditions and psychosis.  In this regard, Bion’s proto-mental 
concept is relevant and useful, as a supplementary source of knowledge with 
regard to the nature of psychotic mechanisms. 
5. The psychoid concept and the proto-mental concept have similar roots in a 
deeply unknowable stratum of the human organism, where body and mind are 
undifferentiated and the individual is not distinct from other humans.  Both 
represent a purposive drive, respectively, towards individuation and as a 
defence. 
6. Theoretically and clinically, the proto-mental concept is associated with an 
asymmetric transference field based on projection, projective identification 
and splitting, applying especially to psychotic mechanisms, an area fully 
documented by Bion and in the psychoanalytic literature, as evidenced in both 
the historical and the empirical strands of this project.  
7. The asymmetrical transference model is thus psychoid-antithetical, but it 
offers complementary features that are of assistance in the understanding and 
treatment of borderline conditions and psychosis. 
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These are important findings, in that they validate a clinically useful concept, namely 
the psychoid concept, and they clarify and advance a current definition for that 
concept, associated with a particular symmetrical transference field.  They are also 
significant in advancing a practical proposal for addressing and elaborating clinical 
use of the psychoid concept by reference to the proto-mental concept. 
The present chapter now evaluates the present research, noting avenues of interest 
opened up by the research, and other benefits, as well as limitations of the research, 
and, finally, possible future directions for further research.  
Research significance 
Apart from the specific findings outlined in previous chapters and above, this project 
has important ramifications for the psychoanalytic field, addressing as it does a 
clinical area of psycho-physical experience, previously covered by a Babel of 
theories, paucity of descriptive language, and considered by at least some clinicians 
as taboo.  It charts the overall topography, clarifying the parameters involved, within 
a locus that is historical, contextual and empirical.  In so doing, it has opened up an 
area of psychoanalysis, in a grounded, practical fashion, to much needed discussion, 
and it has also touched on a number of areas of significant interest. 
The methodology for the project has been based on the proposal for conceptual 
research by Dreher (2000), starting from a historical study combined with an 
empirical study applied to Jung’s psychoid concept, but modified, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, by investigating the concept against a wide historical background of 
cultural developments in the twentieth century to the present day, rather than in a 
narrow historical psychoanalytic context, and by interrogating the concept through 
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expert interviews, based on clinical practice rather than theoretical discussion.  The 
investigation of both strands has been enlivening and informative. 
The historical study has considered the psychoid concept from a variety of different 
contextual angles surrounding the evolution of psychoanalytic theory and practice, 
including: the history of ideas; the history of attitudes towards experimentation, 
research and admissible forms of evidence; and different cultural events and milieux.  
Particularly, this study has, respectively, set the psychoid concept against a vitalist 
background, and against the debate concerning the scientific and hermeneutic 
conceptions of psychoanalysis.  Remarkably, Jung contributed to the 
science/hermeneutics debate quite explicitly from both sides, as discussed in Chapter 
5, since he began a scientific tradition of psychoanalytic research, founded in his 
WATs and the discovery of complexes, and later initiated another, hermeneutic, 
tradition, with his self-experimentation and active imagination in his Red Book work 
and subsequent conceptualisations of the archetypes and the psychoid unconscious.   
The empirical study has addressed the very interesting area of the implicit or private 
theories of the clinician, and their relationship with theory.  This is something that has 
been much more fully researched by the psychoanalysts than by the Jungians, as 
discussed in Chapter 7 on implicit theories.  It is interesting, however, to note that 
whilst the psychoanalysts have published a number of studies on this topic, 
addressing the nature of implicit theories and methods for researching them, there are 
very few publications offering examples of individual implicit theories under the 
microscope, or actually scrutinising implicit theories in practice
88
.  This limits the 
available understandings of the nature of such theories, as well as the possibility for 
                                                 
88
 Tuckett (2008), whilst acknowledging the existence of implicit theories, sets out to investigate rather 
the question of analysts’ explanatory models for analysis, enquiring how does analysis work? 
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evaluating their pertinence to the psychoanalytic method, their influence on 
psychoanalytic efficacy, and any need for adjustment, individually or collectively, in 
the face of such situation.   
One author addressing this area is Hamilton (1996), who conducted a study of 
analysts’ interpretive practices, focusing on their preconscious models for various 
psychoanalytic concepts, most especially the transference.  She interviewed 65 
analysts in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and London, using semi-directed 
interviews, and analysed the results in an attempt to “systematize the beliefs and 
actions that are typical of practising American and British psychoanalysts today” 
(ibid., 2).  Her aim was to obtain generalised theoretical profiles amongst groups of 
analysts linked by affiliation, rather than to track closely particular implicit theories in 
individual clinicians, although she noted as her project progressed that analysts are 
guided preconsciously by many dimensions and tend to practice much more loosely 
than some publicly claim (ibid., 3-4). 
The present project, by contrast, sought to understand the actual private theories of a 
specific set of individuals, in relation to a quite specific type of clinical event, and 
then and only then to generalise from these individual private theories to a common 
model for the type of event, independently of theoretical affiliation, for interrogating 
a specific concept.  The result is a much more detailed account of particular private 
theories, associated with a much more focused area.   
One of the issues that the project especially brings out is how discrepant is the 
relationship between theory and clinical practice.  The disparity between theory and 
clinical practice is significant.  To deal with this discrepancy, it was necessary to 
devise a methodological instrument for use in the interviews, to make possible the 
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tracking and isolation of private theory in practice.  The research instrument devised 
here has proved equal to this task, and furthermore is reproducible, not only in a 
repetition of the present research, but also in other similar situations, where it is 
desired to research other particular clinical concepts through expert interviews.  This 
yields an important additional benefit of the research.  
Even more interestingly, and unexpectedly, it turned out that the private theories of 
certain individuals from differing theoretical traditions were more similar than the 
private theories of other individuals from the same theoretical traditions.  Apart from 
the validation of the psychoid concept that this led to in the present instance, there is 
clearly scope for consideration as to why such a situation arises, and as to what 
conclusions are to be derived from it, in terms of the evolution and current state of the 
psychoanalytic field.  Advantageously, therefore, the present kind of empirical study 
could form a fruitful basis for dialogue between different groupings from the 
psychoanalytic field, both as to the nature of theory, public and private, and as to the 
nature and professional parameters of clinical practice.  
Confirmation of the validity of the psychoid concept, and its association with a 
symmetrical transference field, was one aspect only of the research results.  It also 
became apparent from the hermeneutic aspect of the historical study, and more 
especially from the empirical study, that the psychoid unconscious is a process-
oriented concept applicable to individual human development throughout life, and 
applicable also to the development, and efficacy, of the analytic method in any 
individual case.   
More especially, a further outcome of the present study is the finding that the 
psychoid concept can be seen as a methodology, representing a process of 
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individuation, arising in analysis through a dialectic between undifferentiation and 
differentiation, linked with an emergent dynamic having an imaginal dimension 
represented in the transcendent function, and with analytic progress.  The account by 
S2(AP) in the empirical study effectively demonstrated that this analyst was 
employing such methodology himself in his own analytic work.  Thus, the psychoid 
concept also has a methodological significance in its own right, whether applied to 
individual analytic sessions for gauging the current state of the session or the 
analysis, or whether applied to the progress of the analysis as a whole.   
The study has also had a comparative aspect, setting the psychoid concept against 
different theoretical traditions and clinical approaches within the psychoanalytic field, 
both historically and contemporaneously, taking account of the fact that 
psychoanalytic theory is in a state of constant evolution.  These comparisons, between 
Jung and Freud, Jung and Bion, post-Jungians and post-Freudians, have yielded 
interesting counterpoints, both from early psychoanalytic theorizing and from 
contemporary psychoanalytic practice.   
One result is the discovery as to how different were the early methodologies of Freud 
and Jung, in spite of apparent agreement between them according to the popular 
literature.  By contrast, the historical study showed areas of theoretical agreement 
between Jung and Bion, in spite of considerable overall differences, respectively, in 
the contextual development of their psychoid and proto-mental concepts.  Finally, as 
mentioned above, the empirical work demonstrated, not surprisingly, that individuals 
and groups from the same theoretical tradition do not always hold similar viewpoints, 
and, more unexpectedly, that similarities are to be found between individuals and 
groups from different theoretical affiliations.   
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Research limitations  
A few more points need to be addressed.  The project has necessarily been limited by 
a number of factors, not the least of which is that it is the work of a single researcher 
only, within the ambit of a PhD study, and this affects the methodology, the range of 
the investigation, and the amount of qualitative data that can be collected and 
analysed. 
Most of the earlier studies into psychoanalytic concepts
89
, and implicit or private 
theories, have been generalised researches conducted by groups of researchers, 
making verification by group consensus a possible validation instrument and 
increasing the potential depth and/or range of the investigation.  Tuckett (2008), 
addressing the question of the analyst’s explanatory models for analysis, falls into this 
category.  Such verification has not been possible here, but it is believed that this 
need not be an issue in this, more focused and less ambitious, investigation.  An 
advantage of an individual study is that group dynamics do not have to be taken into 
account in the methodology and in the analysis of the data, although safeguards 
against individual bias do need to be introduced.   
In the present conceptual research, these safeguards have been achieved by: firstly, 
undertaking comparisons repeatedly throughout both the historical and the empirical 
strands, for continually scrutinising, reflecting on, and tightening, definitions; 
secondly, utilising an interview technique as a methodological instrument in the 
empirical strand that seeks understanding by two minds working together at the limits 
of their knowledge to understand clinical events metaphorically, as proposed by 
Fonagy (2003, 2008); and, thirdly, employing grounded theory for the data analysis, a 
                                                 
89
 With the exception of Hamilton, mentioned above. 
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technique whereby the data leads the results to generate private theories for the 
clinicians concerned, which can later be compared with definitions obtained from the 
historical study.   
Likewise, the sample size for the interviews has been limited.  However, by selecting 
a range of interviewees from different theoretical traditions and orientations, and 
making comparisons between them, using the methodological instrument designed 
for the project, a clear and reproducible, and therefore believed satisfactory, result has 
been obtained, although it is acknowledged that a more complete overall account of 
models for the transference field and for countertransference embodiment would have 
been obtained by extending the range of interviewees from the BPAS or by 
additionally selecting interviewees from USA and Latin America.   
Since the empirical investigation contemplates the private theories of the 
interviewees, it follows that their references to public theory may be neither 
consistent nor at times accurate.  A query may then be raised as to whether these 
interviewees thus diminish their credibility or distort their results, if their references 
to public theory turn out to be inaccurate.  In response, it is pointed out that the 
empirical study seeks to conceptualise certain clinical experience, when body and 
mind are in relation, and starts from this point and not from public theory.  The 
exercise did not aim to obtain direct accounts of any public theory, but rather to 
understand how clinicians conceptualised their clinical experience in a private theory.  
In such exercise, it is of greater interest what the private theory is, than whether it is 
an accurate reflection of any particular public theory.   
The present study thus sought to encapsulate and compare private theories relating to 
certain psycho-physical clinical events, whatever the nature of those private theories, 
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and only thereafter to compare the private theories extracted with one particular 
public theory, in order to interrogate, and possibly expand, the definition of that 
public theory.  Hence, the accuracy or otherwise of particular assimilations of public 
theory was not the issue.  It might have been, had the exercise started from public 
theory and had the interviewees been requested to talk about such theory directly, 
when their knowledge and understanding of the theory and its application would have 
mattered. 
It is accordingly believed that the present project has provided a satisfactory 
investigatory and validation methodology for an individual researcher in the 
conceptual field.   
Next, basing the research on the use of one set of process notes only, in the interview 
process, might be criticised.  Here, it is to be reiterated that this is not a single case 
study: the process notes are not the research data but are merely an interview tool, to 
assist the interviewees to associate freely around the research topic of embodiment in 
the consulting room, akin to the questions employed in semi-structured interviews.  
Further, to have expanded the interview process by including more than one set of 
process notes for different analytic sessions in the same case would have pinned the 
subject down, and would have rendered it harder for the interviewees to avoid a 
supervisory stance.  And, to have included more than one case would have 
overloaded the interviews.  Actually, where interviewees wanted to illustrate 
particular points not forthcoming from the process notes offered, they advanced their 
own clinical examples freely, although these have not been cited in detail in this 
thesis for reasons of confidentiality. 
Accordingly, such criticism would be irrelevant. 
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Turning to the question of evidence and the weight of the evidence relating to the 
different concepts, psychoid and proto-mental, it is acknowledged that the historical 
study has devoted less attention to the proto-mental concept, and the empirical study 
has covered it less fully in the interviewees’ responses.  The initial aim of the project 
was a conceptual study of the psychoid concept, and the primary research findings 
have been confined to this concept, its validity and its usefulness, and thus it is 
appropriate that this concept should have received the attention and that the 
methodology herein should focus on this concept.   
The proto-mental concept, having an apparent similarity with the psychoid concept, 
was brought in initially only as an instrument of comparison, in order to refine the 
definitions for the psychoid concept, and not as an object of study in its own right.  
This refinement it achieved, in isolating the fact that the psychoid concept is deficient 
in its delineation of psychotic mechanisms.  It was only subsequently that it became 
apparent that there was merit in consulting the proto-mental concept for making good 
these deficiencies, as a secondary finding.  At that point, the benefits of conducting an 
additional conceptual study into the proto-mental concept became apparent, but the 
study was far advanced and it was considered more important to ensure that the 
psychoid study was completed fully and in detail.  Although these are secondary 
findings of the present research only, a complete conceptual study of the proto-mental 
concept would have enhanced the current results.   
To some extent, this deficiency is mitigated by Torres (2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c), 
who has investigated the proto-mental concept more fully, both historically and 
empirically.  However, his research was undertaken with respect to social conditions 
and not with respect to individual psycho-physical functioning.  Extending the 
present study, by further investigation of the proto-mental concept, both historically 
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and empirically, by interviewing further clinicians known to have a leaning towards 
Bion’s theory, and by setting the proto-mental concept in the context of Bion’s 
overall opus, would have strengthened the secondary findings of the present research. 
Future directions 
Apart from the research benefits and limitations, discussed above, a number of 
extremely interesting avenues of possible future research became apparent in the 
course of this study, avenues which could not be investigated within the present 
project, either for want of time or for divergence of focus.  Some of these avenues 
would have extended the present research and some of them would have branched out 
and taken it in new directions. 
Most particularly, given further time and/or resources, expansion of the investigation 
of the psychoid concept into other avenues, or by other techniques, might be 
considered.  For example, an expansion of the historical strand of the present thesis, 
by further investigation of the phenomenological background to and influences on 
Jung’s thinking in his development of the concept, particularly in the French tradition 
of philosophy, including Bergson and others, would pay dividends.  Jung’s interest in 
philosophers of this tradition, such as Bergson, is already known and is discussed in 
Chapter 6, including early overlap of the circles of these two men through the Society 
for Psychical Research.  However, little has been written about the phenomenology of 
Jung’s ideas, other than by Gunter (1982), who compares Jung and Bergson, and 
Brooke (1991), who contemplates Jung as a phenomenologist, and considers it 
necessary to see him as such in order fully to understand his work.  The psychoid 
concept is fundamentally phenomenological in nature, with its emphasis on the 
relation of body and mind, and on manifestations of this relation, and would benefit 
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from such a lens.  It would be very interesting, therefore, to study more fully the 
influence of Bergson and the other French phenomenologists on Jung, on his work 
generally and on his psychoid concept in particular, and to consider thereby the 
implications of such influence.   
In a still further extension of this avenue, a comparison of Jung’s notion of the ethical 
Self, as an offshoot of his psychoid concept, with the ideas of Husserl and the 
phenomenologists would offer an expanded understanding of Jung’s work, and its 
professional application to the clinical arena. 
Turning to another aspect of the present study that has not been fully explored, 
namely the area of synchronicity, this was omitted from the present study, as has been 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the introduction and the literature review, because of 
differences of scientific foundation and origin, conceptual differences, and 
complexity of the links with the psychoid concept, needing the present study before it 
could be considered.  It would be very interesting to repeat the conceptual 
investigation of this project, employing a similar methodology, applied to this 
alternative strand of Jung’s psychoid concept, and then to compare the findings with 
those of the present study.   
As well as the possibility of extending this study to embrace synchronicity by 
employing a similar method, there is a further aspect to consider, in that the 
interesting question of a foundation of the psychoid concept in biology, based on the 
experimentation of Hans Driesch with sea urchins, or in quantum physics, based on 
Jung’s discussions with Wolfgang Pauli, has not been fully settled.  Although both 
Haule (2010/2011) and Gieser (2005) mention this issue, neither really resolves it.  A 
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study of this particular question, by reference to Jung’s original sources and to 
contemporary scientific knowledge would be of particular interest. 
From a more contemporary point of view, the research might also be extended into an 
investigation into the basis in neuroscience for Jung’s psychoid concept.  This was in 
fact actually contemplated as a base at the outset of the present project, but felt to be 
premature without first having completed a conceptual study based on Dreher’s 
notion of conceptual research and including an historical understanding. 
Furthermore, one of the interesting findings of the present research has been the 
lacunae in the locus of Jung’s psychoid concept.  A more complete study of the 
overlap in conceptualisation between Jung’s psychoid concept, and Bion’s proto-
mental concept, as well as the respective or common influences on the two men, and 
potentially of one on the other, would be interesting.  Such investigation would 
advantageously also compare Jung’s psychoid concept with a combination of Bion’s 
proto-mental concept, as applicable to psychotic functioning, and his other ideas, such 
as his notion of ‘O’, the unknowable and numinous thing-in-itself. 
In a different area, the methodological instrument designed for the present project is 
reproducible, and could readily be applied to the investigation by an individual 
researcher of other clinical concepts, and this is a very important future avenue of 
research. 
Endnotes 
Apart from the quite specific findings of the present research, primarily delineating 
and validating Jung’s psychoid concept in its application to clinical work today, and 
secondarily proposing an extension of its ambit by reference to Bion’s proto-mental 
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concept in relation to psychotic processes, there has been another interesting outcome 
of the research, which is in itself totally unexpected.  That is the effect that the 
research has had on this researcher.   
Commencing the research as someone who saw analysis as a vocation, and therefore 
something to be experienced and practiced rather than scrutinised, and who was 
therefore somewhat doubtful about the merits of research into clinical work, a 
conversion has taken place over the duration of the project.  The research work has 
very noticeably deepened the clinical analytic practice of this researcher, profoundly 
altering the way that embodied states in both patient and analyst are viewed and 
addressed, and extending the range and stability of the researcher’s analytic capacity.  
In part, this is due to the richness and transformational experience of interviewing 
senior clinicians of differing persuasion and seeking to understand their clinical 
approaches, but in part it is simply due to the disciplined experience of researching, 
interrogating, and thoroughly digesting research data in the pursuit of knowledge.  In 
the completion of this project, therefore, this researcher has become fully committed 
to psychoanalytic research. 
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Appendix A 
Comparison of discussion vertices with Canestri and Tuckett 
 
 
Comparison with Canestri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[How to relate to the 
phenomena – a form of 
object relations of 
knowledge vector] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Conceptual vector 
including 
developmental theory] 
 
 
 
 
[Implicit plus explicit 
theorisation vector] 
 
[Structural or 
topographical vector] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Action vector] 
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of the 
phenomena 
themselves 
The unconscious 
origins of the 
phenomena 
The analytic 
theory that best 
describes the 
phenomena 
The clinical 
meaning of the 
phenomena  
The analytic 
response to the 
phenomena 
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Comparison with Tuckett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[What’s wrong?  Describe 
the elements that 
constitute the presenting 
problem] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[How analysis works] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[The analytic situation] 
 
[Listening to the 
unconscious] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Furthering the process] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The nature of the 
sensory 
phenomena 
themselves 
The unconscious 
origins of the 
phenomena 
The analytic 
theory that best 
describes the 
phenomena 
The clinical 
meaning of the 
phenomena  
The analytic 
response to the 
phenomena 
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Appendix B 
Comparison of ‘psychoid’ and ‘proto-mental’ definitions from historical study 
 
 
Historical ‘psychoid’ definition 
 
Historical ‘proto-mental’ definition 
 
An area of undifferentiation, where self 
and other are in a participation mystique 
 
And psyche and soma are monistic 
 
 
From which the individual differentiates 
himself in the process of individuation 
 
 
A psychosomatic matrix having a group 
aspect 
 
Where body and mind are 
undifferentiated 
 
Experienced in the individual faced with 
the conflict of identifying himself with 
the current unconscious emotional state 
of a basic assumption group or with  the 
more sophisticated attitude of a wished 
for work group in order to develop as an 
individual 
 
 
A purposive, structuring and organising 
principle giving rise to psychic patterns: 
 
 
(a) Having emergent properties, by 
which the psyche is differentiated out 
of the body-mind matrix and new 
individual positions come to be 
realised 
 
 
(b) Manifesting in a symmetrical 
transference, in the synchronising of 
associations of analysand and analyst 
in terms of physiological and psychic 
facts 
 
 
 
(c) Symbolically linking instinct and 
spirit by means of instinctual and 
archetypal images 
 
 
 
A precursor to emotional and 
psychological functioning, and having a 
purposive function as defensive: 
 
(a) In primitive states, where psychotic 
anxiety emerges and part-object 
functioning and bizarre objects 
prevail  
 
 
 
(b) Manifesting in an asymmetrical 
transference, where splitting and 
projective identification are 
employed to rid the psyche of 
accretions of stimuli and persecutory 
objects; 
 
 
(c) As a defence against unbearable 
suffering of an instinctual nature 
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A vitalising function having meaning-
making/dissociation-creating aspects, 
depending on ego strength 
 
 
An arena displaying fragmentation and 
meaninglessness 
 
A deeply unknowable arena, thereby 
limiting what can be said about it 
 
 
A deeply unknowable unconscious 
matrix 
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Appendix C 
Data Analysis Tables 
 
 
       
 
Vignette as  Symmetr. Undiffn. Undiffn.  Turning  Moment of 
 
transfer. field self/other body/mind point meaning 
       S1(AP) Y Y Y Y 
  S2(AP) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
S3(AP) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
S4(AP) Y Im Im Im 
  S5(AP) Y Y Y QY Y Y 
S6(PA) Y 
  
QY 
  S7(PA) Y Im 
 
Im 
  S8(PA) Y Im QY 
 
Y Y 
S9(PA) Y Y Y Im Im Y 
S10(PA) N 
  
Y 
  S11(PA) Y Y Y Im 
 
Y 
S12(AP) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
 
       
 
Vignette as Asymmetr. Proj./proj. Prim. states Developt. Regression 
 
deepening field identn. of mind 
  
       S1(AP) Y Y Y 1 Y Y 
S2(AP) Y 
 
1 
 
QY 
 S3(AP) Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 S4(AP) Y 
   
QY 
 S5(AP) Y 
 
1 
 
1 4 
S6(PA) Y Im Y Y Y 
 S7(PA) Y QY Y 
 
Y Y 
S8(PA) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
S9(PA) Y 
  
Y QY Y 
S10(PA) N Y Y 
 
Y N 
S11(PA) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
S12(AP) Y QY QY 
 
Y 
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Teleological Emergence Symbolic Embodied Embodied Embodied 
 
organis. fn. 
 
fn. c-t central c-t - image c-t symptm. 
       S1(AP) 
 
2 Y Y Y Y 
S2(AP) Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
S3(AP) Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
S4(AP) 
  
Y Y Y Y 
S5(AP) Y Y Y N N N 
S6(PA) 
  
Y N N Y 
S7(PA) 
  
Y N Y Y 
S8(PA) 
  
Y N Y Y 
S9(PA) Im Y Y N 
 
Y 
S10(PA) 
  
Y N N Y 
S11(PA) 
   
Y Y Y 
S12(AP) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
 
 
       
 
Enactment Dissocn. Splitting Relation Here &  Progress 
    
as central now emerges 
       S1(AP) 
  
4 Y 
  S2(AP) 
 
Y Y Im 
  S3(AP) 
 
Y 
 
Y 
  S4(AP) 
      S5(AP) 1 
  
Y 
  S6(PA) 
  
Y Im 
 
Y 
S7(PA) Y 
 
Y Y 
  S8(PA) Y Y Y Y QY Y 
S9(PA) Y 
  
Y 
  S10(PA) Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 S11(PA) Y 
  
Y 
 
Y 
S12(AP) 
 
Y 
 
Im 
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Jung Archetypal Psychoid Unknowab. Synchrony. Undiffn. 
      
mind/matt. 
       S1(AP) Y 
 
Y Y 
  S2(AP) Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
S3(AP) Y Y Y Y Y 
 S4(AP) Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 S5(AP) Y QY QY 
 
QY QY 
S6(PA) 
      S7(PA) 1 
     S8(PA) 
      S9(PA) 
      S10(PA) 7 
  
Y 
  S11(PA) 
      S12(AP) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
        
 
 
       
 
Klein/ α and β Protomentl. 
   
 
Bion fn 
    
       S1(AP) Y 
 
1 
   S2(AP) Y Y 
    S3(AP) 
      S4(AP) 
      S5(AP) 
      S6(PA) QY 
     S7(PA) 2 
     S8(PA) Y Y 
    S9(PA) 
      S10(PA) Y Y Y 
   S11(PA) Y Y 
    S12(AP) 
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Index of abbreviations 
  Y Yes, from personal belief/experience 
N No, from personal belief/experience 
Im Generally implied but not clearly stated 
Q Interviewee qualifies and/or expresses reservations 
Integer x Number of times mentioned, but not leading to a conclusion 
Blank Not addressed and/or indeterminate from interview 
   
Caveat 
Most of the entries in the above chart are products of the data analysis, rather than specific 
statements by the Interviewees, and are therefore subject to interpretation. 
Where entries need qualification or explanation, this is included in the overall data analysis 
chapters. 
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Appendix D 
Comparison of features of symmetrical and asymmetrical models from empirical 
study 
(Acknowledging that private theories may embrace both models, either 
consistently under differing clinical circumstances or inconsistently) 
 
 
Empirical symmetrical transference 
(Listing interviewees referring) 
Empirical asymmetrical transference 
(Listing interviewees referring) 
 
An undifferentiated unconscious self-
other field, which is mutual and 
symmetrical 
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), 
S12(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
 
An undifferentiated, monistic bodymind 
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA), S11(PA) 
 
 
Needed for healing a dissociation in the 
patient 
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), S11(PA)) 
 
 
An unconscious field for self and other, 
which is based on projection and 
projective identification and which is 
hierarchical 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
A dualistic approach to body and mind 
(S5(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
 
 
Wherein splitting is a key dynamic 
(S2(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
 
An organising function in the 
unconscious associated with pivotal 
moments or turning points and associated 
with:  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP)) 
 
 
 
 
(a) An emergent dynamism  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
 
(b) A symmetrical transference model 
envisaging an embodied 
countertransference  
 
A model envisaging unconscious conflict 
or deficit with interpretation through 
relationship or in the here-and-now as the 
means to make this conscious, associated 
with: 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
(a) Gradually emerging progress  
(S6(PA), S8(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
 
(b) An asymmetrical transference model 
envisaging embodiment in the 
countertransference 
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(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
Having a developmental aspect  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S7(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
(c) A source of imaginal material  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
Having a developmental aspect 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
(c) Symbolic equation 
(S6(PA), S7(PA), S10(PA)) 
 
 
A source of meaning 
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
 
Meaning resides in authenticity or 
relationship 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S11(PA)) 
 
 
A psychoid unconscious is ultimately 
unknowable  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S4(AP), 
S12(AP)) 
 
A psychoid factor is responsible for all of 
the above features  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP)) 
 
 
A proto-mental unconscious that is 
ultimately unknowable 
(S10(PA)) 
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Appendix E 
Comparison of ‘psychoid’ definition from historical study, and features of 
symmetrical model from empirical study 
 
 
Historical ‘psychoid’ definition 
 
Empirical symmetrical transference 
(Listing interviewees referring) 
 
An area of undifferentiation, where self 
and other are in a participation mystique 
 
 
 
 
And psyche and soma are monistic 
 
 
 
 
From which the individual differentiates 
himself in the process of individuation. 
 
 
An undifferentiated unconscious area, 
which is mutual and symmetrical 
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), 
S12(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
An undifferentiated, monistic bodymind 
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA), S11(PA) 
 
 
Needed for healing a dissociation in the 
patient 
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), S11(PA)) 
 
 
A purposive, structuring and organising 
principle giving rise to psychic patterns: 
 
 
 
(a) Having emergent properties, by 
which the psyche is differentiated 
out of the body-mind matrix and new 
individual positions come to be 
realised 
 
(b) Manifesting in a symmetrical 
transference, in the synchronising of 
associations of analysand and analyst 
in terms of physiological and 
psychic facts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An organising function in the unconscious 
associated with pivotal moments or 
turning points and associated with:  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP)) 
 
(a) An emergent dynamism  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
 
 
(b) A symmetrical transference model  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), 
S12(AP), S7(PA), S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
With embodied countertransference  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
Having a developmental aspect  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP), 
S7(PA), S11(PA)) 
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(c) Symbolically linking instinct and 
spirit by means of instinctual and 
archetypal images  
 
 
(c) A source of imaginal material  
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
 
A vitalising function having meaning-
making/dissociation-creating aspects, 
depending on ego strength 
 
 
A source of meaning 
(S2(AP), S3(AP), S5(AP), S12(AP), 
S9(PA)) 
 
 
A deeply unknowable arena, thereby 
limiting what can be said about it 
 
 
A psychoid unconscious is ultimately 
unknowable  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S4(AP), 
S12(AP)) 
 
A psychoid factor is responsible for all of 
the above features  
(S1(AP), S2(AP), S3(AP), S12(AP)) 
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Appendix F 
Comparison of ‘psychoid’ definition from historical study, and features of 
asymmetrical model from empirical study 
 
 
Historical ‘psychoid’ definition 
 
Empirical asymmetrical transference 
(Listing interviewees referring) 
 
An area of undifferentiation, where self 
and other are in a participation mystique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And psyche and soma are monistic 
 
 
 
 
From which the individual differentiates 
himself in the process of individuation 
 
 
An unconscious field for self and other, 
which is based on projection and 
projective identification and which is 
hierarchical 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
A dualistic approach to body and mind 
(S5(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
 
 
Wherein splitting is a key dynamic 
(S2(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
 
A purposive, structuring and organising 
principle giving rise to psychic patterns, 
associated with: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Emergent properties, by which the 
psyche is differentiated out of the 
body-mind matrix and new individual 
positions come to be realised 
 
 
(b) A symmetrical transference model, in 
the synchronising of associations of 
analysand and analyst in terms of 
physiological and psychic facts 
 
 
 
A model envisaging unconscious conflict 
or deficit with interpretation through 
relationship or in the here-and-now as 
the means to make this conscious, 
associated with: 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
(a) Gradually emerging progress  
(S6(PA), S8(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
 
 
(b) An asymmetrical transference model 
envisaging embodiment in the 
countertransference 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Symbolical linking of instinct and 
spirit by means of instinctual and 
archetypal images 
 
Having a developmental aspect 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
(c) Symbolic equation 
(S6(PA), S7(PA), S10(PA)) 
 
 
A vitalising function having meaning-
making/dissociation-creating aspects, 
depending on ego strength 
 
 
Meaning resides in authenticity or 
relationship 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S11(PA)) 
 
 
A deeply unknowable arena, thereby 
limiting what can be said about it 
 
 
A proto-mental unconscious that is 
ultimately unknowable 
(S10(PA)) 
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Appendix G 
Comparison of ‘proto-mental’ definition from historical study, and features of 
asymmetrical model from empirical study 
 
 
Historical ‘proto-mental’ definition 
 
Empirical asymmetrical transference 
(Listing interviewees referring) 
 
A psychosomatic matrix having a group 
aspect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where body and mind are 
undifferentiated 
 
 
Experienced in the individual faced with 
the conflict of identifying himself with 
the current unconscious emotional state 
of a basic assumption group or with the 
more sophisticated attitude of a wished 
for work group, in order to develop as an 
individual 
 
A precursor to emotional and 
psychological functioning 
 
An unconscious field for self and other, 
which is hierarchical 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
And which envisages embodiment in the 
countertransference 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
A dualistic approach to body and mind 
(S5(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
 
A model envisaging unconscious conflict 
or deficit with interpretation through 
relationship or in the here-and-now as the 
means to make this conscious 
(S1(AP), S12(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), 
S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
Development resides in meaning arising 
through authenticity or relationship 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S11(PA)) 
  
Progress gradually emerges  
(S6(PA), S8(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
Manifesting in an asymmetrical 
transference, where splitting and 
projective identification are employed to 
rid the psyche of accretions of stimuli 
and persecutory objects 
 
 
 
Manifesting in an asymmetrical 
transference, which is based on projection 
and projective identification and wherein 
splitting is a key dynamic 
(S2(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA)) 
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In primitive states, where psychotic 
anxiety emerges and part-object 
functioning and bizarre objects prevail  
 
 
As a defence against unbearable 
suffering of an instinctual nature 
 
Having a developmental aspect 
(S1(AP), S6(PA), S7(PA), S8(PA), 
S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
Requiring containment for anxiety 
(S8(PA), S10(PA), S11(PA)) 
 
 
An arena displaying fragmentation and 
meaninglessness 
 
Symbolic equation is prominent 
(S6(PA), S7(PA), S10(PA)) 
 
 
A deeply unknowable unconscious 
matrix 
 
A proto-mental unconscious that is 
ultimately unknowable 
(S10(PA)) 
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Appendix H 
Comparison of ‘proto-mental’ definitions from historical and empirical studies 
 
 
Historical ‘proto-mental’ definition Empirical ‘proto-mental’ definition 
from S10(PA) 
 
A psychosomatic matrix having a group 
aspect 
 
Where body and mind are 
undifferentiated 
 
Experienced in the individual faced with 
the conflict of identifying himself with 
the current unconscious emotional state 
of a basic assumption group or with the 
more sophisticated attitude of a wished 
for work group in order to develop as an 
individual 
 
 
A primitive matrix, where experience is 
concrete  
 
Where body and mind are 
undifferentiated 
 
Having a group aspect and an individual 
aspect, both in the sense that Bion’s ideas 
on groups and the individual are 
continuous and in the sense that the 
individual has a group mentality  
 
A precursor to emotional and 
psychological functioning, and having a 
purposive function as defensive: 
 
 
 
(a) In primitive states, where psychotic 
anxiety emerges and part-object 
functioning and bizarre objects 
prevail  
 
 
(b) Manifesting in an asymmetrical 
transference, where splitting and 
projective identification are employed 
to rid the psyche of accretions of 
stimuli and persecutory objects 
 
 
 
(c) As a defence against unbearable 
suffering of an instinctual nature 
 
Linked with Bion’s notions of alpha and 
beta functioning, by which raw sensory 
experience in the form of beta elements 
is transformed into psychic experience by 
alpha functioning: 
 
(a) Associated with psychotic 
functioning, hallucinations and 
bizarre objects 
 
 
 
(b) Manifesting in an asymmetrical 
transference, where splitting and 
projective identification are 
employed to rid the psyche of 
accretions of stimuli and persecutory 
objects 
 
 
(c) Which the patient does not want to 
feel, know about or have back, in any 
shape or form 
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An arena displaying fragmentation and 
meaninglessness 
 
An arena without symbolisation or 
organisation, where Segal’s symbolic 
equation prevails 
 
 
A deeply unknowable unconscious matrix 
 
A deeply unknowable layer of the 
unconscious, that cannot be plumbed 
 
 
 
 
